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ABSTRACT 
Negli ultimi dieci anni, per effetto di alcune fondamentali ed innovative pronunce 
giurisprudenziali della Corte di Giustizia europea, è stato riconosciuto il diritto dei 
soggetti privati, danneggiati da illeciti concorrenziali, di ottenere il ristoro dei danni 
subiti.   
La giurisprudenza comunitaria ha introdotto, così, accanto al c.d. public enforcement 
inerente l’attività svolta da parte della Commissione Europea e delle Autorità di 
Concorrenza nazionali, la possibilità per i privati di promuovere azioni basate sulla 
violazione degli articoli 101 e 102 del Trattato dell’Unione Europea (“TFUE”) o delle 
corrispondenti norme nazionali (c.d. private enforcement).   
In verità, ad oggi, la maggior parte delle vittime di cartelli e di collusioni non ha, 
comunque,  ottenuto indennizzi per il danno subito.   
Pur garantito dal TFUE, l’esercizio pratico del diritto al pieno risarcimento è stato in 
concreto ostacolato dalla disomogeneità fra gli ordinamenti interni ed dalle incertezze 
operative in ordine al procedimento applicabile.   
Infatti, tra i diversi Stati membri sussistono differenze normative che rendono alcune 
giurisdizioni (come ad esempio la Germania, l’Inghilterra e l’Olanda) più attraenti per 
instaurare un contenzioso antitrust rispetto ad altri, con la creazione di  fenomeni di 
forum shopping.  
In Italia, sebbene il numero delle azioni civili avviate a seguito dei provvedimenti 
sanzionatori dell'Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (“AGCM”), sia 
progressivamente aumentato, il numero di casi di private enforcement è, comunque, 
ancora ben lontano dai livelli attesi ed auspicati.   
In considerazione del descritto contesto nella prima parte dell’elaborato, previa 
disamina di alcune questioni preliminari, cioè cos’è il private enforcement delle regole 
della concorrenza, perché è necessario e qual è il suo fondamento sistematico e 
normativo, si analizzano gli strumenti giuridici e le tutele, funzionalizzate ad assicurare 
il risarcimento del danno subito a seguito dell’illecito concorrenziale, apprestate negli 
ultimi anni ed attualmente a disposizione dei consumatori in Europa. 
Si ripercorrono, poi, gli sviluppi in materia, al livello nazionale ed europeo, 
soffermandosi, da un lato, sulla proposta (poi approvata) di direttiva della Commissione 
europea e, dall’altro, sull’evoluzione del private enforcement nei principali Stati 
Membri.   
Al livello europeo, difatti, molteplici sono stati, infatti, gli sforzi compiuti dalle 
istituzioni per accrescere il ricorso dei privati a tale strumento di tutela ed incrementare 
il livello di effettività delle norme preposte alla salvaguardia del mercato. 
Al riguardo un ruolo essenziale va indubbiamente riconosciuto alla Commissione 
europea ed alle iniziative da questa messe in campo per rimuovere gli ostacoli che 
rendono difficile per imprese e consumatori agire in giudizio per il risarcimento dei 
danni patiti.  
Dopo il formale riconoscimento, del diritto al risarcimento dei danni delle vittime 
delle condotte antitrust, si sono susseguiti studi e proposte legislative tese a superare le 
significative divergenze relative ai diversi rimedi risarcitori offerti dagli Stati Membri, 
in vista di eliminare qualsiasi disparità di trattamento tra le imprese comunitarie e 
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garantire il corretto funzionamento del mercato interno.  Ciò è avvenuto, dapprima, 
attraverso la pubblicazione del Libro Verde sulle “Azioni di risarcimento del danno per 
violazione delle norme antitrust comunitarie” (2005), con l’intento di agevolare il 
private enforcement e porre le basi per una strategia condivisa, e poi con la 
pubblicazione nel 2008 del Libro Bianco con l’obiettivo primario, purtroppo non 
raggiunto, di chiarire i presupposti per l’esercizio del diritto al risarcimento del danno 
da parte dei privati. 
A novembre 2014, la Commissione ha finalmente approvato una direttiva e stabilito 
nuove norme per facilitare le richieste di indennizzo da parte di chi è vittima di 
violazioni delle regole antitrust, riuscendo a superare le diverse posizioni fra stati 
membri, che in passato, avevano impedito di pervenire ad una disciplina al riguardo.  
 Un primo tentativo della Commissione di presentare una proposta legislativa in 
tema di private enforcement era, infatti, abortito per la mancanza di condivisione su 
alcuni aspetti della disciplina ritenuti particolarmente delicati, quali la prospettata 
introduzione dello strumento delle class actions di impronta nordamericana, ovvero di 
quelle azioni basate su un sistema c.d. di opt-out, della divulgazione predibattimentale 
(c.d. disclosure) e del risarcimento cumulativo dei danni. 
L’elaborato ripercorre, quindi, le evoluzioni legislative più recenti degli Stati 
Membri e analizza brevemente le tutele  apprestate nelle principali giurisdizioni 
europee. 
In particolare esamina la proposta di legge inglese (c.d. Consumer Rights Bill), che 
introduce la procedura opt-out per le azioni collettive (in contrasto con il regime di opt-
in raccomandato dalla Commissione) e con cui si ampliano i poteri del Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”), rendendolo così la sede principale per  le azioni private in 
tema di concorrenza, nonché la nuova legge francese (c.d. Loi Hamon), entrata in 
vigore nel marzo 2014, che introduce per la prima volta una disciplina per le azioni di 
classe con caratteristiche proprie rispetto a quelle presenti negli altri stati Membri.  
Nella nuova legge francese, in specie, si prevede una azione con opt-in espresso ed 
una tutela specifica per gli illeciti anticoncorrenziali (c.d.“actione de groupe en 
réparation des préjudices causés par une pratique anticoncurrentielle”) esperibile, 
però, solo in seguito ad una decisione di condanna da parte dell’Autorità nazionale per 
la Concorrenza.  La Loi Hamon prevede, altresì, una azione di classe semplificata per 
tutti quei casi in cui il procedimento è più semplice poiché l’identità dei consumatori 
lesi è già conosciuta o lo sarebbe facilmente. 
Da ultimo, l’analisi si sofferma sulla direttiva approvata a Novembre 2014, emanata, 
proprio, per armonizzare e garantire l’effettiva applicazione delle regole di risarcimento 
del danno proveniente da violazioni delle norme antitrust all’interno dell’Unione 
Europea.   
Trattasi di un importante traguardo, che migliora la legge europea sulla concorrenza 
e la adatta alle ultime necessità.  L’impatto che avrà la direttiva all’interno dei singoli 
Stati membri è ad oggi solamente ipotizzabile, certamente tale direttiva insieme con i 
recenti sforzi legislativi quali quello francese ed inglese in tema di class action, 
mostrano la volontà di superare i risultati modesti ottenuti sinora all’interno degli Stati 
Membri nell’utilizzo delle azioni private da parte dei danneggiati indiretti e di superare 
le varie cause che hanno per lungo tempo scoraggiato i consumatori a proporre tali 
azioni.  
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Ciò nonostante, ci sono ancora diversi profili problematici che la Direttiva non 
affronta.  L’elaborato si conclude, quindi, con una riflessione sulle problematiche 
irrisolte e sui possibili rimedi. 
Tra le questioni irrisolte che sembrano indebolire il sistema del private enforcement, 
significative e di particolare interesse risultano quelle legate al finanziamento delle 
azioni di classe.   
Le azioni di classe hanno, purtroppo, costi molto elevati.  In particolare, chi propone 
un’azione di classe nei sistemi opt-in, oltre le tradizionali spese legali, deve sostenere i 
costi per dare pubblicità alla classe e per raccogliere le adesioni dei consumatori 
interessati a partecipare all’azione.   
E fra tutti i possibili rimedi, anche alla luce delle proposte ed iniziative adottate nei 
sistemi di private enforcement più evoluti per garantire l’accesso alla giustizia dei 
consumatori, nell’elaborato si privilegia proprio la soluzione (più discussa e 
controversa, ma che appare anche la più efficace) del finanziamento delle azioni di 
classe da parte di terzi. 
  
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”) stipulates that “[t]he Union shall work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on […] a highly competitive social 
market economy”.1 The competition policy is implemented through the enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
which prohibit anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions on the 
market. The enforcement may be carried out through public arms of government or by 
private parties before national courts.2  
Though traditionally based on actions from the part of the European Commission, 
the enforcement system of the European Union (“EU”) antitrust rules has become 
increasingly reliant upon individual actions before national courts. This is a result of a 
long series of modernization actions from the part of the Commission as well as 
progressive case law issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union. A 
strengthening of private enforcement has been deemed necessary mainly to enhance the 
effectiveness of the competition law system and to guarantee that victims of antitrust 
infringements get compensated for the harm they have suffered.3 
Private enforcement has been a very familiar subject in the United States. However, 
this was not the case in Europe until recently. Thanks to the ruling of the Court of 
Justice in the Courage case in 2001 it became clear that, by relying on basic Union law 
principles, a claimant can receive damages from another private party as a result of the 
defendant’s breach of the Union antitrust rules. Nevertheless, there are still today few 
cases where private damages have been awarded for breaches of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.  According to the European Commission, amongst the main reasons for the 
                                                     
1  Article 3(3) TEU. See also Protocol (no. 27) on the Internal Market and Competition, annexed to the 
Treaties. 
2  Craig P. & De Búrca G., “EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials, 2011”, Fifth ed., Oxford University 
Press, p. 181. 
3  Komninos A., “EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law 
by National Courts”, 2008, Hart Publishing, p. 1. 
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considerably small number of claims for damages there are the funding of the actions 
and the inconsistent application of national procedural rules throughout the Union.4  
Notably, Member States use different rules to designate the parties with standing in 
domestic courts and the national legal systems show different tendencies as to which 
arguments that are accepted from the defendants whose illegal anticompetitive 
behaviour is alleged to have caused damage.5 
Stressing the importance of private enforcement, in 2008 the Commission issued a 
White Paper containing specific proposals to facilitate private actions in the EU as a 
complement to public enforcement.6  The proposals involve a harmonization of certain 
national procedural rules throughout the Union, something which has become a subject 
for critique by many stakeholders who believe the proposals are too intrusive and 
insufficiently analysed as to their consequences.  Following to the White Paper, on June 
11, 2013, the Commission published a proposal for a directive on antitrust damages 
actions for breaches of EU competition law with the aim of ensuring inter alia easier 
access to evidence and more effective procedures.  Finally, in November 2014, a 
Directive on “certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union” was adopted. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the objectives, modalities, and actors of antitrust 
enforcement trying to first draw the main differences between public and private 
enforcement.  The thesis will then analyse the right to claim damages under the 
previous EU provisions and case law and go through the Commission policy initiatives 
in the field throughout the years.  A chapter will focus on the recent developments in 
the field of private enforcement of competition law in Italy and across other EU 
jurisdictions.  
                                                     
4  See Study on the conditions for claims for damages in case of infringements of EC competition rules, 
a comparative report prepared by the law firm Ashurst in 2004 on behalf of the European 
Commission (hereinafter called “the Ashurst study”). 
5  See Ashurst study, above. 
6  White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165 final. 
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The analysis will then move on to the recently adopted European Directive on 
antitrust damages actions and the measures that Member States are to implement within 
the next two years. 
To conclude, I will examine the persisting problems in relation to collective actions 
and litigation financing also in light of the legislative proposal for collective actions in 
competition law claims introduced by the draft Consumer Rights Bill in the United 
Kingdom.  I will conclude by comparing the different legislative choices with respect to 
the collective redress mechanism and addressing the neglected obstacle that, in my 
perspective still hinders effective private enforcement, namely the lack of sufficient 
financing and financial alternatives with respect to collective actions.  
. 
1 
CHAPTER I  
 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: AN OVERVIEW  
The first chapter will focus on the definition and legal basis of competition law 
enforcement. I will try to briefly examine the modalities and competent authorities in 
charge of this activity and then draw the differences between public and private 
enforcement of the EU competition law stressing the objectives they pursue.  
Finally, the advantages and benefits related to private enforcement will be listed and 
explained. 
1. Private enforcement: definition and nuances 
Private enforcement could be defined in two different ways – one broad and one narrow. 
In broad terms, one could say that private enforcement includes all actions taken by private 
parties in order to enforce the competition law policy of the EU.  That definition would 
include cases where, for example, an individual reports an undertaking’s behaviour to the 
Commission or to a national competition authority (“NCA”), or where an individual is 
conferred the role of intervenient in a public procedure against an anticompetitive 
agreement. However, the situations where enforcement is facilitated or initiated through 
initiatives of private parties but later carried through mostly by public authorities primarily 
help the effective execution of public antitrust enforcement, and are normally referred to as 
“privately triggered public enforcement”.  A narrower definition of private enforcement 
should be preferred.  The use of the concept should be limited to litigations in which 
private parties act as claimants or counterclaimants against undertakings that are alleged to 
have acted in breach of the EU antitrust rules. Furthermore, for the litigation to constitute 
private enforcement, the claim should be based on the actual competition law rules. 
Although, the claim normally leads to some kind of civil remedy, such as nullity of 
agreement, damages or restitution. This definition of private enforcement is the one most 
commonly used, also by the Commission, and covers in an accurate way the actions of 
interest for this work. Hence, that narrow definition of private enforcement is also the 
definition that will be used throughout this work. 
2 
 The modalities of private enforcement a.
Before proceeding to further characteristics of private antitrust enforcement, it is 
important to analyse the ways in which competition rules can be used in civil litigation. 
The literature7 mainly describes two application modalities and differentiates between, on 
one hand, cases in which the competition rules are used proactively as a “sword”, that is as 
a basis for claiming something from the other side (e.g. claims for damages, injunction, 
interim measures, supply, admission to a distribution system) in order to compensate 
and/or to put an end to the harm caused by the infringement of the competition law.  On 
the other hand, there are cases in which competition rules are pleaded defensively as a 
“shield” against actual or potential claims by the other side, which may be based on a 
contract but also on other rules (e.g. nullity defence in contractual claims for performance 
or for damages because of non-performance).8 
The use of Article 101 TFEU as a shield in contractual disputes has its basis directly in the 
TFEU.  In fact, Article 101 (2) TFEU provides that “any agreements […] prohibited pursuant 
to this article shall be automatically void”.9 Article 102 TFEU contains no such declaration of 
nullity. This omission, however, is not surprising since Article 102 TFEU does not explicitly 
prohibit agreements but focuses on a wider range of conducts. Nevertheless, it is commonly 
assumed that this Article prohibits many contracts and contractual terms and the effect in 
relation to the sanctioned agreements is similar to that of Article 101 (i.e., the offending 
provisions are void).10 In BRT v. SABAM, on a preliminary reference from a national court 
                                                     
7  In this sense, Komninos A., “EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts”, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 2.  The use of Article 101 as a “shield” 
in contractual relations follows from Article 101(2) TFEU which provides that “any agreements […] 
prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automatically void”. More generally for both Article 101 and 
102, in Case 127/73, BRT v SABAM [1973] ECR 51, para. 16, the CJEU stated that the direct effect of 
Articles 101 and 102 can lead to the voidness sanction. 
8  Komninos A., in the introduction of Ehlermann C., Atanasiu C. (eds), “European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law”, Oxford/Portland 2003, p. xxvii; Boge 
U., K. Ost, “Up and running, or is it? Private enforcement – the situation in Germany and policy 
perspectives”, ECLR, 27(4), 2006, p. 197; Jacobs F. G., Deisenhofer T., “Procedural Aspects of the 
Effective Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective”, in European Competition 
Law 2001, p.189.  
9  The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), [2008] OJ C 115/47, 
09.05.2008. 
10  See Whish R., Competition Law, p.316; Jones A., Sufrin B., EU Competition Law. Text Cases and 
materials, 4th ed., Oxford, 2011, p. 1200. 
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before which Article 102 TFEU was raised in an intellectual property infringement case, 
the Court of Justice considered that “as the prohibitions of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU 
tend by their very nature to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these 
Articles create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national 
courts must safeguard”.11 
In Europe, competition law provisions seem to have been used so far mainly as a shield and 
only rarely as a sword.12 In the literature, such state of affairs has been a cause for almost 
unanimous disappointment. 
Various authors, as opposed to the European Commission (“Commission”),13 contend 
that the “shield litigation” cannot directly be classified as private enforcement. They stress that 
cases where competition law is pleaded as a defense have minimal contribution towards the 
development of a more effective system of private enforcement.14 
According to Jacobs F.G. and Deisenhofer T., in cases such as in contractual 
proceedings the competition provisions:  
- are frequently not invoked by victims of a restraint, but by participants therein; 
- are mostly pleaded incidentally, when the defendant might be attacked in court, 
and not because competition is endangered; 
- are often applied when competition has already been harmed; 
- do not fulfill the compensatory function; 
- act as a deterrent only in cases where contractual stability is important (e.g. 
distribution systems); however they have no deterrent effect with regard to ad-
hoc anticompetitive conduct directed against third parties (such as boycotts, 
predatory pricing or price discrimination); and 
                                                     
11  Judgment of  January 30, 1974 in Case n. 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, [1973] ECR 51, para. 16. 
12  Wils W., “Should Private Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?”, World Competition, 26(3), 2003, p. 
475. 
13  In the view of the Commission, actions aimed at the annulment of an agreement on the ground of its 
incompatibility with competition law can be classified as private enforcement. European Commission, 
Report on competition policy 2004, Luxembourg 2005, p. 56, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html. 
14  See, inter alia, Komninos A., EC private antitrust enforcement, cit., p. 3 ; Basedow J., “Panel one 
Discussion; Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann C., Atanasiu C. (eds), European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Oxford/Portland 2003, p. 32. 
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- have no impact on serious infringements of the competition rules15 (such as the 
operation of cartels or market sharing) because potential plaintiffs are normally not 
interested in enforcing the sanctions in the State courts, but are invoked on more 
innocent agreements where the harm to competition is much less obvious.16 
For these reasons, both authors together with several other scholars conclude that the 
passive use of competition provisions does not normally contribute to a better understanding or 
a clarification of the rules on serious infringements. The sanction of voidness and its use as a 
defense certainly has its role in persuading undertakings to obey the law, however from the 
private enforcement perspective, cases where antitrust rules are pleaded proactively are 
unquestionably more significant.  
Where Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are used as a sword17 (e.g. in the form of damages 
claim) the proceedings may, by contrast: 
- lead to compensation for the harm caused by the infringement of the competition 
rules; 
- have a preventive deterrent effect on the undertakings involved, and if made public, 
also on other undertakings; 
- prevent or stop anticompetitive conduct at an early stage through injunctions or 
interim measures; and 
- lead, if publicized, to a better understanding and clarification of competition law, 
particularly with regard to serious infringements, in which civil actions are most 
likely to be brought.18 
As to the use of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as a sword, the TFEU contains no specific 
provision governing private rights of action for damages or injunctions following an 
infringement of the EU antitrust rules. 19  It has however been established that private 
                                                     
15  See, in this sense, Whish R., Competition Law, cit., pp. 309-310. 
16  Jacobs F. G., Deisenhofer T., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Antitrust Enforcement of EC 
Competition Rules: A Community Perspective” in: Ehlermann C., Atanasiu C. (eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Oxford/Portland 
2003, p.197. 
17  Wouter P.J. Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 112. The 
Treaty gives no clear support for such a proactive use of the antitrust provisions, but this interpretation 
has been established through case law, see Case C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6314, para. 26. 
18  Jacobs F. G., Deisenhofer T., “Procedural Aspects of…”, cit., p.190. 
19  This is in contrast with the position adopted in the US: see Clayton Act 1914, ss. 4 and 16. 
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proceedings in the national courts are possible by virtue of the fact that Articles 101 and 
102 have a direct effect in EU Member States.  In particular, Regulation no. 1/200320 in its 
Article 6 provides that “national courts shall have the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 of 
the Treaty”. What follows from recital 7 of the Regulation, according to which “national 
courts have an essential part to play in applying the Community competition rules. When 
deciding disputes between private individuals, they protect the subjective rights under 
Community law, for example by awarding damages to the victims of the infringements”, is that 
the national court proceedings cover both the use of competition provisions as a shield and as a 
sword. The possibility of actions for injunctions as well as damages for breach of competition 
rules before national courts was also confirmed by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).21 
While injunctions (usually of a temporary nature) have been granted relatively often by 
EU Member States’ courts, damages awards have been rarer in Europe when compared to 
the US. Yet, damages claims are considered to be the most important pillar of private 
antitrust enforcement. The reasons for this situation in Europe can be attributed to a variety 
of factors that will be analyzed in the next chapters of this work. 
i. Who is entrusted of the enforcement? 
The next categorization is made on the basis of the agents entrusted with the enforcement of 
competition law and the remedial outcomes. Public and private enforcement are submitted to 
be the two pillars of enforcement of EU antitrust rules. The common feature of both models is 
that they are based on infringements of competition law provisions. Administrative 
enforcement is undertaken by specifically entrusted authorities (i.e., the Commission at the EU 
level and the NCAs at the Member States level), which investigate suspected violations of 
competition law, address their decisions to private individuals and impose administrative 
measures and sanctions such as fines on infringing undertakings. Fines are paid into the public 
budget and the activities of public enforcers are financed by the state. The characteristic 
feature of administrative-public enforcement is the verticality of the dispute, which remains 
                                                     
20  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of December 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [now articles 101 and 102 TFEU], OJ 2003 L 1, 
p.1-25. 
21  The Court held that a national court must ensure that interim measures are available where necessary to 
protect EU rights. Judgment of June 19, 1990 in Case 213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others, [1990] ECR I-2474, para. 21. The possibility of action 
for damages for violation of Article 101 TFEU was confirmed in Courage v. Crehan case, which is 
discussed below. 
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one between the state and private individuals. Private enforcement, on the other hand, takes 
place horizontally, between individuals, within a framework of a civil process. In the latter 
case, the sanctions imposed are of private nature and essentially function as remedies for the 
victim of the anticompetitive behavior, who can make up for his losses only before a civil 
court, as public enforcement cannot have any direct bearing here. The functions of the 
remedies in the context of private enforcement are ambiguous in the literature. Without doubt, 
they serve primarily the private interest in that they aim at compensating and protecting the 
victim of an anticompetitive practice, however, according to some authors, they “also 
reflexively serve the public interest in maintaining effective competition in the market”. 
Private enforcement actions are paid for by the individual who brings the action to court 
but that individual may recover the money paid out as part of the award of compensation, 
if his action is successful in court. As we will see, this represents a crucial issue in the 
development of private damages actions in the EU. 
ii. Standalone v. Follow-on actions 
Last but not least, a final distinction can be made between so-called stand-alone and 
follow-on litigations. Such classification is of great significance and also pertains to the 
relationship between private and public enforcement. Stand-alone litigations, as the name 
suggests, are litigations in which a private party sues another party for having violated the 
EU antitrust rules where no breach has earlier been established by public authorities – 
namely the Commission or NCA. In those cases it is up to the claimant in the proceeding 
to prove that there has been a breach of the antitrust rules in the first place, a task that can 
sometimes be very hard to pursue. The same applies to cases where the private party is not 
suing for damages but raises the other party’s breach of the competition rules as a point in 
his claim or counterclaim. Follow-on actions, on the other hand, take place where a public 
entity has already taken a decision where it condemns the particular anticompetitive 
behaviour. Here, as it could be easily guessed, the earlier finding of a competition law 
breach can facilitate the litigation initiated by the private party, who will not have to bear 
as heavy a burden of proof. Whenever the Commission finds a breach of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU, victims of the infringement can, by virtue of Article 16(1) of Regulation no. 1/2003, 
rely on this decision as binding proof in civil proceedings. Article 16(1) of Regulation no. 
1/2003 states that, where national courts rule on a matter which has already been the subject of 
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a Commission decision under Article 101 or 102 TFEU, they cannot reach conclusions running 
counter to that of the Commission.22 The first sentence of Article 16 (1) gives expression to the 
ECJ‟s judgment in Masterfoods,23 in which the court held that the duty of cooperation set 
out in EU law requires a national court to follow a Commission decision dealing with the 
same parties and the same agreement in the same Member State.24 If the Commission’s 
decision is on appeal to the General Court or the ECJ pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the 
national court should stay its proceedings as long as a final judgment on the matter is pending 
before the EU courts.25  Finally, if a national court considers that a Commission decision is 
wrong, it must not declare it invalid, but is obliged to refer a question to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU). 
With regard to decisions by NCAs only several national competition laws in the EU 
Member States, notably UK, German, and Hungarian law, state explicitly that the civil 
courts in follow-on proceedings are bound by the NCAs decisions.26 There are, though, 
legal systems where the existence of an infringement decision by a public authority does 
not confer any benefit upon the follow-on civil plaintiff. The Commission White Paper on 
damages actions focused on the issue and aimed at suggesting a solution,27 so that final 
infringement decisions taken by a public authority in the EU as well as final review 
judgements by a court upholding the NCA decision could be made binding as to the 
finding of the infringement on the follow-on actions for damages. A rule to this effect, 
                                                     
22  The Regulation does not state specifically that an appellate court in a Member State would be bound by a 
Commission decision even where a lower court had reached a contrary conclusion prior to Commission 
decision, nonetheless this point was established in Masterfoods. 
23  Judgment of December 14, 2000 in Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd, [2000] ECR I-
11369, para. 16. 
24  For the principle of cooperation, see Article 4(3) Treaty on the European Union (“TEU.”), [2010] OJ C 
83. 
25  Commission notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States 
in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, [2004] OJ C101/54, para. 13. 
26 See sections 58A and 47A of the UK Competition Act 1998, as subsequently amended; section 33(4) of 
the German Competition Act (GWB); Article 88/B(6) of the Hungarian Competition Act. In addition, the 
Polish Supreme Court has held that NCA decisions establishing breaches of competition law are binding 
on civil courts. See Tomasz Koziel, “The Polish Supreme Court rules that a civil court may establish an 
abuse of a dominant position independently, unless the NCA has already found such an abuse (Torun 
Timber Industry Enterprise)”, July 27, 2008, e-Competitions, n° 34951. 
27  European Commission, White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 
165 final, 02.04.2008, p. 6. The Commission’s White Paper is discussed in more detail below. 
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according to the Commission, would provide a more consistent application of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU by different national bodies and ensure legal certainty. It would also 
considerably increase the effectiveness and procedural efficiency of actions for antitrust 
damages, since the duplication of factual and legal analysis of the case in administrative-
public proceedings and civil-private litigation would be avoided.  Ultimately, with the 
implementation of the new Commission Directive on antitrust damages actions, a final 
decision of a NCA finding an infringement will automatically constitute proof of that 
infringement before courts of the same Member State. 
The existence of such a rule will substantially improve the position of the plaintiffs in 
subsequent follow-on suits in national courts, as they would not have to produce all the 
evidence once again. 
 Relationship between private and public enforcement b.
From a purely competition law perspective, antitrust enforcement pursues three 
systematically different – yet substantively interconnected – objectives or functions.28 The 
first one is injunctive function, i.e. to bring the infringement of the law to an end, which 
may entail not only negative measures, in the sense of an order to abstain from the 
delinquent conduct, but also positive ones to ensure that such conduct cease in the future. 
The second objective is restorative or compensatory, i.e. to remedy the injury caused by 
the specific anticompetitive conduct. The third one is punitive,29 i.e. to punish the infringer 
and also to deter him and others from future transgressions. 
Ideally, these three basic objectives-functions are pursued inside an enforcement system 
that combines both public and private elements. 
Both public and private enforcement may – directly or indirectly – pursue all three 
objectives-functions.  The injunctive objective-function is served with cease and desist 
                                                     
28  See Harding C. and Joshua J., Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study of Legal Control of Economic 
Delinquency, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 229 et seq.; Komninos A., EC Private Antitrust 
Enforcement, Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts, cit., p. 7 et seq. For 
a slightly different classification of tasks-objectives of antitrust enforcement, compare Wils W., The 
Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32 World 
Competition 3, 2009, who speaks of three tasks: (a) clarifying and developing the content of the antitrust 
prohibitions, (b) preventing the violation of these prohibitions through deterrence and punishment, and (c) 
pursuing corrective justice through compensation. 
29  It is worth specifying that the term “punitive” is used here in its generic sense and does not necessarily 
correspond to criminal law. 
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orders and negative or positive injunctions ordered both by competition authorities, in the 
course of public proceedings, and by the courts, in the course of civil proceedings. Indeed, 
the latter may go even further than public enforcement. For example, it may be easier to 
obtain a preliminary injunction from a national judge within the EU than from the 
European Commission, while the latter, unlike the former, cannot issue orders imposing 
positive measures to undertakings in Article 101 TFEU cases. 30  Private enforcement 
primarily serves the restorative-compensatory objective-function, since private actions 
ensure compensation for those harmed by anticompetitive conduct. However, even in such 
cases, the role of public enforcement is not inexistent. For example, a competition 
authority’s action may in effect amount to redress in specific cases. Then, the competition 
authority may impose on the wrongdoer or accept commitments from him to put in place a 
compensatory scheme.   
Finally, as for the punitive objective-function, public enforcement is undoubtedly 
predominant. This objective is pursued through the imposition of fines, which punish the 
wrongdoers and deter them from breaching the law in the future (i.e., specific deterrence) 
but also deter other persons from entering into or continuing to engage in behaviour that is 
contrary to the competition rules (i.e., general deterrence).31 However, here again, private 
actions may supplement the retributive and deterrent effect of the public sanctions by 
attaching punitive elements to the civil nature of remedies, this being the case of legal 
systems that provide for punitive antitrust damages. More importantly, the existence of 
private enforcement furthers the overall deterrent effect of the law, by adding a 
supplementary system of sanctions and risks for the wrongdoer.32  
                                                     
30  Case T-24/90, Automec Srl v. Commission (II), [1992] ECR II-2223, para. 51. According to the General 
Court, freedom of contract is the rule, so the Commission cannot order a party to enter into a contractual 
relationship “where as a general rule the Commission has suitable means at its disposal for compelling 
an enterprise to end an infringement”. In the Commission’s view such purely positive measures may be 
more justifiable in Article 102 TFEU cases (see the Commission’s arguments in para. 43). 
31  See European Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) 
of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ [2006] C 210/2, para. 4; Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, 
[1971] ECR 397, para. 173; Case C-308/04 Ρ, SGL Carbon AG v. Commission, [2006] ECR Ι-5977, para. 
37; Case C-76/06 P, Britannia Alloys & Chemicals Ltd v. Commission, [2007] ECR Ι-4405, para. 22. 
32  See further European Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, under 1.1; Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC(2008) 404, paras. 15-20. 
10 
In conclusion, there are several distinctive characters that help differentiate between 
public and private enforcement on the basis of the form of administration, the actors and 
the remedies. Public enforcement is carried through by public authorities, such as 
specialized national competition authorities, national courts and the Commission. The 
remedies for a breach of the EU competition rules are in these cases administrative 
sanctions, structural remedies and other penalties provided for in national laws. Private 
enforcement on the other hand takes place in horizontal relations before national courts in 
claims based on EU competition law. The sanctions are of a civil character, aimed mainly 
at compensating the victims of the antitrust breach. The majority of scholars agree that the 
two methods complement each other and that a combination of both private and public 
enforcement is necessary for the functioning of the European competition policy. 
As mentioned, the aims of private enforcement differ to those of public enforcement. 
Where the latter primarily proves effective for deterrence and injunction, private 
enforcement mainly serves the objective of compensation. A system where private and 
legal persons are able to enforce, before their national courts, the rights conferred to them 
by directly effective provisions of EU law gives individuals an easily accessible means of 
reparation and places the benefits of Union law closer to the citizens. Finally, private 
enforcement also helps to fill the gaps in public enforcement that are a natural result of a 
the heavy workload of the Commission and the national competition agencies that have to 
prioritize their work and thus ignore some illegal anticompetitive behavior. Hence, private 
enforcement outweighs the institutional intervention-oriented system of enforcement 
where public authorities are exclusive enforcers. Having said that, there is a need for 
balance between the two kinds of enforcement.  
 Is private enforcement really necessary? c.
In the EU, public enforcement has always been the main device used to detect and 
punish infringements of competitions law, whereas private actions (both stand-alone and 
follow-on) never played a paramount role. 
It is often argued that public enforcement is essential to prevent and punish general 
collusive practices since agencies have specific expertise and are in a better position to 
access information and evidence.  Nowadays, however, it is also undisputed that relying 
only on the oversight of public authorities could lead to an ineffective and unbalanced 
enforcement system for several reasons.  
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It is reasonable to fear that the structure of enforcement agencies in itself might lead to 
a distorted enforcement.  The Commission embodies the perfect example of an integrated 
model33 where the agency plays both the investigative and enforcing role and has great 
discretionary powers.  Such type of architecture leaves room to confirmation biases and 
overall lack of objectivity.34  The issue has been considered by European Courts35 which 
clarified that public enforcement of competition law might entail sanctions and thus could 
have a criminal nature for the purpose of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) regarding the right to a fair trial. The court concluded that there could be 
a potential violation of right of defence in cases in which judges are not able to review the 
facts in addition to the legal issues. Thus, although we can recognize a trend whereby 
European Courts are gaining more and more power in examining the Commission 
decisions, the risk of biases and errors by the main EU public enforcer cannot be 
completely ruled out.  
Secondly, relying merely on public enforcement would entail being exposed to the risk 
that political and economic powers would influence the decision-making process of both 
NCAs and the Commission. In fact, those institutions – although formally independent – 
are never completely insulated from external pressures. 
                                                     
33  See Fox E. & Trebilcock M., The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices, 
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12 -20, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128913. 
34 A confirmation bias entails the agency’s readiness to prefer evidence that corroborate a version of the 
facts that confirms its pre-existing beliefs. See Wils W., “The Combination of Investigative and 
Prosecutorial Functions and the Adjudicative Function”, in 27 World Competition Law & Economics 
Rev., 202, 2004, p. 215. 
35 See the Menarini case brought before the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), A. Menarini 
Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, judgment no. 43509/08, of September 27, 2011. For detailed discussion on the 
potential effects of the Menarini judgment, see Bronckers M. and Vallery “Fair and effective competition 
policy in the EU: which role for authorities and which role for the courts after Menarini?”, in European 
Competition Journal, August 2012, p. 283-299. See also case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. 
Commission, 2011, ECR II‑1167 and Wils W., EU Antitrust enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights 
and Guarantees: The Interplay between EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights, in 27 World Competition Law & Economics 
Rev., 189, 2011, p. 203-206. See contra the Opinion by AG Mazak of May 15, 2012 in case C-457/10 P 
AstraZeneca v. Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, paras. 50 and 70 criticizing “untoward” attempts of the 
appellant in an abuse of dominance case to apply “criminal evidential standards in a field which is not 
criminal in nature.” Finally, it’s worth noticing that in the Final Proposal the term “sanctions” in Article 8 
has been replaced by “penalties”.  The Council explained that the latter term seemed more appropriate to 
a civil law context 
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Public enforcement cannot not be considered the panacea to anticompetitive behaviors 
due to the constant lack of resources earmarked to agencies by their governments. 
Furthermore, public and private enforcement are both needed in order to trigger 
different types of breaches and allow whoever is in a better position – among privates and 
agencies – to act. In case of hardcore cartels, for instance, public authorities might be 
better suited to detect general collusive practices. Whereas, in case of vertical restrictions 
and exclusionary practices, it is not unlikely that an information advantage could lie with 
private parties (i.e., suppliers and consumers). 
Ultimately, as already mentioned, private enforcement has a two-fold purpose.  In fact, 
on one hand, it strengthens deterrence of public enforcement through follow-on actions 
(vertical purpose), and, on the other hand, it increases the overall enforcement through 
stand-alone actions (horizontal purpose). 
For these reasons, private enforcement shall be at least a complement to public 
enforcement and that an optimal enforcement level can only be given by the perfect mix of 
both types of enforcement. 
To date, however, we have witnessed a rather disappointing level of private 
enforcement and thus an overall under-enforcement of competition law.36 
Although EU law has the power to create substantial rights for individuals, the system 
lacks of an effective mechanism to protect those rights in the field of competition law. It is 
left to Member States have to set up effective remedies and enforcement procedures in this 
area of law; consequently, private enforcement procedures are almost exclusively 
regulated by national law with many discrepancies between the rules implemented by each 
Member State.  This situation creates legal uncertainty and an uneven playing field: factors 
that contribute to negatively affect competition law in Europe.37 
                                                     
36 Cfr. para. 52 of the Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Report on Damages actions 
for breach of the EU antitrust rules, available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/swd_2013_0203_en.pdf.  The document shows that only 
25% of competition law cases had follow-on actions. The vast majority of those actions were brought 
before three Member States, namely U.K., Germany, and The Netherlands. England is an interesting (but 
costly) forum due to low or no language barriers, the availability of disclosure procedures for information 
in the possession of the other party, and benches equipped with judges experienced in competition law. 
The Netherlands and Germany are known for their expeditious and relatively low-cost court systems with 
flexible rules for establishing the damage sustained. Finally, Germany might be a natural major forum 
because of its economic importance within the EU. 
37 In this sense, see Speech of Vice President of the European Commission Almunia J. on “Antitrust damages 
in EU law and policy”, of November 11, 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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2. Objective of Competition law enforcement 
Competition law enforcement is generally designed to achieve three main objectives: to 
bring the infringements to an end, to compensate the victims who have suffered a loss 
because of another party’s anticompetitive behavior, and to punish the perpetrators and 
thus deter them and others from future transgressions of the rules. Ideally, all these 
objectives can be pursued inside an enforcement system that combines public and private 
enforcement. It seems clear that, at present, public enforcement has a prominent role in 
achieving corrective justice. Nevertheless, although sanctions imposed by public authorities 
can be reallocated to the society as whole, or potentially result in alleviation of tax burdens for 
citizens, “direct damage awards can serve the goal of restitution in integrum, i.e. putting 
victims of antitrust injury in the same condition in which they would have been, had the 
antitrust violation not occurred. In this respect, private enforcement can be seen as a 
reflection of antitrust injury as a tort law matter.”38 
Furthermore, public competition authorities may pursue the compensatory objective in an 
informal way. In fact, there are cases where the public agency enforcing the competition rules 
may take into account the injury to specific victims of an anticompetitive practice and impose 
on the perpetrator the obligation to compensate those persons. The public agency may pursue 
this informally, for example through an informal settlement. 39  In terms of comparative 
institutional competence, there is no reason to think that competition authorities are 
particularly well suited to award civil damages and decide such issues as causation or the 
amount of harm.40 Awarding damages to compensate for harm caused by antitrust violations, 
at least in follow-on litigation, is not fundamentally different from what courts regularly do 
                                                                                                                                      
release_SPEECH-13-887_en.htm?locale=en: “Clearly, access to compensation is insufficient and 
unevenly spread in Europe. Often the rules are so complex and uncertain that starting a damages action 
in court means embarking in an endless procedural battle. Insufficient, uneven and costly access to 
compensation is simply unacceptable in the Single Market[…]”. 
38  Report for the European Commission, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios, 2007, p. 58, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=441.  
39  In this sense, see Komninos A., “EC private antitrust enforcement...”,cit., p. 8. 
40  For a proposal to confer powers on antitrust authorities to award civil damages to victims of 
anticompetitive behavior, see: Arregui I., “Should the Competition Authorities Be Authorized to Intervene 
in Competition-related Problems, when they Are Handled in Court? If so, what Should Form the Basis of 
their Powers of Intervention? National Report from Spain”, in The International League of Competition 
Law Questions, 2001/2002, p. 5. 
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when rendering judgments in other areas of tort law.41 Therefore, the pursuit of corrective 
justice should remain their task. 
As regards the punitive aspect, public enforcement is undoubtedly predominant. In the 
majority of European countries, the view is and has always been, that damages are only meant 
as compensation for injury suffered and have no punitive goal. The plaintiff will receive no 
more but also not less than the damage actually suffered. This allows for full compensation of 
the plaintiff and prevents unjust enrichment.42 By contrast, in the United States, punishment 
and deterrence are accepted as elements of civil remedies. This is the case of punitive antitrust 
damages, which are awarded to a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, but have mainly a retributive and 
deterrent function. Many forms of punitive damages exist, for instance treble damages for 
certain infringements of antitrust law,43 where the amount of compensatory damages is simply 
tripled. In Europe, however, where it is agreed that the state has the monopoly to punish, such 
damages awards are generally considered incompatible with the public policy. In addition, it is 
held that the award of punitive damages following a fining decision of a competition authority 
breaches the fundamental principle of ne bis in idem.44 
3. Advantages of private enforcement 
 Increased corrective justice a.
As mentioned above, private enforcement mainly fulfills a compensatory function. The 
plaintiff resorts to private action to assert her rights as an individual accorded to her by the 
legal system. She is able to defend these before the civil courts on his own initiative and 
according to his own priorities and demand compensation for the losses he suffered. 
Moreover, the victim of an anticompetitive practice can claim damages only before a civil 
court, as public antitrust agencies have no competence in this area.45 Existing empirical 
studies confirm that ex post private enforcement enables the (at least partial) recovery of injury 
                                                     
41  Wils W., “The relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages”, 
World Competition, 32(1), 2009, p. 12. 
42  Hazelhorst M., “Private enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages are a Step Too 
Far?”, European Review of Private Law, 4, 2010, p. 767. 
43 See Clayton Act, enacted on October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53, 
Pub.L. 63–212, 38 Stat. 730. See, in particular, section 4.  
44   Wils W., “The relationship between…”, cit., p. 20. 
45  The victims, may, however seize the public enforcer, if they are only interested in an injunctive relief. 
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suffered – depending on the calculation of damages. 46 Corrective justice achieved through 
private actions is, though, not perfect, since identifying the real victims of anticompetitive 
practices and the true extent of their loss is a very difficult task. The losses from antitrust 
violations are widely dispersed and, for many reasons, not everyone who sustained an 
economic injury can be compensated. Therefore, some authors support the view that there 
should not be any private actions for the purpose of compensation. 47 The reasoning, 
however, that no victims should receive any compensation because all victims will not 
receive perfect compensation, is unsustainable. Instead of denying relief to all damages 
parties, one can simply attempt to improve the reach of corrective justice where it is 
feasible to do so.48 The same argument applies to the calculation of damages. Factually 
determining how much an overcharge has been passed on, is indeed a difficult task, yet it 
should not undermine private actions in general. Finally, the view that the strive for 
corrective justice is not needed as citizens of Europe, outside the narrow circle of antitrust 
professionals, are not seriously disturbed by the current absence of compensation for 
antitrust damages, is unacceptable as well. The fact that people in Europe do not make use 
of their right not to be harmed by anticompetitive practices, does not mean that they attach 
little or no value to corrective justice. Rather, their right to look for redress in court is 
meaningless, since they are unaware of it or, even more importantly, lack effective legal 
instruments to claim compensation for the injuries suffered. 
 Enhanced deterrence b.
Apart from its compensatory function, private enforcement furthers the overall deterrent 
effect of competition law. According to a study prepared for the Commission, this can be 
done in at least three ways: by increasing the detection rate, by increasing the prospective 
penalty after detection and by ensuring more accurate fact-finding.49 In private antitrust 
                                                     
46  Report for the European Commission, Making antitrust damages actions more effective…, cit.,p. 9. 
47  Wils W., for instance, argues that the victims most deserving of compensation are those who would have 
purchased the cartel product at a competitive price, but due to the anticompetitive behavior do not buy the 
product at all. These victims are denied standing in court in the United States. In Europe, their claim 
would depend on the extent to which they can prove causation, but the chance to succeed is minimal. 
Wils W., “Should Private Enforcement Be Encouraged…”, cit., p. 487.  
48  Jones C.A., “Private Antitrust Enforcement in the EU, UK and USA”, Oxford, 1999, cit., p. 23. 
49  Report for the European Commission on Making antitrust damages actions more effective, cit., p. 70. 
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enforcement the economic agents themselves become instrumental in implementing the 
regulatory policy on competition. Owing to the superior information they hold, they can 
contribute to a higher detection rate through issuing of legal proceedings, and, correspondingly, 
further the deterrent effect. As Clifford A. Jones remarks “more effective enforcement results 
when more enforcers are active, as this increases compensation and tends to deter more 
violations. Historically, in Europe, if an undertaking or cartel could avoid the notice of the 
Commission or a national competition authority, it was “home free”. This is not so when 
consumers, competitors, and other victims are also enrolled as enforcers. It is also worth 
remembering that the last thing undertakings in Europe want is more enforcers of competition 
rules. [...] When objections to private-enforcement facilitating rules are lodged by 
undertakings or their industrial groups, many of which have been found to infringe EC 
competition rules in the past, it is well to recall their motivation. Such stakeholders do not just 
oppose private enforcement, they oppose all enforcement, and especially more enforcement”.50  
This is because they fear the higher detection rate. 
In addition, an effective private actions system increases the incentives of businesses to 
comply with competition law due to higher prospective penalties. In a system of combined 
private and public enforcement the financial and litigation risks are higher for infringing 
undertakings, since the likelihood and magnitude of any financial liability to a competition 
authority and/or plaintiff is raised. As the financial and litigation risks increase, so does the 
interest of those responsible for the governance of the business (i.e., the supervisory boards 
and board members) or for supporting the business (i.e., investors) to treat compliance as an 
important aspect of risk management and internal audit. Although the majority of antitrust 
scholars agrees that higher levels of sanctions strengthen deterrence of anticompetitive conduct 
and that private actions serve as a useful instrument in this regard, single authors criticize 
additional sanctions in the form of private damages. Wouter Wils,51 for instance, points 
out that greater deterrence can only be achieved through adding individual penalties, in 
particular imprisonment. 52  According to his estimates, “the minimum level of fines 
                                                     
50  Jones C. A., “Private Antitrust in the Global Market: An Essay on ‹‹Swimming without getting wet››”, in 
Monti M., Prince von Lichtenstein N., Vesterdorf B., Westbrook J., Wildhaber L. (eds.), Economic Law 
and Justice in Times of Globalization: Festschrift for Carl Baudenbacher, Baden Baden 2007, p. 443. 
51  Prof. Dr. Wouter P.J. Wils is Hearing Officer of the European Commission and a Visiting Professor at 
King’s College London. 
52  Wils W., “Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer”, World Competition, 28(2), 2005, pp. 
117 – 159. 
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required generally to deter price cartels and other antitrust offences of comparable 
profitability and ease the concealment would be in the order of 150 percent of the annual 
turnover in the products concerned by the violation”.53 Raising the general level of fines to 
such a high level, however, would be impossible or unacceptable, since such high fines 
would breach the statutory ceilings on the amount of fines which can legally be imposed54 
and would often exceed the companies’ ability to pay.55 This problem, W. Wils argues, 
exists just as much for damages as for fines, as well as combination of the two. Therefore, 
adding private actions for damages against companies to fines on companies does not 
bring any additional advantage.56 In the author’s view, evidence from the United States 
shows, that the threat of criminal prosecution is by far the most expressive sanction 
(especially in business circles) and provides for the best deterrence, in particular, if 
combined with administrative fines and director disqualification for all types of antitrust 
violations. In fact, other empirical studies from the United States, not mentioned by W. 
Wils, show that damage awards remarkably contribute to the deterrent effect. A report by 
Robert A. Lande and Joshua P. Davies from the American Antitrust Institute, shows that 
private litigation provides more than four times the deterrence of the criminal fines 
imposed by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice.57 The authors also 
compare the deterrence effects of private antitrust enforcement and prosecutions resulting 
in prison sentences and conclude that, to their surprise, private enforcement is significantly 
more effective at deterring illegal behavior than DOJ criminal antitrust suits. 58  The 
                                                     
53  Wils W., “Should Private Enforcement Be Encouraged…”, cit., p. 484. 
54  As to the fines imposed by the European Commission, the statutory ceiling is set in Article 23(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003 and amounts to 10% of the concerned undertaking’s turnover. A suggestion of the 
OECD Competition Law and Policy Division to raise this ceiling, made in response to the Commission’s 
White Paper preceding the proposal for Regulation 1/2003, was rejected by the European Commission. 
55  However, it is worth noting that the “150 per cent of the annual turnover in the products concerned by the 
violation”(emphasis added) may not always breach the statutory ceilings on the amount of fines (10 % of 
the concerned undertaking’s turnover). This will be the case if the concerned undertaking derives its 
turnover from the sale of various goods and infringes the competition law only with regard to selected 
products. 
56  Wils W., “Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law…”, cit., p. 148. 
57  Lande R. H., Davies J. P., “Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: an Analysis of Forty Cases”, 
University of San Francisco Law Review, Vol. 42, 2008, p. 894. 
58  For detailed analysis, see: Ibid., p. 897; Lande R. H., Davies J.P., “Comparative Deterrence From Private 
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws”, University of San Francisco Law 
Research Paper, No. 17/2010, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693. 
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findings of Lande and Davies correspond with the conclusions of John M. Connor, who is 
cited in the report prepared for the European Commission. This author points out that, in 
the United States, private actions represent the lion’s share of ex post punishment 
(according to his estimates, damage awards account for 90% of the penalties) and have a 
significant deterrent effect.59 
To keep things in perspective, one has to remember that in the US antitrust private 
plaintiffs are awarded treble damages, which are not likely to be introduced in Europe. The 
overall deterrent effect may, hence, not be as high as in the United States. However, the 
accumulation of fines and claims for damages will certainly enhance prevention of 
anticompetitive practices and raise compliance with the law. 
 Closing gaps in the enforcement system c.
A further advantage of private enforcement is that the weakness of public enforcement, 
i.e. the enforcement gap generated by the inability of public enforcement to deal with all 
attention-worthy cases, is counterbalanced. As noted by the scholarship, public authorities 
cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcing for various reasons 
including: budgetary constraints, undue fear of losing cases, or lack of awareness of 
industry conditions. The insufficiency of public scrutiny of anticompetitive conduct can be 
remedied by private actions, which fulfill a relief function. Public authorities can 
concentrate their relatively limited resources on cases which are of general significance for 
competition. Some of these can be of secondary importance for competition authorities 
whereas they might be so significant for an undertaking that it would be willing to take the 
case to court. In this way public enforcement and private actions are complementary. 
Public enforcement is a fundamental pillar of the system, but it has to be focused and make 
the optimum use of the resources that are made available from the public purse. 
Meanwhile, “private attorneys general”,60 motivated by their selfinterest, can remedy the 
public authorities inaction and provide that potential harm to consumers and businesses 
                                                     
59  Report for the European Commission on “Making antitrust damages actions more effective…”, p. 74. 
60  The concept of “private attorney general” is a specific of US antitrust system. In general usage, the term 
“attorney general” refers to public prosecutor. Here, however, it refers to the use of private litigation as a 
means of bringing potential antitrust infringements to court and therefore assisting public authorities in 
their enforcement role. See: Gerber D.J., “Private enforcement of competition law: a comparative 
perspective”, in: The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe, Möllers T., Heinemann A. (eds.), 
Cambridge 2007, p. 437. 
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does not go unchecked. In this way civil actions can not only make a significant 
contribution to the general enforcement of competition law but also fulfill an indicator 
function and improve the accuracy of administrative enforcement. The competition 
authorities often do not realize what is happening in the market,61 whereas victims of 
anticompetitive practices, especially competitors, have the knowledge of the industry and 
are often more informed on the exact length and nature of the infringing conduct. Owing to 
civil lawsuits in the area of antitrust, public enforcers can acquires knowledge from civil 
courts regarding the frequency of competition problems in certain areas and launch 
investigations. In this respect, private actions can help to define focal areas of general 
antitrust enforcement. 
 Bringing competition law closer to the citizen d.
Another benefit of increased private enforcement may be that it can raise awareness of 
potential antitrust infringements on the sides of businesses and consumers. By having the 
opportunity to directly enforce their rights in the field of competition, the citizens can be 
brought closer to competition rules and be more actively involved in the enforcement of 
law.62 
 Strengthening the competition culture e.
Seen in a broader perspective, private actions can also help to strengthen the 
competition principle or competition culture. Successful civil lawsuits show market 
participants, including consumers, that competition rules have to be observed and 
violations can be stopped on their own initiative.63 
                                                     
61  A major premise of administrative enforcement, including leniency programs, is that the participants in 
the market will complain or seek a reduction in fines, thus bringing to the attention of public authorities 
infringing conduct they do not know about. 
62  In this sense, se Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, p. 7. 
63  Report for the International Competition Network, “Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in 
Cartel Cases”, Moscow, May 2007, p. 33, available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc349.pdf.  
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 Macroeconomics benefits f.
Apart from direct impacts on corrective justice and deterrence private enforcement may 
bring significant advantages in macroeconomic terms and contribute to social welfare, by 
ensuring greater allocative efficiency and an impact on productivity and growth. 64  
Properly functioning markets in which there is vigorous competition drive productivity and 
maximize consumer welfare, which has been acknowledged to be an important an 
overriding objective of European competition law in recent years.65 Effective competition, 
often described as the lifeblood of strong economy, provides incentives for companies to 
operate efficiently, contributes to a more effective use of resources, promotes flexibility 
and encourages businesses to innovate. It also forces firms to deliver benefits to consumers 
in terms of price, quality and variety of goods and services. As such, it is the main driver 
behind economic growth, and in the end, the standard of living of citizens. Private antitrust 
enforcement provides for open and competitive markets. Private litigants not only support 
the public authorities in their mission, but they also help to achieve the total welfare 
benefits described above. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU  
In this chapter I will analyze the right to claim damages under the TFEU and in light of 
the case law of the European courts. I will focus on the two milestones judgment – namely 
the Courage and Manfredi – in which for the first time the European judges were 
confronted with the question on whether privates had the right to ask damages for breaches 
of EU antitrust provisions. I will then proceed examining the developments following the 
two judgments. I will go through the Commission’s policy activities in the field of private 
enforcement from the Ashurst report to the Green and White Papers, to the very recently 
approved EU Directive on Damages Actions.  
1. Is there an EU right to damages as a result of the breach of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU? 
Unlike the US antitrust law, 66   the TFEU does not expressly provide a right to 
damages for loss suffered as a result of antitrust infringement. In 1974, the ECJ ruled 
that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and give rise and obligations 
which national courts have a duty to safeguard and enforce.67 
However, until 2001 there had not been a judgment of the Court dealing specifically 
with the question of whether Member States are under an obligation, as a matter of EU 
law, to provide a remedy in damages to compensate harm that has been inflicted as a 
result of an infringement of EU competition rules. The right to damages was not 
immediately obvious, since the only remedy explicitly foreseen in the Treaty is the 
nullity of any contract that violates Article 101(1) TFEU.68 
Yet, the resolution of this uncertainty was of particular importance for private antitrust 
enforcement, given the fact that damages actions have personified this process, 
                                                     
66  See Section 7 of the original Sherman Act 1890, superseded by Section 4 of the Clayton Act 1914.  
67  Komninos A., “New prospects for private enforcement of EC competition law: Courage v. Crehan and 
the  Community right to damages”, CMLR, 39, 2002, p. 458.  
68  Judgment of January 30, 1974 in Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, [1973] ECR 51, para. 16. 
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particularly if one studies the oldest and most developed antitrust system of the world.69 
Moreover, as shown above, the Commission has no power to award damages, 
although it may be able to encourage a defendant to compensate its victims in return 
for a reduction in its fine.70 
Prior to the judgment in 2001, it was unclear whether the right to damages in cases of 
EU competition law infringements was to be derived from EU law or was purely a 
question of national law. The “traditionalist” camp in the legal literature, represented 
primarily by French and German scholars, argued that damages were a matter of national 
remedial and procedural autonomy,  i.e.  they  were  a  question  of  national  law  subject  
to  the  minimum  EU  law requirements of equivalence and effectiveness. The 
“integrationists”, on the other hand, have shown a conviction as to the existence of an EU 
right to damages.71 Arguments for this opinion were based on the Francovich judgment,72 
in which the ECJ introduced the right to (monetary) compensation for the violation of EU 
law. This right was only enforceable against the State and related to State violations of the 
EU law. In the literature, though, “it was thought that there was no compelling  reason to 
differentiate between State and individual liability for damage caused by infringement of  
Community law, since the basis for such liability, which is the principle of […] 
effectiveness of Community law, is not affected by the identity of the perpetrator, i.e. 
whether it is the State or individuals”.73 A point central to that view was that by extending 
the Francovich principle horizontally, there was a similar EU right to damages where an 
undertaking has committed a breach of the EU competition rules. Hence, the question of 
whether or not national law recognized a damages remedy for breach of the competition 
rules was irrelevant, since national courts had to accept and to enforce the EU right to 
damages.74 
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the Community right to damages”, CMLR, 39, 2002, p. 458. 
71  Komninos A., “EC private antitrust enforcement...”, cit., p. 167. 
72  Judgment of November 19, 1991 in Case 9/90, Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357. 
73  Komninos A., “New prospects for private enforcement…”, cit., p. 454 
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The horizontal liability for breaches of EU law was expressly approved by Advocate 
General van Gerven in his Opinion in H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal Corp.,75 in 
which he considered that the general basis established by the ECJ in Francovich also 
applied to the case of “breach of right which an individual derives from an obligation 
imposed by Community law on another individual.” Advocate van Gerven observed that: 
“[t]he full effect of Community law would be impaired if the former individual or 
undertaking did not have the possibility of obtaining reparation from the party who can  
be held responsible for the breach of Community law – all the more so, evidently, if a 
directly effective provision of Community law is infringed.”76 
The arguments raised in the Opinion of Advocate General, were, however, not 
addressed by the European Court of Justice in the case of Banks. The fundamental issue of 
the EU or national law basis of the right to damages in EU competition law infringements 
was finally addressed by the ECJ in Courage judgment of September 20, 2001.77 
2. ECJ Case Law: the first input to Private Enforcement  
 Courage v. Crehan case  a.
The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Courage Ltd v. Crehan arose from a 
reference to it by the English Court of Appeal using the Article 267 TFEU procedure. 
The Court of Appeal requested the ruling in the course of hearing a series of cases that 
raised the compatibility of “beer ties” with Article 101 TFEU. Courage Ltd v. Crehan 
itself concerned two leases of public house (pubs) concluded between Inntrepreneur  
Estates (“IEL”, a company owned equally by Grand Metropolitan plc and Courage Ltd) 
and Mr Crehan. Each lease was an IEL standard form lease and was concluded for a 
period of twenty years. One of the terms of the leases stipulated that Mr Crehan 
agreed to purchase fixed minimum quantities of various beers for resale at the leased 
premises from IEL, or its nominee, and no other person. The specified nominee was 
Courage from 1991 to 1993. 
Mr Crehan ran the two pubs, but made huge losses. In 1993 he surrendered both 
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ECR I-1209. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Judgment of September 20, 2001 in Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, [2001] ECR I-06297. 
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leases. Courage, the plaintiff in the main proceedings, brought an action for the recovery 
of £15,266, alleged to be the price of beers sold and delivered to Mr Crehan. Mr 
Crehan contested the action on its merits. He argued that Courage sold its beers to 
independent tenants of pubs at substantially lower prices than those on the price list 
imposed on IEL tenants subject to a beer tie. Further, he alleged that had he not been 
required to purchase  most of his beers from Courage at full list prices, he could have 
competed with other local pubs on an equal footing and his business would have been 
profitable. Finally, he contended that the beer tie, which made his business fail, was in 
breach of Article 101 and counterclaimed for damages in respect of excessive prices for 
his beer under the void beer tie and for loss caused to his business in consequence. 
According to the Court of Appeal, which referred a question to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling, English law did not allow a party to an illegal agreement to claim 
damages from the other party (“in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis”). 78  
Moreover, in the view of the English Court of Appeal, which was expressed in one of its 
previous judgments, Article 101(1) TFEU was intended to protect third parties, whether 
competitors or consumers, and not parties to the prohibited agreement, since they were 
the cause, not the victims, of the restriction of competition.79  However, referring to the 
US Supreme Court’s opinion in Perma Life Mufflers Inc v. International Parts Corp.,80  
the Court of Appeal recognized that there might be sound policy arguments in favour  
of accepting that where a party to an anticompetitive agreement is in an economically 
weaker position, he may sue the other contracting party for damages. Further, that a 
party to a prohibited agreement such as that before it, might have rights by virtue of 
Article 101 that were protected by EU law. If Mr. Crehan was not afforded a remedy 
by English law, it was possible, accordingly, that the principle of English law denying 
that right was incompatible with,  and superseded by, EU law.81 
The Court of Appeal thus made a reference to the ECJ requesting a preliminary ruling 
on four questions, which aimed to establish, whether Articles 101 TFEU conferred rights 
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on a party to a contract concluded in breach of that provision and, if so, whether such an 
individual, should, in principle be entitled to damages. If damages should be available, 
the Court asked whether, and if so when, the national court may nevertheless deny the 
claim on the basis of its illegality? Whether or not the English court had, in denying the 
Mr. Crehan’s claim, acted in breach of its EU obligations was therefore dependent on two 
questions: “first, whether, as a matter of EU law, national courts were required in 
principle to ensure that an individual could recover in respect of loss caused by another’s 
breach of EU law and; secondly, if they were, whether or not the application of the 
defense of illegality was compatible with the EU principle of effectiveness”.82 
At the outset, the Court of Justice recalled the new legal order created by the Treaty, 
which is integrated into the legal systems of the Member States and which national courts 
are bound to apply, as well as  the rights the Treaty provisions confer on individuals. It 
then moved on to stress the centrality of Article 101 TFEU to the European project, 
since “it constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential  for the accomplishment 
of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the 
internal market”.83  
The Court also reiterated the well-established fact that Article 101(1) TFEU had direct 
effect and did not hesitate in concluding that any individual can rely on breach of 
Article 101(1) TFEU before a national court, even where he is a party to a prohibited 
contract. The Court then went on to stress the obligation of national courts to ensure that 
EU rules took full effect and to protect the rights which those provisions confer on 
individuals. Further, the Court emphasized that: “[t]he  full effectiveness of Article 101 of 
the Treaty and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 
101(1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for  
loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition.”84 
The ECJ also highlighted the instrumental character of such liability for the 
effectiveness of EU in stating that: “[i]ndeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the 
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working of the Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, 
which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that 
point of view, actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant 
contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the Community.”85 
Finally, the Court concluded that, for these reasons, there should be no absolute bar to 
a damages claim, even to one brought by a party to the prohibited contract.86 Insofar as 
the English principle of “in pari delicto” provided an absolute bar to a claim for 
damages under Article 101 TFEU it was thus incompatible with EU law. 87 The ECJ 
stressed that EU law did not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the 
litigant should not profit from his unlawful  conduct, yet in order to deny his right to 
obtain damages from the other contracting party the ruling court must find that the litigant 
bears significant responsibility for the distortion of competition.88 In the ECJ’s view, 
national courts should take into account matters such as the economic and legal context 
in which the parties find themselves and the respective bargaining power and conduct 
of the two parties to a contract.89 Of particular importance would be whether a person 
in a position of Mr Crehan found himself in a markedly weaker position than a brewer 
such as Courage, so as to seriously compromise or even eliminate his freedom to 
negotiate the terms of the contract and his capacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent.  
Also, a contract might prove to be an infringement of Article 101 TFEU for the sole 
reason that it is part of a network of similar contracts which have a cumulative effect 
on competition. In those circumstances it would be the party controlling the network, 
such as Courage, who should bear the significant responsibility for the infringement  of 
the competition rules, not the weaker party who had the terms of the contract imposed 
upon him.90 
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The judgment in Courage Ltd v. Crehan was a landmark in the private enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.91 It is of significance to all damages claims brought within 
the sphere of the competition rules, not  only those involving co-contractors.92 The ruling 
confirmed that the basis for a civil action arising from a breach of the competition 
provisions is firmly grounded in EU law. 93 The recognition of the right does not, in 
principle, depend on national law, although Article 101 TFEU is silent on that point.94 
Significant is the fact that the ECJ did not define any specific uniform EU conditions 
of liability. It delegated the conditions of the exercise of the right to damages to 
national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In the literature, 
thus, it was argued that Courage is a “hybrid” judgment.95 Also, it was claimed that it was 
only the first case, which set out the principle of horizontal liability. The Court, however, 
“left open the future possibility of proceeding in an appropriate way to set out the 
conditions of the remedy in greater detail”.96 
Indeed, as foreseen by the commentators, the contours of the new remedy of a right in 
damages based on Article 101 TFEU were soon further shaped by the Court of Justice 
in the Manfredi ruling. 
 
 Manfredi case  b.
As also described in Chapter III, in the context of the Italian judicial approach to private 
enforcement of competition law, in Manfredi 97  the Italian Competition Authority 
(“AGCM”) imposed sanctions on a cartel  between several insurance companies  active  
in the motor-vehicle civil liability insurance market. The cartel consisted of a complex 
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and structured horizontal agreement aimed at the tied selling of separate products and 
the exchange of strategic commercial information between competing undertakings, 
including: premium prices, terms and conditions of contracts, discount rates, costs of 
accidents and distribution costs, etc. The AGCM demonstrated that through this 
information exchange mechanism, all colluding companies had artificially established 
(from 1994 to 1999) insurance prices 20% higher than the price in a competitive market. 
As a result, at the end of 1999 customers in Italy were paying  the highest price for 
civil liability auto insurance premiums within the European Union. The decision of the 
AGCM, which was challenged by the insurance companies, was essentially upheld on 
appeal to the Council of State. Customers of the insurance companies, including Mr. 
Manfredi, who alleged that they had suffered overcharge, sued for damages for breaches 
of both Italian and EU competition law.98 
Various questions were submitted to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU by the Italian 
court (Giudice di pace of Bitonto), partly as to the right to damages under Article 101 
TFEU and partly as to specific Italian provisions concerning damages claims and internal 
Italian law. The  questions focused on: the entitlement of third parties (consumers) to 
damages, the jurisdiction of national courts, national limitation periods and when they 
begin to run, and the ability of the courts to award punitive damages. 
In confirming its jurisdiction in the Manfredi case, the Court of Justice emphasized 
the Italian court’s right to refer a question for a preliminary ruling, by stating that: “it 
should be recalled that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are a matter of public policy which 
must be automatically applied by national courts”. The  Court also indicated that, 
depending on the specific circumstances of the case at hand, an anticompetitive practice 
may simultaneously infringe both national and EU competition rules.99 On the right to 
damages the ECJ repeated what it said in Courage and added that the full effectiveness of 
Article 101(1) TFEU required that: “any individual can claim compensation for the harm 
suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or 
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practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU”.100  
According to the commentators, the ECJ created a fundamental distinction between 
the “existence” of the right to damages and the “exercise” of that right.101 The Court 
in Manfredi not only confirmed  that  there is an EU right to damages, 102 but also 
defined its “constitutive” conditions.103 The right to damages thus should be open to “any 
individual” as long as there is harm, a competition law violation, and a “causal 
relationship” between the harm and the violation. 
However, for the “exercise” of the right, in the absence of EU rules, “it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing 
the exercise of that right, including those on the application of the concept of causal 
relationship, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
observed.”104 
It is interesting to note that the ECJ did not refer to any requirement of fault over and 
above the proof of the infringement. There is disagreement in the literature as to the 
nature of this “omission”. On one hand, it is argued that the individual civil liability for 
EU competition law violations is strict and that national requirements or conditions of 
fault are incompatible with EU law and must be set aside by national courts.105 On the 
other hand, it is claimed that the issue of fault was not considered by the ECJ in Manfredi, 
and “it cannot be assumed, that the Court implicitly forbade the application of this 
liability element by failing to include it in the list of obstacles and restrictive elements 
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105  Komninos A.P., EC private antitrust enforcement..., p. 175 and 194 ; De Smijter E., O’Sullivan D., 
“The Manfredi judgment of the ECJ and how it relates to the Commission’s initiative on EC 
antitrust damages actions”,  Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 3/2006, p. 25. 
30 
considered compatible with the principle of effectiveness”.106  Rather, it is thought, the 
ruling in Courage implies that the Court approves of “the principle of contributory 
negligence according to which courts may take a “significant‟ responsibility of the 
claimant into account”.107  As a result, the question of whether the list of “constitutive” 
conditions of the EU right to damages given in Manfredi is complete, seems to be 
unresolved. 
With regard to procedural questions, i.e. the executive conditions of the EU right 
governed by national law that seemed to complicate the  Italian claimants’ action and 
were thus referred to the ECJ (rules that allocated jurisdiction in actions for damages 
based on competition law to a different court than the one that would deal with “normal” 
damages claims, thereby increasing the cost and length of the litigation or unfavorable 
limitation periods) the Court, in essence, held that they are compatible with EU law as 
long as they did not offend the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The ECJ, for 
instance, held that national time-limits can be applied as long as they do not make it 
“practically impossible or excessively difficult” to bring a claim.108 
Regarding the possibility of national courts to award punitive damages,109 greater than 
the advantage obtained by the infringer, thereby deterring the adoption of agreements 
or concerted  practices  prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, the Court ruled that they 
may be available if they are also  available for similar domestic claims.110 However, 
they are not specifically required as a head of damage  under EU law, since EU law 
does not prohibit Member States from legislating to prevent unjust enrichment. 111   
Finally, the Court held that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only 
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for actual loss (damnum emergens) but also for loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus 
interest.112 In the court’s view, the total exclusion of loss of profit as a head of damage, 
for which compensation may be awarded cannot be accepted in the case of breach of EU 
competition law. Especially in the context of economic or commercial litigation, “such a 
total exclusion of loss of profit would be such as to make reparation of damage 
practically impossible”.113 As to the payment of interest, the Court contended that it is an 
essential component of compensation.114 
From the perspective of the development of EU private antitrust enforcement, the 
ECJ’s Manfredi decision is to be welcomed. The Court confirmed the judicial origins 
of private enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, since neither the TFEU nor 
Regulation no. 1/2003 provides explicitly for a legal rule on damages. The ruling, 
similarly as the judgment in Crehan, sends out a clear message that the right to damages 
has a Treaty law basis and is derived from the principle of effectiveness of EU 
competition law. 
In Manfredi, the ECJ solved some of the most debated procedural aspects of civil 
actions based on violations of EU competition rules. It clarified the scope of the civil 
right to damages for breach of Article 101 TFEU in relation to standing, causation, 
limitation periods and the extent of damages available. Nevertheless, the ruling in 
Manfredi also revealed where the main “problem” lies with EU private antitrust 
enforcement. The Court continued to leave some considerable discretion to national 
courts to apply procedural rules of their domestic judicial systems, as well as the 
substantive rules of recovery in tort, delict, restitutionary and other actions.115 These rules, 
however, vary between Member States and can lead to differing levels of protection in EU 
countries or even inhibit successful damage claims.116 It is precisely because of this, and 
the paucity of damages litigation in the EU, that the Commission set out to identify the 
“obstacles” to successful antitrust damage actions in the Member States and to consider 
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whether measures can or should be adopted to reduce and eliminate them. Its initiatives in 
this field are discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
3. The post-Courage developments in the European Commission - towards a 
coherent European approach to actions for damages? 
 The Ashurst report a.
The ECJ’s ruling in the Courage case provided an impetus for the Commission to 
adopt a more pro-active  stance on the question of private enforcement in Europe and 
make the remedial right become a reality across the EU. Soon after the European Court 
of Justice rendered the Courage judgment the European Commission ordered an external 
study which analyzed the conditions for claims for damages in the Member States in 
the case of infringement of EU competition rules. The results of that study, known as 
the Ashurst Study were published in 2004 and showed an “astonishing diversity and 
total underdevelopment” of civil antitrust actions in the  Member States”.117 The study 
revealed that up to mid-2004 there were 60 judged cases for damages  actions (12 on 
the basis of EU law, around 32 on the basis of national law and 6 on both). Of these 
judgments 28 had resulted in a damages award being made (8 on the basis of EU 
competition law, 16 on national law and 4 on both).118 It is possible that  these figures 
to some extent misinterpret the number of damages actions that have been brought, since 
many cases are settled out-of-court on the basis of confidentiality,119 however the Ashurst 
Report did highlight numerous obstacles to private enforcement of the EU competition 
rules in national legal orders. Its findings led the Commission to commence efforts to 
enable private parties to enforce EU competition law. Already in the modernization 
programme in 1999, the Commission recognized that its public enforcement agenda 
cannot be achieved by the competition authorities alone and that private enforcement of 
EU competition rules is a necessary component. Given the fact that it was still in it its 
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infancy, or at least not practiced on the scale familiar from other jurisdictions, especially 
the US,120 the Commission decided to take a more active stance with regard to private 
actions and encourage the use of private competition law remedies before the national 
courts. 
 The European Commission’s Green Paper on Damages Actions for b.
Breach of the EC antitrust rules 
On December 19, 2005 the Commission published a Green Paper, “Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, 121 the aim of which was to identify the main 
obstacles to a more efficient system of damages claims and to set out different options for 
further reflection and possible action to improve damages actions both for follow-on 
actions and for stand-alone actions. The Commission has been considering whether 
measures can or should be adopted to harmonize national procedural and substantive rules 
governing damages claims, for instance on costs, access to evidence, limitation periods, 
standing, class or representative actions, fault and/or defences, such as passing on 
defence. Interested parties were invited to comment during a consultation period which 
ended on April 21, 2006. Following a short description of motives and objectives, the 
Green Paper listed a number of legislative proposals for improving the enforcement of 
civil law sanctions for violations of EU competition law in the Member States. The 
Commission identified the following obstacles to damages claims that exist in the 
Member States and key areas for discussion and possible legislative action: 
i. Access to evidence 
In many Member States (especially those with civil law background) it is difficult 
to get access to evidence held by the party committing an anticompetitive practice.  The 
Commission in the Green  Paper thus invited discussion on issues such as whether 
special rules should be introduced on disclosure of documentary evidence in civil 
proceedings for damages under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (and if so, in which form) 
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and whether there should be special rules regarding access to documents held by a 
competition authority.  Further, the Commission proposed to consider whether the 
claimant’s burden of proving the antitrust infringement in damages actions should be 
alleviated and, if so, how. 
ii. The fault requirement 
The Commission invited comments on the issue whether, in addition to the necessity to 
prove the infringement, a damages action for breach of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU 
should require fault to be proven (a requirement in tortious proceedings in some Member 
States) or whether the liability should be strict. 
iii. Damages 
With regard to damages, the Commission proposed to discuss how damages should be 
defined and quantified and whether the Commission should publish guidance on 
quantification. In addition, the Commission contemplated, whether double damages for 
horizontal cartels should be introduced. Such awards could be automatic, conditional or 
at the discretion of the court. 
 
iv. The passing-on defence and indirect purchaser’s standing 
Another key issue for discussion raised by the Commission referred to rules on the 
admissibility and operation of passing-on defense and indirect purchasers standing. 
v. Defending consumers’ interests 
The Commission proposed to reflect on how consumers’ interests could be defended 
(especially those with small claims) and whether special procedures should be 
introduced to bring collective actions. If so, the Commission suggested to analyze how 
such procedures could be framed  (for instance, whether a cause of action should be 
available to consumer associations). 
vi. Cost of action 
Another area in which obstacles to damages claims were found related to costs.  The 
Commission invited comments whether cost rules operate as incentive or disincentive 
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for bringing an action and whether special rules should be introduced to reduce the cost of 
risk of the claimant. 
vii. Coordination of private and public enforcement 
The Commission also proposed to discuss how public and private enforcement 
could be coordinated and, in particular, how it can be ensured that damages actions do 
not impact negatively on the operation of leniency programs. With regard to impact 
on leniency programs, one option put forward by the Commission assumed that 
conditional rebate could be awarded to a leniency applicant. Alternatively, if  
participants in hardcore cartels would be liable to double damages, the successful 
leniency applicant would be at risk only of single damages. 122 The Commission also 
accepted that leniency applications should not be disclosed in the course of discovery, if 
it would be introduced. 
viii. Jurisdiction and applicable law 
One of the last problems submitted for discussion touched on issues from the area of 
private international law. The Commission was interested in opinions as to which 
substantive law should be applicable to antitrust claims and whether the general rule 
contained in Art. 5 of the so-called Rome II Regulation was satisfactory.123 
The Green Paper did, as anticipated, stimulate debate was met with broad interest in 
the antitrust community: it was discussed on various conferences and stimulated debate at 
the OECD, 124 the European Parliament and the national parliaments of EU Member 
States. The Commission received 1 4 9  submissions, which were later on published on 
the website of Directorate General (“DG”) for Competition.  The majority of the 
respondents were in favor of enhanced private enforcement and acknowledged its 
complementary role in the overall enforcement scheme.  There was widespread agreement 
that victims  of  competition  law infringements are entitled to damages and that national 
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rules should provide for effective redress. 125 However, there were also warnings that 
stronger incentives for private enforcement could foster frivolous claims and, perhaps even 
more importantly, endanger public enforcement since private actions would interfere with 
the leniency programs that have so far contributed to the substantial progress made by the 
Commission and by national authorities in detecting hardcore cartels. 126 Against this 
background and the request of the European Parliament to prepare a detailed proposal 
that would address the obstacles to effective antitrust damages actions,127 the Commission 
published a White Paper on Damages Actions accompanied by two Commission staff 
working papers and a very long impact report submitted by an external team of 
academics.128 
 
 The European Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions for c.
Breach of the EC antitrust rules 
The White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules was 
published on April 2, 2008 and is a response to the public consultation process first 
triggered by the Green Paper by inviting stakeholders to comment on the questions and 
proposals put forward by the Commission. It contained a broad range of measures aimed 
at stimulating damage claims and to ensure compensation to victims. Regarding its legal 
nature, the document did not have any binding effect.129 It envisaged a combination of 
measures at  EU and national level. On the one hand, it called Member States to create 
procedural rules and conditions to make antitrust damages actions more effective and 
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provide for greater legal certainty across the EU.130 On the other hand, the Commission 
argued that such a “soft-law” instrument would not be sufficient and that a “European 
legal framework” for an effective antitrust damages regime would have been a better 
solution.131 
i. The key objectives and underlying principles 
With regard to its primary objective the White Paper stated that it is to ensure that all 
victims of infringements of EU competition law have access to a truly effective 
mechanisms for obtaining full compensation for the harm they suffered. The need for 
improvement in this area can be explained by the fact that, despite some positive 
developments in the Member States following the publication of the Green Paper, the 
victims of the EU antitrust infringements only rarely obtained reparation of the harm 
suffered. The amount of compensation that victims are usually forgoing is in the range 
of several billion euro each year.132 Moreover, the majority of the Member States have 
had no real experience of private antitrust damages actions to date. The ineffectiveness 
of the right to damages is largely due to various legal and procedural hurdles in the 
Member States‟ rules governing antitrust-related damages claims in national courts. 
Traditional rules of civil liability and procedure are often inadequate for actions for 
damages in the field of competition law, due to the specificities of the actions in this 
field, such as complex factual and economic analysis required, unavailability of crucial 
evidence and often unfavorable risk/reward balance for claimants.  
The general goal of the White Paper was therefore “to improve the legal conditions 
for victims to exercise their right under the Treaty to reparation of all damage suffered as 
a result of a breach of the EU antitrust rules”.133 The proposals in the White Paper are 
put forward with consideration to three main guiding principles, namely: 
- full compensation is to be achieved for all victims – nevertheless, it is also 
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acknowledged that an enhanced level of actions for damages will also 
“produce beneficial effects in terms of deterrence of future infringements and 
greater compliance with EU antitrust rules”;134 
- the legal framework for more effective antitrust damages actions is to be 
based on a genuinely European approach that should reflect legal culture and 
traditions of the Member States;135 
- the effective system of private enforcement by means of damages actions is 
meant to complement, and not to replace or jeopardize public enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the competition authorities 
of the Member States claimants. 
The issues addressed in the White Paper concerned all categories of victims 
(consumers and businesses), all types of breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and 
all sectors of the economy.136 What follows here is a brief review of the proposals made 
by the Commission in the White Paper. 
 
ii. Proposed policy measures 
a) The scope and calculation of damages 
The ECJ in Manfredi confirmed that the principle of effectiveness requires Member 
States to ensure  that victims of antitrust infringements are compensated for the actual 
loss (which results from the illegal overcharge) and the loss of profit (which results from 
the drop in demand caused by the price increase). Moreover, the Court emphasized that 
harm must be compensated at real (rather than nominal) value and it thus required that 
(pre-judgment) interest shall also be paid. 
The White Paper suggested to endorse this broad definition of the harm caused by 
antitrust infringements and to accept the acquis communautaire to serve as a minimum 
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standard in the Member States. In the Staff Working Paper the Commission 
acknowledged that according to the jurisprudence of the ECJ exemplary or punitive 
damages, if awarded under national law, are not contrary to the European public 
order,137 yet it did not propose any measures of such nature at EU level.  By limiting 
damages to single awards, the Commission favored the compensatory principle over the 
deterrence principle. In this respect, the “modest” proposal of the Commission was 
welcomed, as it was believed to be in line with the European norms and values.138 
As regards the quantum of damages, the White Paper recognized that even when the 
scope of  damages is clear, the victim of the antitrust infringement may face difficulties 
in proving the extent of the harm suffered. The calculation of damages, involving a 
comparison with the economic situation of the victim in the hypothetical scenario of a 
competitive market, may be a very cumbersome task. Under some circumstances it can 
even become impossible for the victim to show the exact amount of the loss. The 
Commission therefore proposed to produce a non-binding guidance on the calculation of 
damages in antitrust cases in order to provide judges and parties with pragmatic solutions 
to these often complicated exercises. The guidance was only announced in the White 
Paper. It was drafted by the DG Competition of the Commission on the basis of an 
external study prepared by legal and economic practitioners as well as academics and 
submitted for public consultation in June 2011.139 
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b) Standing: indirect purchasers and the passing-on defence 
In Courage and Manfredi the ECJ stressed that “any individual” who has suffered 
harm caused by an antitrust infringement must be allowed to claim damages before 
national courts. This principle has given the Commission the mandate to establish a 
wide basis for legal standing to bring damages claims and to embrace indirect 
purchasers, i.e. purchasers who had no direct dealings with the infringer, but who 
nevertheless suffered harm because an illegal overcharge was passed on to them along the 
supply chain. 
The position adopted in the White Paper appeared to be in clear contrast to the United 
States. There the rule at federal level prevents indirect claims. Thus, damages actions are 
not allowed where there is only an indirect nexus between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
for instance, the situation of a consumer who buys the goods from a retailer and not 
directly from the manufacturer – who is the infringer.140 
The American choice was based on concerns about the complexity implied by indirect 
claims, especially the difficulties in tracing the alleged overcharge through multiple 
layers of distribution, as well as the assumption that it is more efficient for direct 
purchasers to bring a private-antitrust claim and that the deterrence objective is better 
served by letting direct purchasers sue for the full amount of damages.141 The European 
Commission’s choice, on the other hand, has been in line with the guiding principle of 
the White Paper, i.e. full compensation of all victims. The Commission preferred to 
adopt a compensation-based approach that allows all the victims (including indirect 
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purchasers) to seek redress, but also to allow the defendants to invoke the so-called 
passing-on defense. According to the Commission, if ultimately there was no harm 
suffered, there should also be no compensation.142 Purchasers of an overcharged product 
or service who have been able to pass on that  overcharge to their own customers should 
therefore not be entitled to compensation of that overcharge. Nevertheless, the passing-
on of the overcharge may well have led to a reduction in sales.  Such loss of profits 
should undoubtedly be compensated by the one who is responsible for the initial 
overcharge.143 
In order to avoid unjust enrichment of purchasers who passed on the illegal overcharge, 
as well as multiple compensation of the overcharge, the White Paper suggested to allow 
the infringer to invoke the passing-on defense. The Commission appeared keen to stress 
that the standard of proof for the passing-on defense should not be lower than the 
plaintiff’s standard of proof of the damage.144 The plaintiff, thus, must proof the loss he 
suffered but the defendant may show that the plaintiff mitigated the loss by passing on 
the overcharge (or part of it) to the downstream purchasers. 
The White Paper also addressed the case where an indirect purchaser invokes the 
passing-on of overcharges as a basis to show the harm he suffered. The Commission 
noted that purchasers at, or near the end of the distribution chain are often those most 
harmed by antitrust infringements, but given their remoteness from the wrongdoer they 
find it particularly difficult to prove the existence and the scope of the illegal 
overcharge that was passed on to their level. In consequence, they are not compensated 
and the infringer, who may have successfully used the passing-on defence against other 
plaintiffs upstream, retains the unjust enrichment. To avoid such scenario, the White 
Paper suggested to lighten the victim’s burden of proof and that indirect purchasers 
should be able to rely on a rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed 
on to them in its entirety.145 This presumption could be rebutted by the infringer, for 
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example by referring to the fact that he has already paid compensation for the same 
overcharge to someone higher up in the distribution chain then the plaintiff.146 According 
to the Commission, the described presumption would be a very limited, although 
important, alleviation of the victim’s burden of proof, since the plaintiff would still be 
under a duty to prove the  initial  infringement, the existence of the initial overcharge 
and the scope of his damage.147 
c) Collective redress mechanisms 
The answer to the passing-on question adopted in the White Paper led to an 
enforcement problem. In fact, if the overcharge is passed along the distribution chain, the 
damage is most likely scattered among large groups of customers. If it finally stops with 
consumers, the individual harm has often such a low value that an individual action does 
not make any sense. As a result, many such victims currently remain uncompensated.  
Indeed, a major issue concerning competition law enforcement is how to deal with 
mass harm situations, i.e., situations in which many potential claimants have been harmed 
by the same unlawful conduct.  Damages actions are particularly difficult where the 
amount of harm suffered in each individual case is too small to justify the risks and bring 
the cost of litigation because the risks are out of proportion to the expected benefits. For 
this reason, in the past ten years, as part of its efforts to enhance competition law 
enforcement, the Commission tried to solve the underenforcement problem by introducing 
two complementary mechanisms of collective redress. 
In June 2013, it finally took action by embracing a horizontal approach - i.e., one 
across different areas of law - in the field of collective redress through the use of non-
binding tools.148  Thus, collective redress mechanisms are not addressed directly as part of 
the new 2013 Commission package – that deals exclusively with competition law 
enforcement – but are the object of a separate Communication and a Recommendation by 
                                                     
146 Becker R, Bessot N., De Smijter E, “The White Paper on damages actions…”, cit., p. 6. 
147  Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, paras. 215 and 220. 
148  In the Proposal, the Commission justified its choice not to include competition-specific provisions on 
collective redress but rather adopt a horizontal approach by explaining it was made “in the wake of 
stakeholders’ responses [to the public consultation] and the position of the European Parliament”.  
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the Commission.149 
The Commission’s purpose was to offer alternative means of court action for victims 
such as consumers of SMEs that would otherwise be unwilling to seek compensation 
given the costs, uncertainties, risks and burdens involved.150 
The collective redress is a mechanism whereby multiple claimants sharing the same 
characteristics seek a remedy against the same defendant.  Collective redress can be 
divided into two broad categories.  There can be representative actions brought by 
consumers organizations or trade associations on behalf of their members and collective 
actions brought directly by individual on behalf of a group. 
 
Traditionally, representative actions have predominated across EU jurisdictions.  
However, for enforcement purposes, it would not be realistic – nor safe – to merely rely on 
representative bodies since they usually have limited government  funding151 and might 
end up being exposed to political and economic pressure. In addition, representative bodies 
might have no incentive to bring expensive and time-consuming actions since they 
normally do not get to keep part of the damages and, if the action is unsuccessful, they are 
also be exposed to the risk of paying the defendant’s litigation costs – according to the 
loser pays principle. 
 
Therefore, in recent years, most Member States have also introduced the possibility for 
individuals to bring a collective action – without a representative body – on behalf of a 
whole group of claimants. 
 
With regards to procedural mechanisms of collective actions, the two common models 
that have been adopted across jurisdictions are either the opt-in or opt-out mechanism.   
 
                                                     
149 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions - “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, 
COM (2013) 401. Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms of June 11, 2013, C (2013) 3539/3, published on June 26, 2013 OJ 
L201/60, also available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf.  
150  Becker R., Bessot N.,De Smijter E, “The White Paper on damages actions…”, cit., p. 7. 
151 An example of an successful government funded entity is the German Verbraucherzentrale 
Bundesverband (The Federation of German Consumer Organizations) - a consumer association acting 
as an umbrella for 41 German consumer associations which is very active and mostly financed by the 
federal government. Its monopoly position also contributes in making it easier to bring representative 
actions before German courts.  
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 Opt-in collective actions 
In opt-in collective actions, members are required to join the claim and a judgment will 
bind only those who participated. Thus, the group members must be identified before 
bringing the action. Conversely, in opt-out actions the claim can be brought on behalf of an 
unidentified group of people and the judgment will bind every member of the class except 
those who have timely opted-out.  In Europe, some form of collective action exists in 
nearly every Member State.152 
Most jurisdictions introduced opt-in mechanisms, whereas a few States have both the 
opt-in and opt-out model (see infra).153 
Thus, an opt-in collective action combines in one single action the claims from those 
victims who expressly decide to combine their individual claims for damages into one 
action. Such a system improves the situation of the plaintiffs by making the cost/benefit 
analysis of the litigation more attractive, since it allows them to reduce the litigation 
costs and share the evidence. There has been much discussion on whether the Commission 
should suggest an opt-in mechanism, which is closer to the European legal traditions,154 or 
rather a US-style opt-out mechanism, whereby an individual brings an action on behalf 
of an unidentified class of injured persons and the victims represented are all those 
who do not expressly declare that they will not participate in an action. Opt-in 
collective actions are claimed to make the litigation more complex by requiring the 
identification of the plaintiffs and the specification of the harm allegedly suffered, 
whereas an opt-out mechanism allows a wider representation of the victims and can 
thus be seen as more efficient in terms of corrective justice and deterrence.155  Yet, 
                                                     
152  Approximately 20 EU Member States have introduced different forms of collective injunctive or 
collective compensatory redress mechanisms. See report commissioned by DG SANCO on “Evaluation 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – Final 
Report” (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-26.pdf  
153 Numerous Member States have introduced collective redress systems after 2000. See, for instance, 
Bulgaria in 2006 and 2008, Denmark in 2005, 2008, and 2010, Finland in 2007, Hungary in 2009, Italy 
with the reform of 2009, Lithuania in 2003, Netherlands in 2005, Poland in 2010, Sweden in 2003. 
More recently, France and Belgium also introduced similar systems. See infra for further details. 
154  Stuyck J. “Class Actions in Europe? To Opt-In or to Opt-Out, that is the Question”, EBLR, 20(4), 
2009, p. 483.  
155  Becker R., Bessot N., De Smijter E., “The White Paper on damages actions…”, cit., p. 7. 
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opt-out actions in the United States, combined with other features, 156  have been  
perceived to encourage nuisance and lead to excesses.  Against the EU background, the 
Commission considered it more appropriate to suggest opt-in collective actions.   
The Commission, in its 2013 Recommendation,157 not only advocated for of opt-in 
regimes but also stressed that any exception to them should be duly justified by reasons of 
sound administration of justice.158 It argued that opt-in systems “respect the right of a 
person to decide whether to participate or not” in a claim and also make it easier to 
determine the combined value of the individual claims..159 
 
With regards to the other main provisions included in the Recommendation, the 
Commission encouraged Member States to set up general registries for collective redress 
actions in order to allow any interested parties to freely access information..160 
 
It also underlined the importance of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) as a 
possible solution that should be incentivized at any stage and suggests that settlements 
would be reviewed by a competent court.161 
The Recommendation prescribed that, with respect to representative actions, in order 
to have standing, entities should have non-profit character and be officially designated 
either in advance or ad hoc.162 
Hence, national courts would have prior control on legal standing and funding of the 
organizations bringing the claim, this way ensuring that cases in which the conditions for 
                                                     
156  E.g. jury trial, liberal discovery rules, contingency fee arrangements, the award of costs and attorneys’ 
fees to the successful plaintiff, without the corresponding requirement that the unsuccessful plaintiff pay 
the defendant’s costs and attorneys’ fees, joint and several liability (without any guarantee of 
contribution), treble damages. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, p. 17; A. Jones, B. 
Sufrin, “EU Competition Law…”, cit., p.1187. 
157 Commission Recommendation of June 11, 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of 
rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU) C(2013), OJ 2013 L201/60. 
158 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 8, para. 21 “The claimant party should be formed on the basis 
of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed (‘opt-in’ principle). Any 
exception to this principle, by law or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound 
administration of justice.”  
159 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 11-12. It’s interesting to notice that the counterarguments to 
opt-in actions have been relegated to the footnotes (38 and 39) of the Communication. 
160 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 9, paras. 35 and 36.  
161 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 8, para. 25. 
162 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 6, para. 4. 
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collective redress are not met or cases are promptly discontinued. 
 
This is only one of the several safeguards proposed by the Commission. In fact, in line 
with the widespread criticisms against the U.S. system, the Recommendation explicitly 
suggested that punitive damages,163 jury trials, and intrusive pre-trial discovery164 shall be 
avoided in order to prevent the development of abusive litigation in mass harm situations.  
With regards to the financial aspects of bringing a collective action - which will also 
further analyzed below - the Commission explicitly disfavored contingency 
fees,165 whereas did not move objections to third-party funding if it is disclosed before trial 
and there is no conflict of interest between the funder and the claimants..166  
Finally, the Recommendation supported the loser pays principle as the general rule 
applicable to collective actions.167  
Against this new background, it is not quite clear whether the overall situation is 
slightly brighter or darker than before.  It seems undeniable that the Recommendation was 
an attempt to balance diverging interests; a compromise based on a realistic estimation 
that, in light of political tensions, nothing else seemed possibly achievable in the short 
period of time remaining to the Barroso II Commission.168  However, as argued infra, this 
framework – even against the new background of the EU Damages Directive – might not 
be able to positively influence competition law enforcement in Europe. 
 
• Representative actions 
A representative action for damages is an action brought by a natural or legal person 
on behalf of two or more individuals or businesses who are not themselves parties to 
                                                     
163 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 9, para. 31 “[…]punitive damages leading to 
overcompensation in favor of the claimant party of the damage suffered, should be prohibited”. 
164 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 3, (15). 
165 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 9, para. 30: “The Member States that exceptionally allow for 
contingency fees should provide for appropriate national regulation of those fees in collective redress 
cases, taking into account in particular the right to full compensation of the members of the claimant 
party”.  
166 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 9, para. 30 with regards to the prohibition of contingency 
fees and p. 7, paras. 14-16 with respect to funding 
167 See Recommendation COM(2013) 401/2, p. 7, para. 13. 
168 In this sense, see Stadler A., “The Commission Recommendation on common principles of collective 
redress and private international law issues”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, vol. 4, 2013, p. 484. 
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the action. It is aimed at obtaining damages for the individual harm caused to the 
interests of all those represented (and not to the representative entity).169 The White 
Paper suggested the introduction of representative actions, to be brought by qualified 
bodies, for instance trade associations or consumer associations that may be either 
officially designated in advance or certified on an ad hoc basis by the public 
authorities of a Member State for a particular antitrust infringement. These qualified 
entities would need to meet specific criteria set in the law. These criteria, together with 
the risk that the designation is withdrawn in case of excesses would help prevent abusive 
litigation. According to the Commission, the damages would be awarded to the 
representative entity, who is the party bringing the action. Where possible, it is preferable 
that the damages be used by the entity to directly compensate the harm suffered by all 
those represented in the action (e.g. the harm suffered by the producers in a given 
industry). However, the Commission did not exclude the possibility that, 
exceptionally, damages could be awarded indirectly (e.g. damages attributed to a fund 
protecting the interests of victims of antitrust infringements in general).170 
The two above mentioned mechanisms of collective redress are considered 
complementary in the White Paper. It is assumed that opt-in collective actions are more 
likely to be used by businesses or victims having suffered a significant individual harms, 
since they require at the outset a positive action from the victims. Conversely, the 
representative action mechanism is conceived to target the victim’s traditional inertia 
when the harm suffered individually is of low value. Also, the victims of antitrust 
infringements retain the right to bring an individual action for damages if they so wish. 
In the view of the Commission, all these possibilities to bring individual actions 
constitute a set of solutions that should significantly improve the victim’s ability to 
effectively enforce their right to damages. However, the White Paper also noted that 
safeguards should be put in place to avoid that the same harm is compensated more than 
once.  The nature of such safeguards was not discussed in the documents prepared by the 
Commission. The issue of  multijurisdiction litigation (for instance a situation in which 
representative and opt-in actions occur more or less simultaneously in multiple countries) 
                                                     
169  Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, para. 49. 
170  Ibid., para. 56;. Becker R, Bessot N., De Smijter E, “The White Paper on damages actions…”, cit., p. 7. 
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was also not addressed. 
It is worth noting that, with regard to group litigation, the White Paper proposals 
were part of the Commission’s wider initiative to strengthen collective redress 
mechanisms in the EU. Following the joint information note by EU Commissioners for 
Justice, Competition and Consumer Policy, on the need for a coherent approach to 
collective redress, 171 a public consultation on this topic was held from February 4 to 
April 30, 2011. The purpose of the public consultation, among other things, was to 
identify common legal principles on collective redress in the EU and to examine how 
such common principles could fit into the EU legal system and into the legal orders of 
the 27 Member States. 
d) Limitation periods 
Taking into account that statutory provisions regarding limitation periods vary among 
EU Member States,172 the White Paper suggested to adopt a uniform limitation period to 
allow for an effective private enforcement of EU competition rules. With regard to 
stand-alone cases, the Commission proposed that the limitation period should not start 
to run before a continuous or repeated infringement ceases or before the victim of the 
infringement can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the infringement and the 
harm caused to him. It did not, however, determine a minimum duration of the limitation 
period. To keep open the possibility of follow-on actions, the Commission put forward 
solutions to avoid limitation periods expiring while public enforcement of the competition 
rules by competition authorities (or the review courts) is still ongoing. In this respect, 
the Commission suggested that a limitation period of at least two years starting only 
once the infringement decision on which a follow-on plaintiff relies has become final. 
The Commission believed that such a rule would not have unduly prolonged the legal 
                                                     
171  European Commission, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps – 
Joint Information Note by Vice-President Viviane Reding, Vice-President Joaquin Almunia and 
Commissioner John Dalli, SEC(2010) 1192, available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2010/EN/2-2010-1192-EN-1-0.Pdf. 
172  Some EU countries use subjective periods which start running on the date the potential plaintiff 
discovered or should have discovered the damage (e.g. France, Portugal, UK, Finland). A few Member 
States have objective limitation periods which begin to run irrespective of the knowledge of the plaintiff 
(Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Sweden). Finally, some Member States apply both types of time limit (e.g. 
Austria, Germany, Poland). Ashurst, “Study on the conditions of claim for damages in case  in case 
of infringement of EC competition rules. Comparative Report”, p. 87. 
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uncertainty for the infringer, while it would have enabled the plaintiff to bring a 
damages claim once the illegality of the practice has been finally established. 
e) Costs of damages actions 
While it was acknowledged in the White Paper that costs associated with antitrust 
damages actions and cost allocation rules can be a decisive disincentive to bring an 
antitrust damages claim, the Commission did not suggest any specific changes on 
national cost regimes. The White Paper only encouraged the Member States to reflect 
on their cost rules, including the level of court fees, the cost allocation principles and 
the ways of funding. The Commission highlighted the necessity for Member States to 
give due consideration to mechanisms fostering early resolution of cases, for instance by 
settlements. As articulated further infra, the experience in the US suggests that as 
private enforcement becomes more prevalent in Europe, nations will indeed have to find 
ways to facilitate the funding and settlements of claims both within the national 
context and within a more global context, recognizing that many cartels operate 
globally.173 However, in the EU, as long as there is no effective pan-judicial protection of 
the victim’s right to damages for breach of antitrust rules, settlements mechanisms will 
remain of secondary importance. They will have a real value once the court alternative 
becomes credible.  Thus, at this stage, the first step should be to focus on the funding of 
the actions brought before national courts should be the first problem to address.  
 
f) Access to evidence: disclosure inter partes 
Victims of antitrust infringements u s u a l l y  find themselves in a dilemma: antitrust 
damages cases are very fact-intensive since the proof of the infringement, the quantum of 
damage and the relevant causal links all require an unusually complex assessment of 
economic interrelations and effects. Much of the needed evidence, however, often lies 
inaccessibly in the hands of the infringers, who often put much effort into concealing the 
relevant information. According to the Commission, the current systems of civil 
procedure in many Member States offer, in practice, no effective means to overcome the 
information asymmetry that is typical of antitrust cases. In consequence, infringers are 
                                                     
173  Vrcek B., “Overview of Europe”, in: Foer A., Cuneo J. (eds.), “International handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, Cheltenham 2010…”, p. 293. 
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able to keep crucial evidence to themselves, which means that victims are discouraged 
from bringing a claim for compensation, and if they do, judges are not able to decide the 
case for their sake, since they lack sufficient evidence.174 
It order to help private plaintiffs to prove the factual basis necessary for a claim 
under Article 101 or 102 TFEU, the Commission suggested already in the White Paper 
to  pursue a minimum harmonization of procedural laws through a disclosure 
mechanism that would follow the approach of the Intellectual Property Directive  
2004/48/EC.175 Under this approach, obligations to disclosure arise only once a court 
has adopted a disclosure order and they are subject to a strict control by this court. 
According to the White Paper, “conditions for a disclosure order should include that the 
claimant has: 
- presented all the facts and means of evidence that are reasonably available to him, 
provided that these show plausible grounds to suspect that he suffered harm as a 
result of an infringement of competition rules by the defendant; 
- shown to the satisfaction of the court that he is unable, applying all efforts 
that can reasonably be expected, otherwise to produce the requested evidence; 
- specified sufficiently precise categories of evidence to be disclosed; and 
- satisfied the court that the envisaged disclosure measure is both relevant to 
the case necessary and proportionate.”176 
In this way the Commission intended to avoid, on the one hand, unwelcome 
externalities such as US-style “fishing expeditions”177 or “discovery blackmail”178 and, on 
the other hand, major obstacles to revealing the truth simply because the relevant 
                                                     
174  Becker R., Bessot N., De Smijter E., “The White Paper on damages actions…”. p. 9. 
175  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ [2004] L 157/45. 
176  White Paper on Damages actions, COM (2008) 165 final, p. 5. 
177  The term “fishing expedition” describes a strategy to elicit in an unfocused manner, through very broad 
discovery requests, information from another party in the hope that some relevant evidence for a damages 
claim might be found. 
178  The term “discovery blackmail” describes a strategy to request very broad discovery measures entailing 
high costs with the intention to compel the other party to settle rather than to continue the litigation, 
although the claim or the defence may be rather weak or even unmeritorious. It is a strategy that can be 
employed by both claimants and defendants. 
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evidence happens to be under the control of the wrongdoer.179 
 
g) Probative value of NCA decisions 
Further important issue addressed in the White Paper related to the evidential value of 
the NCA decisions. To these days, where a breach of EU antitrust rules has been found 
in a decision of the European Commission, victims can rely on this decision as binding 
proof in follow-on civil proceedings for damages (Art. 16(1) of Regulation no. 1/2003). 
The Commission found that there was a range of compelling reasons for a similar rule 
in relation to national competition authorities when they find a breach of Article 101 or 
102 TFEU.180 Therefore, the White Paper advocated that a final decision by an NCA and 
a final judgment by a review court upholding the NCA decision or itself finding an 
infringement should be accepted in every Member State as an irrebuttable proof of the 
infringement in subsequent civil antitrust proceedings for damages.181 In the view of 
the Commission, such a rule would not only increase legal certainty, especially for 
victims of the infringements, but also enhance the effectiveness of private enforcement 
of EU competition law by allowing a rational division of labour and allocation of 
resources between courts and specialized agencies. Moreover, it would also provide for 
consistency in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and reduce the difficulties 
that victims encounter when they have to prove their case.182 
h) Fault requirement 
Another topic that was covered by the White Paper (and which is relevant in the 
context of proving a case) relates to the fault requirement.  The Commission noted that in 
some Member States it is sufficient to prove the infringement of the EU competition 
                                                     
179  Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, para. 70. 
180  As was discussed in chapter 1, at present, such a rule exists only in the national law of some Member 
States, e.g. Germany, UK or Hungary. 
181  White Paper on Damages actions, COM (2008) 165 final, p. 6. The rule would only apply to  
positive decisions confirming the infringement. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, para. 
152. 
182  Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, para. 144. 
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rules (and obviously the damage it has caused) in order to be awarded damages. 183  
However, under the rules of tort law of most of the Member States plaintiffs must usually 
provide some evidence of the defendant’s fault in causing the damage and show intent 
or negligence. 184 The idea behind this additional requirement is that wrongdoers who 
did not know that they were breaking the law should not be held liable for the negative 
consequences of their behavior. The Commission is of the opinion that the full 
application of this requirement to breaches of directly applicable EU competition rules 
cannot be reconciled with the principle of effectiveness of those rules. 185  That is 
because the burden of proving fault lies with the plaintiff, who is often unlikely to 
have information that allows him to prove intent or negligence. Accordingly, the White 
Paper suggested the introduction of a no-fault liability regime, with the possibility of the 
defendant to escape liability if he can demonstrate that the infringement was the result of 
an excusable error. The Commission explained that this would occur “if a reasonable 
person applying a high standard of care could not have been aware that the conduct 
restricted competition”.186 
i) Interaction between leniency programs and actions for damages 
A final – yet very important – topic covered by the White Paper attained to the 
relation between leniency programs and actions for damages. The Commission 
introduced the leniency program in order to encourage greater detection of cartels.187 
By whistle-blowing on a cartel, the cartel member may obtain full or partial immunity 
from fines. In recent years such forms of detection have influenced the large fines 
                                                     
183  Amongst these countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Cyprus, UK, and Ireland – according to the 
Ashurst, “Study on  the conditions of claim for damages in case in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules. Comparative Report”, p. 50. 
184  This group of countries includes Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary 
Poland and Portugal. Ibid., p. 50. 
185  Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 404, para. 175. See, in this context, the Manfredi 
ruling, in which fault is not mentioned explicitly by the ECJ as a condition of the EU right to damages. 
However, it is not excluded, either. 
186  White Paper on Damages actions, COM (2008) 165 final, p. 7. In the literature it is suggested that  
this exception could only be used to cover certain non-hard core (such as Research and Development) 
and vertical agreements, which are novel. Nebbia P., Szyszczak E, “White Paper on Damages Actions…”, 
p. 646. 
187  Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ 2006 C 298/17. 
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which have been imposed on serious cartels. The Commission acknowledged that the 
conflict of protecting leniency programs on one hand, and ensuring a fair compensation to 
the victims of antitrust infringements, on the other hand, needs to be balanced. The 
protection of leniency is also in the interest of private applicants who wish to bring 
follow-on damages actions, since they can profit from the decisions of competition 
authorities based on leniency applications. Therefore, in order to preserve the 
effectiveness of leniency programs, the Commission suggested to offer enhanced 
protection to leniency applicants in private actions for damages. In the White Paper, the 
Commission proposed not to disclose corporate statements188 by leniency applicants and 
thus make an important exception to the disclosure obligations described above.  This 
protection would apply to all applications (successful or not) submitted under EU or 
national leniency programs when the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU is at issue.189 
According to the Commission, such protection would have avoided placing the leniency 
applicant in a less favorable condition that its co-infringers. Otherwise, the threat of 
disclosure of the confession submitted by a leniency applicant could have a negative 
influence on the quality of his submissions, or even discourage an infringer from applying 
for leniency altogether. In the White Paper, the Commission also put forward for further 
consideration the possibility of limiting civil liability of the successful immunity 
applicant to claims by his direct and indirect contractual partners. The purpose behind 
the rule is to make the amount of damages to be paid more predictable and limited, since 
plaintiff who did not buy goods or services directly or indirectly from the immunity 
recipient would not have standing to claim damages. The protection of the leniency 
programs as foreseen by the Commission met some concerns.  The Commission’s 
proposal departed from the broad rule on standing recognized by the Court of Justice in 
Courage and Manfredi and favored deterrence over compensation.  
It has been questioned whether it is not overly generous to limit the civil liability of 
immunity recipients. The general idea of leniency is to grant a rebate in fines to 
someone who helps to discover the infringement and has to be distinguished from the 
compensation issue. Linking the two matters would  amount to “a contract at the 
                                                     
188  The voluntary presentations by a company of its knowledge of a cartel and role therein which are 
drawn up specially for submission under the leniency program. Ibid., point 31. 
189  White Paper on Damages actions, COM (2008) 165 final, p. 10. 
54 
expense of third parties (the victims) between the authority and the wrongdoer”.190  
Thus, there would be no reason to mitigate the compensation principle. It has been 
argued that the Commission proposal to introduce stricter rules controlling the disclosure 
of corporate statements was sufficient in order to avoid making the leniency applicants 
more vulnerable than the co-infringers and that their protection should not go as far as to 
protect any leniency application, regardless of its success. Many feared that this might 
have led to a situation where leniency applications would serve as a shield to 
disclosure therefore undermine the effectiveness of the measure.191 
 Reactions to the White Paper d.
Following the publication of the White Paper, the Commission received numerous 
comments that were published on its website. The overall reception of the document can, 
at best, be characterized as lukewarm. Some commentators expressed their 
disappointment with the allegedly modest approach adopted in the White Paper. In the 
editorial of its June 2008 issue, the Common Market Law Review commented that “a 
little more action could be a lot better for the enforcement of competition law”.192 Yet, 
with regard to the Member States’ reactions, there was widespread agreement that the 
Commission should not have gone any further in its efforts to encourage private 
litigation; on the contrary, resistance against the Commission’s initiatives appeared to 
have grown. Almost all Member States raised questions as to the Commission’s 193  
authority to intervene at the EU level in their national law in order to facilitate antitrust 
damages claims. Some Member States expressly opposed to the necessity of European 
legislative measures. In their joint response to the Commission, the German 
Government and Bundeskartellamt concluded that they could not “discern any convincing 
                                                     
190  Drexl J.,  Gallego B., Enchelmaier M., Mackenrodt M., Podszun R., “Comments  of  the  Max  Planck 
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191  Ibid., p. 811. 
192  Editorial comment, “A little more action please! – The White Paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules”, CMLR, 45(3), 2008 
193  “Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice,  
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reasons for special private law and civil procedural rules for enforcing antitrust law”. 
In the same line of argument, the Austrian Government objected to the White Paper’s 
aim of creating a “special law of damage compensation” 
(“Sondernschadenersatzrecht”).194 
The Member States’ unenthusiastic attitude to the White Paper was noticed as well in 
the European Parliament. A report of March 9, 2009 by the European Parliament’s 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON),195 followed by a Resolution of 
the European Parliament on March 26, 2009, 196  expressed modest support for the 
Commission’s proposals – in particular those relating to collective redress.197  In general, 
however, the report echoed the concerns raised by the Member States and questioned 
the Commission’s competence for its proposals.198 
In the legal literature the White Paper also received strong criticism. Besides the 
argument that there was no basis in the Treaty for the measures proposed by the 
Commission, it was claimed that the White Paper created a potential for 
overcompensation.199 In particular, the Commission’s proposal on the passing-on defence 
was argued to entail such risk and was therefore heavily criticized. According to some 
commentators, “if accepted, the Commission’s proposed measures regarding the passing-
on would put the defendant in the position of having to both prove and disprove the 
passing on. Vis-à-vis the direct purchaser, the defendant would have to prove that all or 
                                                     
194 “Österreichische Stellungnahme zum Weißbuch‚ Schadenersatzklagen wegen Verletzung des EG- 
Wettbewerbsrechts”, p. 2, available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/oster_de.pdf.  
195  Lehne K. (rapporteur), Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Report on the White 
Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules (2008/2154 (INI)), A6-0123/2009, available 
at: http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:228:0040:0046:EN:PDF. 
196  European Parliament Resolution of March 26, 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) available at:  
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-
0187+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
197  The European Parliament, however, called for an integrated approach to the issue of collective redress. 
The resolution showed strong reservations to the idea that private enforcement of competition rights 
should be favored and prioritized over other forms of collective redress, leading to an arbitrary and 
unnecessary fragmentation of national procedural laws. Ibid., points 5-6. 
198  ECON, “Report on the White Paper…”, p. 9. 
199  Kortmann J., Swaak C., “The EC White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions: Why the Member States 
are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic”, ECLR, 30(7), 2009, p. 344. 
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part of the alleged overcharge was passed on down the distribution chain. By contrast, 
vis-à-vis indirect purchasers would have to prove the exact opposite, that is, that the 
alleged overcharge was not passed on to them”. 200  If the defendant would be 
unsuccessful to prove the passing-on vis-à-vis the direct purchaser and fail to rebut the 
presumption invoked by indirect purchasers who would rely on the alleged passing-on, 
he would face multiple liability for the same overcharge.  In reality, it was argued, 
there are no effective “mechanisms” available to national courts to ensure that claims 
from different levels of the distribution chain are concentrated in the same court. 
Therefore, multiple liability would be a likely consequence of the Commission’s 
model.201  As one author put it, such would provide for “jackpot justice”.202 
Another major concern was the way in which the framework proposed by the White 
Paper would affect the national systems. The national rules of tort law form an integral 
part of the private law systems in the Member States. Several scholars exposed the fear 
that changes to these rules, even minor ones, would affect the internal coherence of 
these systems and run counter to the basic principles that inspire the development of a 
unified private law. 203   Thus, the creation of specific procedures and substantive 
requirements for competition law damages actions was regarded as undesirable, mainly 
due to the worry that “the special treatment of competition law cases might  have 
possible unforeseen effects”.204 
4. The European Commission package of June 2013 
On June 11, 2013, the European Commission adopted a package to facilitate damages 
claims by victims of antitrust violations with the purpose to enhance access to justice and 
                                                     
200  Ibid., p.345. 
201  Ibid., p. 345. See also: ECON, Report on the White Paper…, p.11. 
202  See the Dutch Retail Association’s response to the White Paper, p. 4, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/dutchretail_en.pdf. 
203  See, for instance, Kortmann J., Swaak C., “The EC White Paper on…”, p. 347; Marcos F.,. Graells A.S, 
Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonizing 
Tort Law through  the Back Door?, European Review of Private Law, 3, 2008, p. 483. 
204  Association of  European  Competition  Law Judges,  “Comments  on  the  Commission’s  White Paper  
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, p.1, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/judges_en.pdf.  
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regulate some aspects of the interaction between public and private enforcement The 
package is composed by a “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union” (“Proposal”),205 a Communication on quantifying harm in actions for damages,206 
and an accompanying Commission Staff Working Document - Practical Guide on 
quantifying damages.207 
The Proposal – the pillar of the package – has been subsequently subject to legislative 
scrutiny.  In December 2013, the Council agreed upon its general approach on the 
Commission's Proposal. That gave the Council Presidency mandate to start negotiations 
with the Parliament and the Commission with a view to reaching an agreement in the first 
reading. In January 2014, the Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
(“ECON”) voted its report on the Proposal and in February the informal trilogue 
discussion started, along with several technical meetings.  In March 2014, a full 
compromise was achieved and an amended version of the Proposal was circulated. 
Following this political agreement by the three main institutions, the Proposal has been 
formally approved by the Parliament on April 17, 2014.  A formal approval by the Council 
has completed the ordinary legislative procedure on November 26, 2014.208 
With respect to the Proposal, the Commission maintained that its aim was to ensure the 
effective exercise of EU right to compensation and regulate some aspects of the interaction 
between public and private enforcement. 
                                                     
205 Proposal of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law and for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and the European Union of June 11, 2013, COM (2013) 404, 2013/0185 (COD), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0404. 
206 Communication on quantifying harm in actions for damages quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU of June 11, 2013, 2013/C 167/07, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:167:0019:0021:EN:PDF.  
207 Commission Staff Working Document: Practical Guide quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU accompanying the Communication from the Commission on 
quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU of June 11, 2013, 
SWD (2013) 203, available at: 
  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf.  
208 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ 2014 L 349, p. 1–19. Available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.349.01.0001.01.ENG. 
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During negotiations, the two major points of contention were the access to evidence 
and the recognition of cartel decisions of authorities in one EU member state by judges in 
other states. 
 
With regards to access to evidence and disclosure of leniency documents, after the 
balancing of interest test and case-by-case approach were established by the European 
Court,209 the Proposal now advocates for the non-disclosure of documents that have been 
obtained solely through access to the file of an agency in return for leniency or settlement 
submissions. As a compromise, it has been agreed that judges will be able to review the 
documents to ensure that they have correctly been identified as exempt from disclosure.210 
It has also been agreed to remove the cross-border binding effect of national decisions 
(which was part of the original Proposal). While within a Member State final decisions by 
NCAs and courts shall be deemed to be “irrefutably established”, foreign final decisions 
shall only be considered by other Member States as means of evidence. Hence, they can be 
used as prima facie evidence abroad but they will not automatically bind foreign judges.211 
Furthermore, with respect to the joint and several liability of undertakings, the latest 
Proposal introduced a SME exception.  In fact, the final version of Article 11 exempts 
entities with a relevant market share below 5% and that would be “irretrievably 
jeopardized” by the joint liability regime, unless those entities actually led the 
infringement, coerced others to participate, or had already previously infringed 
competition law.  Article 11 also contained a provision in favor of immunity recipients 
who would be jointly and severally liable to other injured parties only where full 
compensation cannot be obtained from other undertakings involved in the same 
infringement. 
The Proposal still included a provision explicitly recognizing the possibility of passing-
on of overcharges,212 it confirmed the rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements 
                                                     
209  See case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, [2011] ECR I-516 and case C-536/11 
ChemieBundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and others, judgment of June 6, 2013. 
210 Article 7 of the Proposal. Member States remain free to classify the documents as inadmissible or choose 
other ways to protect the files amongst the instruments available under national law. 
211 Article 9, paras. 1 and 2 of the Proposal. 
212 Article 12 establishes the principle that full compensation might be claimed by both direct and indirect 
purchasers. However, claimants can only be awarded the amount of compensation corresponding to the 
actual harm. Hence, compensation shall not exceed the overcharge. The provision also contains the 
passing-on defense, thus the latter has the burden of proving the overcharge was passed on. 
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cause harm,213 and prescribed a limitation period of at least five years. 
Finally, the Proposal also introduced in Article 2 a new section on damages that could 
be awarded for violations of competition law, whereby it explicitly states that “[f]ull 
compensation […] shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, 
multiple or other types of damages.”214 
For the purposes of giving a bird’s-eye view on the Proposal, I will briefly go through 
the set of measures proposed to assist claimants in bringing private damages actions 
arising out of infringements of EU and national competition law.  One of the key issues 
addressed by the Directive Proposal were ensuring access to evidence, while at the same 
time providing certain classes of leniency documents protection from disclosure and 
effectively giving NCAs’ decisions the same probative value as Commission decisions in 
order to ensure that national courts would not be able to take any decision running counter 
to an infringement decision by a NCA or review court.   
The Proposal also aimed at extending limitation periods within which potential 
claimants must bring their claims and confirming the joint and several nature of co-
infringers' liability, but limiting the potential liability of immunity recipients. Furthermore, 
the Commission proposed to confirm the availability of the passing-on defence, unless it is 
legally impossible for the entity to which the overcharge was passed to claim 
compensation.   
In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives, the key provisions of the Proposal 
provided that national courts shall be able to order disclosure of evidence by other parties 
or third parties where the requesting party can show that the evidence is relevant to 
substantiating its claim or defence.  The requesting party specifies either pieces of the 
evidence or as precise and narrow categories of that evidence as it can.  However, 
disclosure shall not be disproportionate, and when considering whether to order disclosure 
the national court shall consider the legitimate interests of all parties concerned.   
                                                     
213 Article 16, 2a of the Proposal of March 24, 2014. See also (36a) of the preamble: “To remedy the 
information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying antitrust harm, and to 
ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages, it is appropriate to presume that in the case of a cartel 
infringement, such infringement resulted in harm, in particular via a price effect. […] This presumption 
should not cover the concrete amount of harm. The infringer should be allowed to rebut such 
presumption.” The reformulation, in the Proposal of March 24, 2014, takes great care to make clear that 
there is no double presumption here, as each individual claimant still has to show that harm was caused to 
him. 
214 Article 2a of the Proposal of March 24, 2014. 
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National courts shall be prohibited from ordering disclosure of leniency corporate 
statements and settlement submissions.  Other documents that the NCA or the undertaking 
being investigated prepared for the investigation, such as responses to requests for 
information and statements of objections, can only be disclosed after the regulatory 
proceedings have concluded.  That is not to say that those documents will be disclosed, but 
that national courts can order their disclosure.  These provisions would be applied equally 
to documents that an undertaking has obtained solely by way of access to the regulatory 
authority's file.  The provisions in respect of access to leniency documents follow on from 
the recent European case law.  In 2011, the Court of Justice held in Pfleiderer215 that it is 
for national courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to allow claimants access 
to leniency documents submitted by a defendant to a competition authority.  In doing so, 
the court should undertake a balancing act between the need to protect the leniency regime 
as an effective tool of public enforcement and the claimant's right to effective redress.  
Most recently, the Court held in Donau Chemie216 that EU law precludes a provision of 
national law that provides that disclosure of documents from the competition authority's 
file is subject to the consent of all parties to those proceedings, without leaving any 
opportunity for the national court to undertake the balancing act laid down in Pfleiderer. 
Moreover, decisions of NCAs and review courts shall have the same probative effect as 
Commission decisions.  National courts would therefore not be able to take any decision 
running counter to an infringement decision by a NCA or review court of any Member 
State.   
With respect to the limitation period, the Proposal established that it shall be at least 5 
years and shall not begin to run before a potential claimant knows, or can reasonably be 
expected to know, of the relevant behavior and the fact that it constitutes an infringement 
of competition law and caused it harm, and the identity of the infringer.  Importantly, the 
limitation period shall be suspended if a competition authority begins an investigation and 
the suspension will not end until at least one year after an infringement decision has 
become final (i.e. after any appeals).  Limitation shall also be suspended for the duration of 
a consensual dispute resolution process.  This will result in a considerable extension of the 
                                                     
215  Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-516. 
216  Case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, [2013], not yet reported. 
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limitation period in many Member States.  Moreover, the Proposal confirmed that entities 
that participate in collusive infringing behavior are jointly and severally liable for the 
damage caused, and an infringing entity has the right to bring contribution proceedings 
against other infringing entities.  However, leniency applicants that are granted immunity 
from fines are offered some protection and will generally be liable only for harm caused to 
their own direct and indirect customers and to other claimants to the extent that they 
cannot obtain full compensation from other infringing undertakings.  Successful immunity 
applicants will also receive limited protection from claims, but will still be exposed to 
claims from its own direct and indirect customers. The intention is to discourage claimants 
from targeting the immunity recipient, but not to relieve it of liability entirely. 
The passing-on defence is contemplated by the Proposal which however provided that 
the defendant will bear the burden of proof.  Hence, the passing-on defence could not be 
invoked, however, to the extent that it is legally impossible for the entity to which the 
overcharge was passed to claim compensation.  Defendants will no doubt welcome 
confirmation that the passing-on defense is to be available under the laws of all EU 
Member States, at least in most cases. 
According to the Proposal, an indirect purchaser could prove that an overcharge was 
passed on to it (and so will have a claim) if it can show that the defendant infringed 
competition law, that the direct customer of the defendant paid an overcharge, and that it 
purchased the same goods or services that were the subject of the infringement or goods or 
services derived therefrom.  The defendant retains the right to show that the overcharge 
was not wholly or partly passed on to the indirect purchaser. 
As to the burden of proof, in the case of a cartel infringement, there shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that there was an overcharge.  The burden and level of proof in respect of 
quantification of damages should not be unduly burdensome such that the right to damages 
is practically impossible or excessively difficult.  In addition, national courts must be 
allowed to estimate the amount of harm.   
Finally, with respect to settlements, the Proposal established that, following a 
settlement, the claimant’s claim would be reduced by the value of the settling infringer’s 
share of the harm suffered by the claimant and that non-settling infringers could not 
recover contribution from the settling infringer for the remaining claim.  
The final text of the Directive has been formally adopted on November 26, 2014.  
Although it is still too early to draw substantive conclusions, a more detailed analysis of 
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the measures that Member States will have to implement within the next two years and 
some first thoughts on the provisions is offered infra in chapter V.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ITALIAN 
COURTS 
1. Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Italy: an overview. 
The Italian competition law system is relatively young. For decades, 
anticompetitive conduct was solely examined under the Italian Civil code (“Codice 
Civile”) provisions prohibiting unfair competition. However, at the end of 1990, after 
a very long drafting process, the first Italian Competition Act was adopted in strict 
adherence with the competition law provisions contained in the EC Treaty.217  It has 
been pointed out that such a delay allowed the Italian competition law system to 
start directly from the most advanced front of competition law, thus avoiding facing a 
significant part of the previous troubled development.218 This is true only in part. In 
fact, the Competition Act has been based on an old-fashioned competition culture 
which has been strongly influencing the interpretation and even the application of such 
new rules in courts.  Indeed, prior to the enactment of Law no. 287/90  (“the Italian 
Competition law”), competition was perceived as a business for enterprises,219 a kind 
of special field of law with a marked individualistic dimension in which the concept of 
‘free competition’ was seen as a synonym for entrepreneurial economic freedom.220  
The Codice Civile prohibitions of unfair competition have been intended to protect 
solely commercial enterprises against anticompetitive acts by direct competitors.  Such 
an individualistic dimension, in which the public interest in a competitive market was 
not taken into account at all, has for decades been one of the deepest cultural barriers 
                                                     
217  Law No. 287, dated October 10, 1990 “Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato”. The Italian 
Civil code provisions prohibiting unfair competition are provided for by article 2598 and followings. 
218  In this sense, see Tesauro G., “Concorrenza e Autorità Antitrust, un bilancio a 10 anni dalla legge”, 
speech given at Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roma, October  9-10, 2000. 
219  However in Italy, at the beginning of the 20th century some typical legal reasoning of the modern 
antitrust law has been anticipated, by a case-law tendency. See Ghidini, “I limiti negoziali alla 
concorrenza”, in Galgano, Trattato di diritto commerciale, IV, 31, 1981. 
220  Meli M., “Autonomia Privata, Sistema delle invalidità e disciplina delle intese anticoncorrenziali”, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 2001. 
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between the Italian competition law environment and the most developed competition 
law systems in the world. 
In such an old-fashioned cultural environment any private enforcement rule of 
competition law, in which the consumers would have had a proactive role in promoting 
the enforcement of competition law in court, was inconceivable.  Just few years ago, in 
2003, the Corte di Cassazione firmly denied consumers legal standing under Italian 
competition law,221 only recognizing such standing for the first time in 2005.222 
Notwithstanding the ECJ held, more than thirty years ago, that the prohibitions laid 
down in articles 81 and 82 EC (now article 101 and 102 TFEU) are directly effective 
and that the national courts should safeguard the rights which litigants can derive the 
prohibitions, private enforcement in Italy, as well as in other EU countries, is still in its 
infancy.  Its use is very far from the scale known in other jurisdictions, especially the 
United States, where some 90% of antitrust proceedings are initiated by private parties. 
As already pointed out, in the European Union, however, the emphasis has traditionally 
lain with public enforcement (both by the Commission and by national authorities). 
This is why competition law in Italy was originally conceived as an administrative tool, 
a means for the State  to intervene in market processes in order to achieve public goals. 
The marked administrative path was evidently in the legislator’s mind when the 
Italian Competition law was adopted. In fact, the Italian legislator adopted a kind of 
‘binary’ system in which the task of dealing with national competition matters was split 
between the civil judicial authority and the administrative one depending on the 
(private or public) nature of the interests needing protection.223  Pursuant to Law no. 
287/90 , the administrative ‘side’ is made up of the Autorità Garante per la 
concorrenza ed il mercato (“AGCM”), a public agency with a structure and powers 
                                                     
221  Corte di Cassazione judgment of February 4, 2005, No. 2207, Foro It.; Judgment of the Corte di 
Cassazione dated December 9, 2002, No. 17475, Foro it., 2003, I.  The issue of consumer standing under 
Italian competition law is discussed in § 3. As noted by Palmieri A. and Pardolesi R., the Italian 
competition law system “has been living for almost two years the nightmare of a dimidiated antitrust law 
system” as a consequence of the 2003 “false move” by the Corte di Cassazione “that has been threatening 
to nip private enforcement in the bud”. See Palmieri A. & Pardolesi R., “L’antitrust per il benessere (e il 
risarcimento del danno) dei consumatori”, (2005), I 1015 Foro It.  
222  Corte di Cassazione judgment No. 2207. 
223  For an introduction to the Italian Competition Law system, see Fattori & Todino, “La disciplina della 
concorrenza in Italia”, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004. 
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resembling those of the Commission (the AGCM having wide powers to investigate 
and sanction violations of Italian competition law), the Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale del Lazio (“TAR Lazio”), an administrative Court, which has exclusive 
administrative jurisdiction - in first instance - on the AGCM’s Decisions; and the 
Consiglio di Stato (“Council of State”) competent to hear appeals against the AGCM 
Decisions in the second instance. 
The other side of the “binary” competition law system is the civil judicial authority. 
Pursuant to  article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 , the ordinary second instance court (i.e., 
the Corte d’Appello territorially competent) has exclusive jurisdiction on civil actions 
based on national competition law (i.e., actions aimed at obtaining interim relief and 
claims for damages arising out breach of national competition rules224  The exclusive 
jurisdiction provision of article 33(2) constitutes an exception to the ordinary Civil 
procedure rules on jurisdiction, 225  the legislator having conferred the private  
enforcement of national competition rules to Courts of Appeal, “in recognition of the 
fact that a higher court is better placed to deal with disputes involving complex 
economic assessments”.226  This decision regarding exclusive jurisdiction also reflects 
an effort to avoid judicial fragmentation, and to secure uniformity and specialization 
through the appointment of a small number of courts with a regional jurisdiction. 
Notwithstanding the legislator’s good intentions, article 33(2), has highlighted at least 
two serious structural weaknesses in its judicial application it does not take a clear 
position on the issue of consumer standing and it is not applicable to law suits 
concerning violations of EC competition rules. 
At first glance such an approach appears inconsistent with the EU competition law 
system in which private enforcement is perceived as an essential tool to create and 
                                                     
224  Under the article 33(2) of Law 287/90, “Actions for nullity and for damages as well as actions for 
obtaining interim relief in connection with violation of the provisions set forth in Titles from I to IV are 
brought before the Corte d’Appello having territorial jurisdiction”.  By the ordinary Civil procedure 
rules on jurisdiction, the Giudice di Pace or the Tribunale have jurisdiction as court of first instance, 
further details are provided in the § 3. 
225  By the ordinary Civil procedure rules on jurisdiction, the Giudice di Pace or the Tribunale have 
jurisdiction as court of first instance, further details are provided in the § 3. 
226  Tesauro G., “Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules in Italy: The Procedural Issues”, (2001) 
European Competition Law Annual, p. 267. 
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sustain a competitive economy in the common market. 227  As stressed out above, 
damages actions based on infringement of competition law actually serve several 
purposes: compensating those who suffered a loss as a consequence of anticompetitive 
behavior; ensuring the full effectiveness of the antitrust rules of the TFEU; 
discouraging anticompetitive behavior and contributing significantly to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the EU.  The new regime under Regulation no. 
1/2003 increases the likelihood of consumer actions becoming a central pillar of an 
effective competition law system within the EU.228  
The desirable increase in the frequency of consumers’ private actions in the 
Common market may be jeopardized; however, by the negative influence of some 
cultural and legislative elements - most of them even cryptic - present in the individual 
legal systems of the Member States.  Remarkable differences are, in fact, still present in 
Member States’ legislation on civil suits based on competition rules, in particular 
regarding legal standing, standard of proof, class actions, limitation period, and  
punitive or exemplary damages.229  The result of a private action based on a violation 
of EU competition law is therefore highly influenced, if not jeopardized, by the variety 
of national rules regarding civil actions. Even the compensation for the damage 
suffered by a customer as a consequence of an agreement that violates article 101 
TFEU largely depends on the compatibility of the national rules of the Member State 
with the EU competition law system.  On this point, the Ashrust comparative report 
revealed that specific national rules on procedural aspects of civil actions adversely 
affected the success of the private enforcement of competition law.  There is no doubt, 
however, that the effectiveness of private enforcement mainly depends on the 
consumer’s proactive attitude. Consumers are those who exist at the final level of the 
                                                     
227  Commission Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Brussels, 19.12.2005, 
COM (2005) 672 final, p.3. 
228  In this sense, See Kroes N., “Damages actions for Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Realities and 
Potentials”, Cour de Cassation, Paris, October 17, 2005; Monti M., “Private litigation as a key 
complement to public enforcement of competition rules and the first conclusions on the implementation of 
the new Merger Regulation”, 8th Annual Competition Conference, Fiesole, Italy, September 17, 2004; 
Woods D., Sinclair A. & Ashton D., “Private enforcement of Community competition law: modernization 
and the road ahead”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/2004_2_31_en.pdf.  
229  See Ashrust Comparative Report, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement 
of EC competition rules, August 31, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html. 
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production/distribution chain and by consuming finish the whole economic process.  
The consumer is better placed (i.e., has economic incentives) to promote a civil action 
against the company which has illegally disrupted the competitive economic setting of 
the market. This is the case when the end buyer, for instance, has to pay an artificially 
increased price for a determined product or service; or he gives up a certain product or 
service due to the higher price imposed by the monopolist or by the cartel. Proactive 
consumers alone, however, are not enough to achieve effective private enforcement of 
competition law. Access to national courts is also a prerequisite. 
Following to the preliminary ruling ex article 234 EC (now article 267 TFEU) by the 
Giudice di Pace of Bitonto, the judgment of the ECJ in Joined Cases C-295-298/04 
focused on four aspects of national procedure that govern private actions in the 
Member States, namely the entitlement to rely on the invalidity of a practice prohibited 
under EC competition law and the concomitant right to claim damages; the limitation 
period for seeking compensation and the ability of the national courts to award punitive 
damages).  The applicants in the main proceedings brought their actions before the 
Giudice di Pace to seek compensation for damages suffered as a consequence of an 
anticompetitive practice.  Each company involved, in fact, had sanctions imposed by 
the AGCM in 2000 for engaging in illegal practices in violation of article 2 of Law 
no.287/90.  The Giudice di Pace decided to stay the proceedings and to refer some 
questions on the interpretation of article 81 EC (now article 101 TFEU) to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling.  With its first question the national Court asked 
whether an agreement or concerted practice which infringes national rules on the 
protection of competition, may also constitute an infringement of article 81 EC.  It then 
referred for clarification four procedural issues: the entitlement to rely on the invalidity 
of an agreement or practice prohibited under EC competition law and the concomitant 
right to claim damages; the compatibility of the article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 with 
EC law; the limitation period for seeking compensation for harm caused by an 
agreement or practice prohibited under article 81 EC; and the ability of the national 
courts to award punitive damages.  It follows a more in-depth analysis of the four 
questions submitted to the Court in the next section dedicated to providing a description 
of the structure of the RCA’s illegal agreement. 
2. The RCA Cartel 
By decision no. 8546 of July 28, 2000, the AGCM imposed sanctions on a cartel 
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between several insurance companies active in the motor-vehicle civil liability (“RCA”) 
insurance market. 230   The AGCM found that thirty-nine insurance companies had 
joined the RCA cartel from 1994 to 1999; among them were all of the top twenty 
insurance companies in the market. The RCA cartel was in blatant violation of 
competition law: the joint market share of the colluding companies reached 80% of the 
domestic RCA insurance market. 
The AGCM investigation started in 1999 on the basis of the assumption that 
between 1994 and 1999, RCA insurance premiums were significantly higher in Italy 
than in the other major EU Member States.  The Eurostat data report showed that in 
1994 (the year of RCA insurance tariff liberalization) Italy had the lowest insurance 
premium prices among European Member States, 231 and that just five years later, in 
1999, the premium prices had grown 63% in comparison with the European average.  
At the end of 1999 customers in Italy were paying the highest price for RCA insurance 
premiums within the EU.  This artificial price increase took place in a market 
characterized by very rigid elasticity from the demand side.232  In fact, in the Italian 
legal system, in order to compensate for damages suffered by third parties, insurance 
against motor-vehicle accidents and third party liability is compulsory.233  This means 
that in Italy anyone owning a motor-vehicle and wanting to use it in public areas (or in 
other places qualified by law as public areas) has to subscribe to an RCA insurance 
policy. From an economic point of view this means that the Italian RCA insurance 
market is inelastic because customers cannot easily react to the generalized price 
increase of RCA insurance premiums, unless they stop using their motor-vehicle in 
public areas. 
Through its market investigation, the AGCM found several typical elements of a 
non-competitive market. First, the stability of the undertakings’ market shares. 234  
                                                     
230  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 261.  
231  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 75. 
232  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 79.   
233  In order to grant the restoring of damages suffered by third parties as a consequence of motor vehicle 
circulation, the Italian legislator adopted the Legge No. 990, of December 24, 1969 on Assicurazione 
obbligatoria della responsabilità civile derivante dalla circolazione dei veicoli a motore e dei natanti. 
234  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 87 et seq. 
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Second, the presence of a major dominant group of companies and a fringe of smaller 
ones. Third, an anomalous speeding up of the premium price increase especially in the 
recent period235 and the fact that the premium price increased much more in the Italian 
market than the European average. 236  Finally, the companies’ inability to reduce 
production costs237 and a market demand elasticity very close to zero.238   
Although the AGCM found several elements which indicated the presence of 
“strong barriers to entry”,239 the market affected by the horizontal cartel was defined 
as having a national dimension.240  In the AGCM’s view, the fact that several, “foreign 
insurance companies joined the cartel does not weigh on the market’s geographical 
dimension” mainly because, “to operate in this business, foreign companies have to set 
up in Italy their own distribution and liquidation structures, as well as to adapt 
themselves to Italian law on mandatory motor-vehicle insurance”. 241   The cartel 
consisted of a complex and structured horizontal agreement aimed at the “extended and 
pervading” exchange of all kinds of strategic and sensitive commercial information 
including: premium prices, terms and conditions of contracts, discount rates, sales 
takings, distribution costs, and accident costs, and so on.  RC Log, an Italian consulting 
firm specialized in the insurance business, played a central role in the exchange of 
information.  The cartel worked in the following way: each insurance company was 
subscribed to the RC Log database; by virtue of such subscription, each company 
regularly sent its own commercial data (e.g., premium  prices, terms and conditions of 
contracts, discount rates, sale takings, distribution costs, accident costs, etc.) to RC Log 
with the specific aim of receiving in exchange the competitors corresponding data. RC 
Log were periodically publishing (and distributing to all their subscribers) reports 
which contained all this commercial data in aggregate form. In order to improve such a 
                                                     
235  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 71. 
236  AGCM Decision No.8546, paras. 70 and 75. 
237  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 77 et seq. 
238  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 195 et seq. 
239  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 92.  
240  AGCM Decision No.8546, paras. 64 and 65. 
241  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 92. 
70 
complex information exchange mechanism, the colluding companies had several direct 
contacts between them (e.g., informal meetings, etc.) with the aim of better defining the 
framework of their cooperation and even of choosing which new companies would be 
admitted to the illegal information exchange. 
The AGCM demonstrated that through this information exchange mechanism, all 
colluding companies had artificially established (from 1994 to 1999) insurance 
premium prices 20% higher than the price in a competitive market. 242 The overall 
anticompetitive effect of the illegal activity was the elimination of every degree of 
uncertainty about the competitors’ strategic behavior in the market. The AGCM 
imposed sanctions on the cartel on the basis of article 2(2) of Italian Law no. 287/90 
(the equivalent of article 101 TFEU) and imposed heavy fines on the colluding 
companies. 
In a subsequent administrative proceeding for the annulment of the AGCM’s 
Decision, taken by the insurance companies, both the T.A.R. Lazio243 (as Court of first 
instance) and the Consiglio di Stato (as the Court of Appeal) confirmed the validity of 
the decision to impose sanctions on the cartel.  Due to the significant number of 
companies who had joined the illegal agreement and to the mandatory nature of the 
RCA insurance policy, most Italian motor vehicle drivers were damaged by the 
cartel.244  Indeed, when they realized that their insurer had joined the cartel, many of 
the policy subscribers, despite the relatively minor monetary damage suffered, 
immediately gave their lawyer a procura litis to sue the colluding insurer in a civil 
proceeding.  The consumers’ reaction to the illegal agreement was quite remarkable; 
only a few months after the publication of the AGCM decision, a significant number of 
follow-on civil actions for damages had already been brought before the Italian civil 
courts by policyholders against the colluding insurer. In spite of article 33(2) Law no. 
287/90 , by which the Corte d’Appello has exclusive jurisdiction on civil actions based 
                                                     
242  AGCM Decision No.8546, para. 259.   
243  TAR Lazio, sez. I, July 7, 2001, No. 6139, in Foro amm., 2001. 
244  The monetary damage suffered by the policy subscribers would be the price unduly paid, or better the 
difference between the competitive price and the price illegally fixed. 
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on a violation of competition law,245 the majority of such claims were brought before 
the lower court (i.e., the Giudice di Pace) on the basis of the ordinary civil procedure 
rules on jurisdiction. It should be noted that according to Italian civil procedure rules, 
first instance jurisdiction belongs to the Giudice di Pace or to the Tribunale according 
to the value of the claim. In particular, while the Giudice di Pace has jurisdiction over 
claims with a value not exceeding €2,582.28,45 all civil claims with values higher than 
€2,582.28 (or of indeterminable value) must be brought before the Tribunale. Moreover, 
under article 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the value of the claim does not 
exceed €1,100, the Giudice di Pace shall decide the case on an equitable basis.246  The 
‘equitable basis’ provision authorizes the judge to decide the case, disregarding the 
ordinarily applicable rules, without being bound either by the specific provisions of 
ordinary law applicable to  the case, nor by the general principles embedded in such 
provisions, nor even by the general principles of the legal system.247 
Maybe due to the lack of a good competition law culture among Italian attorneys, 
hundreds of RCA policy-holders individually sued their insurer, before the territorially 
competent Giudice di Pace, on the basis of the ordinary civil procedure rules on 
jurisdiction: that the value of the claim did not exceed the €1,100 threshold, also in 
light of the fact that the Giudice di Pace is faster, cheaper and not as strictly formal as 
the Tribunale. 
All the insurance companies sued before the Giudice di Pace assumed in their 
respective defenses the lack of the Giudice di Pace’s jurisdiction on the basis of the 
Corte d’Appello exclusive jurisdiction provision under art. 33(2)Law no. 287/90 . 
In a surprising series of decisions favorable to consumers, most of the Giudici di 
                                                     
245  Art. 33.2 of Law 287/90 establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorially competent Corte 
d’Appello on civil actions based on a violation of competition law (i.e., actions of nullity, actions aimed 
at obtaining interim relief and claims for damages arising out breach of national competition rules).  
246  As a consequence of the numerous successful actions brought before the Giudici di Pace by policy 
holders against the colluding insurance companies, the Italian Government adopted an emergency decree 
(i.e., Law Decree of February 8, 2003 No. 18 on “Disposizioni urgenti in materia di giudizio necessario 
secondo equità”, then converted into Law No. 63 of April 7, 2003) which amended the article 113 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. By such Law, the Giudice di Pace may now decide on an equitable basis claims 
not exceeding  €1,100 provided that they do not relate to contracts governed by uniform standard terms 
and conditions (so-called ‘consumer contracts’). 
247  Corte di Cassazione Sezioni Unite, judgment No. 716 of October 15, 1999. See also Ashurst Italy Report, 
cit., p. 4.   
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Pace affirmed their jurisdiction and awarded to the plaintiffs monetary damages of up 
to 20 per cent of the insurance premiums paid, representing, in their view, the 
overcharge found by the AGCM. Such decisions were based on legal reasoning which 
differed widely from one judge to another,248 but most of the Giudici di Pace who had 
affirmed their jurisdiction shared the opinion that those actions fall outside the scope of 
Italian competition law. The Giudice di Pace of Laviano, one of the first to reject an 
insurance company’s defense, affirmed its jurisdiction on the basis of the assumption 
that, “a civil action whose object is to recover a part of the premium price unduly paid 
to an insurance company” as a consequence of an anticompetitive conduct sanctioned 
by the Italian Competition Authority, “does not fall within the scope of art. 33(2)of Law 
No. 287/90”.249  Other Giudici di Pace shared this legal reasoning and affirmed their 
competence to decide the respective cases pending before them on the assumption that 
Competition law, “was solely applicable to enterprises” and not to individual 
consumers.250  However, other Giudici di Pace in the civil proceedings pending before 
them reached the opposite result: they denied their jurisdiction and affirmed the Corte 
d’Appello’s exclusive competence to decide such cases.251  Whether one likes it or not, 
the Giudice di Pace of Laviano’s legal reasoning was indeed supported by a significant 
Corte di Cassazione precedent in the Norme bancarie uniformi case.252  Indeed in that 
case the Corte di Cassazione stated that, according to the constitutional principle of 
                                                     
248  A variety of legal grounds were cited as the basis for these decisions. Some Giudici di Pace argued that 
the reimbursement of the overcharge was a restitution grounded in the prohibition against unjustified 
enrichment; others argued that the overcharge was a breach of the principle of good faith and fair dealing; 
others relied on the bar to unfair contractual terms in consumer contracts; while still others relied on 
simple tort. For a detailed analysis, see Palmieri A., Intese restrittive della concorrenza e azione 
risarcitoria del consumatore finale: argomentazioni «extravagantes» per un illecito inconsistente, 2003, 
I-1121, Foro It.; Giudici P., Private Antitrust Law Enforcement in Italy, 2004, 1 CompLRev p. 61.   
249  Judgment of the Giudice di Pace of Laviano of September 27, 2002, Foro it., 2003, n. 42.   
250  See the judgment of the Giudice di pace Milano of January 2, 2004; the judgment of Giudice di pace of 
Davoli of November 13, 2002, Foro it., 2003, n. 41.   
251  See the judgment of Tribunale of Torre Annunziata of July 26, 2004; the judgment of Giudice di pace 
Cosenza of October 31, 2003, Foro it., 2005, I-259; the judgment of Giudice di pace Albano Laziale of 
September 10, 2003, Foro it., 2004, I-466, commented by Pardolesi R., “Cartello e contratti dei 
consumatori: da Leibniz a Sansone”, 2004, I-469 Foro it.   
252  Montanari v. Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia, Cass. civ., sez. I, judgment no.1811 of March 4,
 
1999, in Foro. It., 1006. In this case a consumer sued its bank claiming that the bank guarantee he had 
been required to sign was an improper requirement imposed by a bank cartel and prayed that it be 
declared null and void.   
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“free enterprise” established in article 41 of the Italian Constitution, 253  national 
competition law is not directly concerned with consumer interests because the only 
interest that this law protects is free competition among commercial entities. By such a 
statement, the Corte di Cassazione denied consumers, as well as any other non-
commercial party, standing under Italian competition law to claim the annulment of an 
anticompetitive agreement before the territorially competent Corte d’Appello. 
3. The Axa case 
Approximately three years later, in 2002, an RCA insurance case reached the Corte 
di Cassazione for the first time: the central question submitted to the Court related to 
the determination of the competent judge to decide claims for damages brought by end 
consumers against the colluding companies who had joined the RCA insurance policy 
cartel. By the judgmen known as the Axa judgment, named after the insurance company 
involved,254 the Corte di Cassazione first section held - in perfect coherence with its 
previous statement in the Norme bancarie uniformi case - that the aim of Italian 
competition law is to protect enterprises and the public interest in free competition in 
the market. However, only enterprises have standing under art. 33(2) Law no. 287/90 ; 
whereas consumers do not have any legal standing, under national competition law, to 
recover damages suffered as a consequence of anticompetitive conduct. Consumers 
damaged by anticompetitive conduct can promote a civil action under the general tort 
provision before the competent civil Court identified under the ordinary Civil 
procedure rules.  Consumer would have been able to prove in Court that a subjective 
right – different from those protected by Law no. 287/90  - had been harmed by the 
colluding company. Very sure of the public nature of the Italian competition law and 
strongly based on a strict interpretation of article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 , the Corte di 
Cassazione de facto denied legal standing to consumers with regard to damages actions 
for breach of  national competition rules.  According to this reasoning, the Corte 
d’Appello would have exclusive jurisdiction for damages actions for breach of national 
                                                     
253 Article 41 of the Italian Constitution provides that “[p]rivate economic initiative is free.  It cannot be 
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activity is given direction and coordinated to social objectives.” 
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competition rules as long as such actions were brought by and between undertakings 
and not by consumers.  It should be noted, however, that such a restrictive 
interpretation does not deny standing to consumers who, if damaged by an 
anticompetitive conduct, bring damage actions under the general tort rules (i.e., art. 
2043 Codice Civile).  According to ordinary civil procedure rules, such actions would 
have to be brought before the territorially competent judge depending on the value of 
the claim; indeed, due to the minimal monetary damage suffered by the plaintiffs in the 
RCA cases, the competent judge would have surely been the Giudice di Pace.  
Following the Corte di Cassazione’s reasoning, the consumer would have been able to 
prove in Court that a subjective right - different from those protected by Law no. 
287/90  which relates solely to undertakings - had been harmed by the colluding 
company. By such a statement the Corte di Cassazione clearly skews protection under 
the Italian competition law on the grounds of the subjects damaged by the 
anticompetitive conduct.  The most favorable treatment (i.e., legal standing under art. 
33(2) Law no. 287/90 ) is reserved for undertakings, or better the conspirator’s 
competitors, whose harm is directly caused by the violation of competition law; 
consumers, whose harm is mediated by the colluding companies behavior, fall out of 
the scope of the art. 33(2) and of competition law as a whole. By the Corte di 
Cassazione’s statement, ”what in EC Competition law has appeared at the very 
borderline to the heterodoxy to the exegetes of the Courage case” is pretty normal in 
the Italian competition law system.  In fact, while in Courage the ECJ stated that Art 81 
EC (now article 101 TFEU) protects not exclusively third parties but also, under certain 
circumstances, a party to a contract liable to restrict or distort competition which “can 
rely on the breach of [Art 81 EC] provision to obtain relief from the other contracting 
party”, in the Axa case the Corte di Cassazione stated that undertakings are the only 
subjects protected by national competition law.  
The Corte di Cassazione at the same time denied consumers access to the Corte 
d’Appello but threw open the doors of the Italian legal system to a significant number 
of low cost civil proceedings under tort rules.  In fact, the only procedural way 
available to consumers damaged by an anticompetitive conduct was to sue colluding 
companies under tort rules before the territorially competent Giudice di Pace as it 
would have been the only court to have the competence to decide such small value civil 
claims. The Corte di Cassazione went further: it would not be enough for the consumer 
to base his tort action on the decision of the Competition Authority against the cartel, a 
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subjective consumer right had to be violated by the colluding company to justify the 
successful consumer civil action. The most relevant problems arise in relation to the 
individuation of such a mysteriously subjective consumer right violated by the cartel.  
The Axa statement 255  had been heavily criticized by the Italian doctrine quite 
unanimously,256 most of the critics have pointed out that, by denying legal standing to 
consumers, the Corte di Cassazione has completely ignored both the European Court 
decision in the Courage case, and the entire modernization process of EC competition 
law (whose primary object is to foster the private enforcement of competition law in 
Member States).257  Moreover, it had been underlined that the Axa judgment violates 
article 1(4) Law no. 287/90 , by which the courts have to interpret Italian competition 
law according to EC competition law principles.   
4. The Unipol case 
The Axa statement has been overruled by the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione in 
the Unipol case.  The Court was asked to decide which was the competent court to hear 
consumers’ damages action under Italian competition law.  This time the Third Section 
of the Court held that, due to its great significance, the issue of consumers’ legal 
standing deserves careful examination and that joint sections of the Court had to 
discuss and decide the issue. The joint Sections of the Corte di Cassazione radically 
dismissed the previous restrictive interpretation of art. 33(2) and re-oriented Italian 
competition law in light of EC Treaty principles and the current tendencies of private 
enforcement of competition law in the  European Union. The Cassazione stated that 
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americana e in quella italiana”, in Dir. comunitario scambi internaz., 2003, p. 79. 
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“Italian competition law is not the law of the entrepreneurs solely but the law of all 
market subjects”. Market subjects in the new Court’s view are everyone who has a 
‘procedurally enforceable’ legal interest related to the maintenance of the competitive 
character of the market. Such subjects, “have juridical standing to the extent to which 
he/she can claim a specific injury deriving from the breach or the decrease of the 
competitive character [of the market]”.  The consumer, here intended as whoever, 
‘closes the economic process started by the good’s production’, has finally been 
granted the legal standing to bring a damage action under art. 33(2).  The Corte di 
Cassazione finally recognized the, “diversity both in the scope and in functions between 
the Civil Code provisions on unfair competition law and the antitrust law” and affirmed 
“the standing before the Court of Appeal to the consumer, third party with regard to 
the horizontal illegal agreement”.  However, not every Giudice di Pace identified such 
a fraction in such a way: the Giudice di Pace of Sant’Anastasia for instance liquidated 
15% of the insurance premium paid, while the Giudice di Pace of Casoria liquidated 
only 10%.258   
5. The Sai case 
A few months after the Unipol judgment the Corte di Appello of Naples decided the 
Sai case via its exclusive jurisdiction.259  The Corte d’Appello was indeed asked as a 
court of first instance to decide the insurance policy subscriber’s damage action based 
on the AGCM decision against Sai, an insurance company who had joined the RCA 
insurance policy cartel.  The court decided the case in a somewhat similar way to the 
Giudici di Pace; first of all it affirmed that the insurance company’s anticompetitive 
conduct ‘had surely injured the plaintiff’, then it identified the plaintiff’s monetary 
damage as “the difference between the RCA insurance policy price paid and the price 
that would have been offered to the consumer without the illegal horizontal agreement 
effect” (i.e., the competitive market price), and third it based the whole reasoning on the 
AGCM’s factual findings (i.e., the stability of the undertakings market shares; the 
presence of a major dominant group of companies and a fringe of smaller ones; the 
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259  Corte di Appello di Napoli, judgment on May 3, 2005, Foro it., 2005, I-1880. Commented by Palmieri A. 
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anomalous speeding up of the premium price increase especially in the recent period; 
the fact that the premium price has increased much more in the Italian market than the 
European average; the company’s lack of ability to reduce the production costs and that 
the market demand elasticity was very close to zero), finally, it awarded the plaintiff a 
monetary compensation corresponding to 20% of the premium price paid, equivalent to 
€19.68. The Court said that such an amount of money has to be considered “fair” in 
light of both the AGCM’s decision and on the “nozioni di comune esperienza”.260  It 
thus demonstrated that it is not exempt from the embarrassing degree of uncertainty in 
the identification of the exact quantity of damage suffered by the plaintiff, “in order to 
determine the quantum debeatur, the equitable criteria is helpful because of the 
impossibility of proving the damage suffered [by the plaintiff] in its precise entity”. 
Such a degree of uncertainty is well known to economists, indeed, it is an extremely 
difficult task (if not an impossible one) to determine a posteriori the “competitive price” 
in the market at a precise moment. 
Another underlying question that emerges from this case is the issue of the incentive 
(if any) for consumers to take private actions under the Italian competition law system. 
As aforesaid, art 33(2) Law no. 287/90  introduces an anomaly in the system because 
by this provision different judges are competent to decide, in first instance, private 
actions based on a violation of competition law depending on the dimension (national 
or communitarian) of the rules violated by anticompetitive conduct.  Since the Unipol 
judgment finally granted consumers damaged by anticompetitive conduct the right to 
invoke the national competition law provisions, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in 
favor of the territorially competent Corte d’Appello is also applicable to them. 
The whole effect of this statement sounds more like a disincentive to consumers’ 
private actions than an incentive to them, mainly because of the structural and 
procedural characteristics of proceedings before the Corte d’Appello (the ordinary civil 
second instance Court).  In fact, those proceedings are more formal and much more 
expensive than those before the Giudice di Pace, and may take on average between two 
and three years to reach a decision; an equivalent period of time (i.e., between two and 
three years) may be necessary to reach a final decision because of a possible appeal 
before the Corte di Cassazione. On the other hand, while civil proceedings before the 
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Giudice di Pace may be concluded within a few months, those before  the Tribunale 
may take between two and four years; anyway, in case of appeal, proceedings before 
the competent court (and then eventually before the Corte di Cassazione) will 
substantially increase the duration of the process.  All these factors, including the long 
duration of civil proceedings – this still constitutes an endemic structural element of the 
Italian legal system despite the fact that it has been decreasing in recent years - clearly 
contribute to creating a disincentive to the domestic private enforcement of competition 
law.  Is it a reasonable choice, for those who have suffered a small monetary damage 
like in the Sai case (€19.68), to seek protection under Italian competition law?   
How many consumers would be so risk addicted to accept the real risk that if they 
lose in Court (e.g., in case of the lack of or insufficient proof of the existence of the 
cartel, or the lack of or insufficient demonstration of the specific harm and/or the link 
of causality between the  injury suffered and the cartel effect or other anticompetitive 
behavior, or the abuse of a dominant position in the market)261 they may be ordered to 
pay the counterparty’s legal costs?  The scenario for the potential plaintiff is 
surprisingly different, and rather more pleasant, if the anticompetitive conduct has 
violated EC competition rules. In such a case the competent judge to decide the case 
would be, in first instance, depending on the value of the claim, the Giudice di Pace or 
the  . As aforesaid those civil proceedings are more agile, more consumer friendly, less 
formal and surely cheaper.  This different protection under national and EU 
competition rules is not in contrast with the principle of equivalence. Under this well-
known principle, judicial actions based on EU rules must not be less favorable than 
those based on domestic rules. 262  The situation here appears to comply with this 
principle as a claim for damages can be filed either with the Giudice di Pace – in which 
case it may be argued that preferential treatment is accorded – or with the Corte 
d’Appello – in which case a claim based on European law is accorded the same 
treatment as a claim based on national law. In other words, damages actions alleging 
violations of EC competition rules are afforded substantially more favorable treatment 
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than  those actions brought under national competition law.  It should be noted however, 
that private actions under EC competition law also lack adequate incentives for 
consumers to bring law suits before the Court. Indeed, the issue of incentives for 
private action has been widely discussed within the so-called modernization process of 
EU Competition Law at Communitarian level. 
It should be noted, however, that in cases like RCA exists a concrete ‘risk of 
competition law isolation from the legal system as a whole’.  In fact, under EU law 
victims of anticompetitive conduct do “not have the right to recover his/her damages in 
the specialized Antitrust courts, but the right (and legal standing) to recover his/her 
damages in Court.”  A civil action to recover damages suffered by anticompetitive 
conduct can be brought by the injured party in Civil Court under contractual rules or in 
tort. Indeed, in the RCA insurance cartel cases, policy subscribers sued ‘their’ 
colluding insurer under the general Civil code rules on the basis of the illegal price paid: 
in fact by becoming a member of the cartel, the insurers have cheated their customers 
by obliging them to pay an illegal price.  Consequently the consumer’s civil action can 
be brought under the dolo contrattuale rules using the AGCM decision to prove the 
actual malice. 
6. The view of the ECJ in joined cases C-295-289/04 on the insurance companies’ 
cartel (“The Manfredi Judgment”) 
In June 2004 the Giudice di Pace of Bitonto submitted to the ECJ four references for 
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of article 81 EC (now article 101 
TFEU) in connection with some procedural aspects of national regulation of damages 
actions. As aforementioned, the first question concerned the capability of 
anticompetitive conduct which infringed national rules on competition to constitute an 
infringement of article 81 EC. The other questions submitted focused on: the 
entitlement to rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice prohibited under EC 
competition law and the concomitant right to claim damages; the compatibility of 
article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 with EC law; the limitation period for seeking 
compensation for harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited under article 81; 
and, the ability of the national courts to award punitive damages.  Each question is 
further analyzed in the following sub-sections in the order they were decided by the 
ECJ. 
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 First question: the capability of anticompetitive conduct infringing a.
national rules of competition to constitute an infringement of article 81 
EC 
The Court solved the first question on the basis of the different purposes of EU law 
and national competition law: “whereas articles 81 EC and 82 EC regard [the 
anticompetitive practices] in the light of the obstacles which may result for trade 
between Member States, national law proceeds on the basis of considerations peculiar 
to it and considers restrictive practices only in that context”.263 In the view of the Court, 
such varying aims make possible the parallel application of EC and national 
competition rules. Indeed, the wording of article 81 EC necessarily stipulates that EU 
competition rules relate to the capability of the practice to affect trade between Member 
States. According to communitarian Court case law the ability of the practice to affect 
trade between Member States must be “appreciable”.264  This criterion helps to distance 
EU and national competition law despite their naturally overlapping objects.  Thus, EU 
law covers any agreement or any practice which is capable of affecting trade between 
Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of a single market, in 
particular by sealing off national markets or by affecting the structure of competition 
within the common market.265 To explain why the anticompetitive conduct challenged 
by the national Authority could also potentially violate EU competition rules, the Court 
has used the argument of the difference in scope, to which the interpretation and 
application of the condition relating to effects on trade between Member States, has to 
be to traced back.266 
Once it clearly established the connection between the two competition law systems, 
the Court – adhering to its previous case law – solved the question by reminding the 
                                                     
263  Cases C-295-298/04, para 38. See also Case 14/68, Wilhelm and Othrs [1969] ECR 1, para 3; Cases 
253/78, 1/79-3/79, Giry and Guerlain and others [1980] ECR 2327, p. 15, and Case C-137/00, Milk 
Marque and National Farmers’ Union [2003] I-7975, p. 61.   
264  See Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004, 
C101/07, para. 12-13. See in this respect Case 22/71, Béguelin, [1971] ECR 949, para. 16; See, for 
instance, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429, and Joined Cases 6/73 
and 7/73, Commercial Solvents, [1974] ECR 223. 
265 See Case 22/78, Hugin v. Commissione, [1979] ECR 1869, p 17, and Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, 
[2001] ECR I-8089, p. 47. See also Guidelines, ibid, para.35. 
266  Cases C-295-298/04, para. 41. See also Advocate General Opinion, Cases C-295-298/04, para. 33. 
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national judge that in order to satisfy the “communitarian” standard, it is necessary that 
“with a sufficient degree of probability” the agreement or concerted practice may have 
an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the commerce between Member 
States. Such an influence has to be not insignificant and need to be capable of 
preventing the creation of the internal market within the EU. 
Maybe the most interesting part of the Court’s solution is its analysis of the 
capability of the RCA cartel to influence commerce between Member states.  The Court 
gave importance to the fact that the practice had been challenged by the AGCM on the 
basis of national law. According to communitarian case law, a concerted practice 
relating only to a single Member State is capable of affecting trade between Member 
States. A concerted practice covering the entire territory of a Member State has, by its 
very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis, 
thereby holding up economic interpenetration.  The AGCM found that the ten biggest 
assurance companies active in the Italian RCA assurance market joined the illegal 
practice, and that among them there were several foreign companies.267 The cartel’s 
widespread membership alone was not so decisive as to satisfy the criterion of trade 
between Member States being affected but provided, ‘a clear indication that intra-
community trade may have been affected, certainly in combination with the fact that 
non-Italian undertakings also took part in the agreements’.268 Such active participation 
by foreign operators clearly indicated a certain degree of market permeability open to 
newcomers from aboard.  In that regard, according to case-law, since the market 
concerned was open to infiltration by operators from other Member States, the 
members of a national price cartel could retain their market share only if they defended 
themselves against foreign competition.  Although there were strong barriers to entry in 
the RCA market the presence of foreign companies indicates another argument as to the 
communitarian dimension of the illegal practice.  Those barriers (in the view if the 
NCA arisen primarily due to the need to set up an efficient distribution network and a 
network of centers for the settlement of accident claims throughout Italy) made the 
provision of insurance services more difficult for newcomers.269  In cases like this 
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where barriers to entry are not “absolute”, but are nevertheless capable of negatively 
impacting intra-community commerce, EC competition law is likely to be affected. 
In the view of the Court, it is for the national court to decide whether the mere 
existence of the agreement or concerted practice is capable of having a deterrent effect 
on insurance companies from other Member States, in particular by enabling the 
coordination and fixing of civil liability auto insurance premiums at a level whereby the 
sale of such insurance by those companies would not be profitable (thus rendering such 
influence “appreciable”). Thus, in the RCA cartel the anticompetitive effect on 
commerce between Member States was hidden in the information exchange between 
competitors and in the subsequent effect of segmenting the internal market and 
restricting the freedom to provide services. 
The Court has therefore answered the first question in Joined Cases C-295-298/04 
by stating that an agreement or concerted practice, which infringes national rules on the 
protection of competition may also constitute an infringement of article 81 EC where: 
there is a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement or concerted practice at 
issue may have an not insignificant, direct or indirect, actual or potential, influence on 
the sale of insurance policies in the relevant Member State by operators established in 
other Member States. Such an influence has to be not insignificant and need to be 
capable of preventing the creation of the internal market within the EU. With respect to 
the Community dimension of the cartel, the Court underlined the fact that the national 
AGCM had found the ten biggest assurance companies active in the Italian RCA 
assurance market to have joined the illegal practice, and that among them there were 
several foreign companies.   
Finally, the Court made clear that it is for the national court to decide whether the 
mere existence of an agreement or concerted practice is capable of having a deterrent 
effect on insurance companies from other Member States, in particular by enabling the 
coordination and fixing of civil liability auto insurance premiums at a level whereby the 
sale of such insurance by those companies would not be profitable (thus rendering such 
influence ‘appreciable’). Thus, in the RCA cartel the anticompetitive effect on 
commerce between Member States was hidden in the information exchange between 
competitors and in the subsequent effect of segmenting the internal market and 
restricting the freedom to provide services. 
The Court therefore answered the first question in Joined Cases C-295-298/04 by 
stating that an agreement or concerted practice, which infringes national rules on the 
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protection of competition may also constitute an infringement of Article 81 EC where 
there is a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement or concerted practice at 
issue may have an not insignificant, direct or indirect, actual or potential, influence on 
the sale of insurance policies in the relevant Member State by operators established in 
other Member States. 
 Second question: The entitlement to rely on the invalidity of a practice b.
prohibited under EC competition law and the concomitant right to claim 
damages 
This question focuses on two relevant consequences that anticompetitive conduct has 
on third parties. The national court asked whether article 81 EC (now article 101 TFEU) is 
to be interpreted as entitling any individual to rely on the invalidity of a practice prohibited 
under that article and, where there is a causal relationship between that agreement or 
practice and the harm suffered, to claim damages for that harm. The Court answered the 
question in the affirmative, basing its arguments on settled case-law on the direct effect of 
articles 81 and 82 EC. The ECJ recognized the direct effect of articles 81 and 82 EC on 
horizontal relations more than thirty years ago. National Courts in each Member state are 
therefore obliged to apply these rights.270 According to settled case-law, the principle of 
invalidity established in article 81(2) EC can be relied on by anyone, and the courts are 
bound by it once the conditions for the application of article 81(1) EC are met and so long 
as the agreement concerned does not justify the grant of an exemption under article 81(3) 
EC. The ECJ answered the first part of the second question by recognizing the right of any 
individual to raise an action for breach of article 81 EC before a national court 
(simultaneously recognizing individuals’ right to rely on the invalidity of an agreement or 
practice prohibited under that article). The second part of the question focuses on the right 
to seek compensation for loss caused by a conduct liable to restrict or distort competition. 
To answer the question the Court referred to the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in 
particular, its judgment in the Courage case.  In the absence of EU rules governing the 
matter, the Court was forced to design a remedy on the principle of full effectiveness and 
on the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in article 81(1) EC. In the Court’s view, 
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the effectiveness of article 81 EC would be limited if it were not open to any individual to 
claim damages for loss caused to him.  It follows that if any individual can claim 
compensation for harm suffered on the basis of a violation of article 81 EC, the 
effectiveness of EU competition rules and the enforcement system of competition law 
would increase.  Legal standing to seek compensation is, of course, conditional on the 
presence of the causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice 
prohibited under article 81 EC.  In the absence of EU rules governing the matter, the Court 
relied on the domestic legal systems of each Member State to establish the courts and 
tribunals having jurisdiction.  However, the Court relied on its own legal culture to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing: actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive directly from EU law, and the concept of ‘causal relationship’.  When 
regulating domestic procedure all Member States have to respect the principles of 
equivalence (measures adopted would not be less favorable than those governing similar 
domestic actions) and effectiveness (that they do not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law).271  The EU principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are the “chiave di volta” (i.e. the cornerstone) used by the 
Court to answer all the other questions relating to procedure raised by the Giudice di Pace 
in this case. 
 Third question: The compatibility of Article 33(2) of Italian Law No c.
287/90 with Article 81 EC 
With this question, the national court asked whether Article 81 EC must be 
interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 33(2) of Law No 287/90, 
under which third parties must bring their actions for damages for infringement of EU 
and national competition rules before a court, other than that which usually has 
jurisdiction in actions for damages of similar value, thereby involving a considerable 
increase in costs and time. As aforementioned, Italian competition Law establishes the 
exclusive competence of the Corte d’Appello (the ordinary second instance Court) to 
hear first instance civil actions based on competition law.272  As recently stated by the 
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Italian Corte di Cassazione, the article 33(2) rule applies only to actions for damages 
based on infringement of national provisions protecting competition.273  Conversely, 
actions for damages based on infringement of articles 81 and 82 EC fall, in the absence 
of express legal provisions, within the competence of the ordinary courts.  The fact that 
different judges are competent to hear first instance actions for breach of national 
competition law and EU competition law constitutes a structural anomaly of the Italian 
competition law system.  Under this system, when establishing the competent judge, 
litigants have something of a choice depending on whether his/her claim is based solely 
on an infringement of European competition law (in which case the Giudice di Pace or 
the Tribunale would have jurisdiction) or partly thereon (in which case the Corte 
d’Appello would have jurisdiction, given its exclusive competence to deliver judgments 
on claims for damages based on infringement of national competition law).274  To 
evaluate the compatibility of this domestic rule with EU competition law, the Court 
used the test of equivalence, by which the rules which apply to a claim based on 
European law must not be less favorable than those which govern similar claims under 
national law. In the Court’s opinion the Italian rule establishing the exclusive 
competence of the Corte d’Appello did not infringe the principle. This is because a 
claim for damages can be filed either with the Giudice di Pace, in which case it may be 
argued that preferential treatment is accorded, or with the Corte d’Appello, in which 
case a claim based on European law is accorded the same treatment as a claim based on 
national law.  It should be noted that civil proceedings before the Tribunale (and even 
more those before the Giudice di Pace) are less expensive, less complex and less 
formal than those before the Corte d’Appello (which do not allow a second instance 
judgment either). This could be seen as a kind of unwilling discrimination in melius, or 
even an incentive to private enforcement of the EU competition law.  In fact, as 
aforesaid, the structural and procedural characteristics of proceedings before the Corte 
d’Appello (the ordinary civil second instance Court) are more formal and much more 
expensive than those before the Giudice di Pace, and take on average between two and 
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three years to reach a decision. A further equivalent period of time may also be 
necessary to reach a final decision due to the possibility of an appeal before the Corte 
di Cassazione. On the other hand, while civil proceedings before the Giudice di Pace 
may be concluded within a few months, those before the Tribunale may take between 
two and four years; anyway, in case of appeal, proceedings before the competent court 
(and then eventually before the Corte di Cassazione) will substantially increase the 
duration of the process. 275   All these factors, including the long duration of civil 
proceedings - which still constitutes an endemic structural element of the Italian legal 
system despite the fact that it has been decreasing in recent years - clearly contribute to 
creating a disincentive effect to the domestic private enforcement of competition law. 
Accordingly, in light of the principle of procedural authority of Member States, if a 
national court was called upon to revive observance of the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness in relation to article 33 of Law no. 287/90, it could not fail to observe 
that the legal position based on EU law is better protected, having regard to the 
guarantee of two levels of jurisdiction, than that based on national law.276  The Court 
has stated that it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the 
courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to hear actions for damages based on 
infringement of EU competition rules and to prescribe the detailed procedural rules 
governing those actions. Those provisions shall not be not less favorable than those 
governing actions for damages based on an infringement of national competition rules 
and shall not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the 
right to seek compensation for the harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited 
under article 81 EC.277 
 Forth question: The limitation period for seeking compensation for harm d.
caused by a practice prohibited under Article 81 EC 
With this question the national court asked the Court whether Article 81 EC must be 
interpreted as precluding a national rule which provides that the limitation period for 
seeking compensation for harm caused by a practice prohibited under Article 81 EC 
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begins to run from the day on which that practice was adopted. Among the procedural 
issues that could jeopardize the effectiveness of private enforcement of competition law 
within the EU, the limitation period is one of the most important because it regulates 
the access to courts in time. The question put to the Court was, therefore, of extreme 
interest because the absence of uniform regulation of the matter makes the 
effectiveness EC competition law enforcement highly vulnerable due to the variety of 
national solutions.278  It is important to bear in mind that too short a limitation period 
would jeopardize the effectiveness of the private enforcement system. Special 
consideration needs to be given to the relationship between limitation periods and 
proceedings before public competition authorities.  Longer time limits are favorable for 
follow-on claims as other parties which feel aggrieved by the impugned anticompetitive 
behavior will be more inclined to bring an action if a judgment or decision has already 
found a breach of competition law.  If limitation periods are too short, a claim might 
already be statute barred once a judgment or decision is finally rendered so that 
potential claimants are no longer able to bring a case.  The obligation in some 
jurisdictions to present all evidence to the court when filing a claim also has important 
consequences for the role played by limitation periods.  A short limitation period 
together with an extensive need for collecting evidence could constitute a serious 
obstacle to the bringing of such competition-based damages cases.  A considerable 
diversity exists between the Member States as to the rules concerning limitation 
periods;279 the absence of EU rules governing the limitation period is partially made up 
for by the Court via the principles of equivalence (i.e., the prescription period has not to 
be less favorable than that applicable to similar domestic actions) and effectiveness (i.e., 
the limitation period shall not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the 
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exercise of rights conferred by EU law).  These principles allow the Court of Justice to 
avoid the dangerous reference tout court to national rules which, as already noted, 
could make private enforcement potentially ineffective.  A tout court reference could 
also foster contradictory judgments and create disparities in treatment on the basis of 
the territorially competent court. 
To answer the question the Court scrutinized the prescription rules in Italy. It found 
that the limitation period would begin to run from the day on which the agreement or 
concerted practice was adopted. In the Court’s view this rule could make it practically 
impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused by that 
prohibited agreement or practice, particularly if that national rule also imposed a short 
limitation period not capable of suspension. In fact, especially where there are 
continuous or repeated infringements, it is possible that the limitation period could 
expire even before the infringement is brought to an end, in which case it would be 
impossible for any individual who had suffered harm after the expiry of the limitation 
period to bring an action.  The Court answered the question by establishing that in the 
absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to prescribe the limitation period for seeking compensation for harm 
caused by an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC, provided that the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed. 
 Fifth question: National courts and the award of punitive damages. e.
With this question, the national court asked whether Article 81 EC should be 
interpreted as allowing national courts to award punitive damages. Although it focuses 
on a specific aspect – i.e., punitive damages – the question shed light on a key difficulty 
relating to the private enforcement of EU competition law.  The quantification of 
damages can be particularly complex given the economic nature of the illegality and 
the difficulty of determining the position the claimant would have been absent the 
infringement, as usually required under tort rules. Within the EU, both the definition of 
the damage and its quantification in court lack generally recognized models.  
Differences of approach in relation to lost profits can result in considerably different 
awards, and a restriction on this could operate as a disincentive to private actions.  The 
choice of a potential plaintiff to bring his case to court is directly influenced by it and in 
a certain way private enforcement of competition law in the EU depends on the 
damages award. Especially when the potential plaintiff is a consumer, incentives to 
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bring the case to court are of crucial relevance. As such an incentive many Member 
States allow for a reduction in the standard of proof required when damages are 
difficult to quantify. In the few Member States where this reduction does not operate, if 
the claimant is unable to prove the exact loss, the claim fails. In every case the amount 
of the award has to be defined by the national court in accordance with the national 
legislation and legal culture. In this respect, several definitions are founded on the idea 
of compensation or recovery of illegal gain. Compensatory damages, especially when 
the potential plaintiff is a single consumer, might not operate as a good enough 
incentive for him to bring his case to court even if it had a high probability of success. 
In the RCA cartel case, for instance, the estimated overcharge for each year of violation 
was twenty percent. That figure, without taking into account legal fees, was in the vast 
majority of cases less than €100. The introduction of award mechanisms that could go 
beyond mere compensation and attack the illegal gains made by the colluding 
companies would undoubtedly act as incentives to private enforcement of EU 
competition law. The Commission’s proposal regarding the introduction of double 
damages for the most serious antitrust infringements (i.e. horizontal cartels) clearly 
follows this line. Currently, a handful of Member States go beyond the mere 
compensation model and recognize punitive (Cyprus) or exemplary (Cyprus, Ireland, 
UK) damages.  The question submitted by the national court focused on the possibility 
of awarding punitive damages, thereby deterring the adoption of agreements or 
concerted practices prohibited under that article. The Court based its answer on the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In the same way it solved the three 
previous questions the Court, in the absence of uniform communitarian regulation on 
the matter, referred the definition of concrete procedural issues to the domestic legal 
system. In the Court’s view it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to 
set the criteria for determining the extent of the damages, provided that the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are observed.  In the majority of Member States, actions 
for damages merely compensate the victims for the loss suffered and, generally, do not 
asses any extra economic advantage. In Italy, punitive damages are foreign to the legal 
system and to the rationale behind compensation. The latter is designed to make good 
proven harm suffered by the victim. In no circumstances should damages have a 
punitive or repressive function, since that function falls within the scope of statute.  To 
grant the full effectiveness of Article 81(1) EC, it is not necessary, according to the 
Court’s settled case-law, to grant to the victim compensation higher than the loss 
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suffered. 280  In that respect the Court has underlined that, in accordance with the 
principle of equivalence, it must be possible to award particular damages, such as 
exemplary or punitive damages, pursuant to actions founded on EU competition rules, 
if such damages may be awarded pursuant to similar actions founded on domestic law.  
The Court’s answer was based on the principle of effectiveness and the right of any 
individual to claim damages on the basis of a violation of competition rules. It follows 
that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss 
(damnum emergens) but also for loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus interest. In the 
Court’s view, the total exclusion of loss of profit as a head of damage for which 
compensation may be awarded cannot be accepted in the case of breach of EU law 
since, especially in the context of economic or commercial litigation, “such a total 
exclusion of loss of profit would be such as to make reparation of damage practically 
impossible”.281 
The Court of Justice made an interesting final consideration: in its view EU law, 
“does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the 
rights guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those 
who enjoy them”.282 This appears to be a political suggestion aimed at the creation of a 
clear incentive for claimants to bring antitrust damages cases; a kind of hidden message 
addressed to the Commission to follow the suggestion in the Green Paper regarding the 
possibility of ‘double damages automatically or conditionally or at the discretion of the 
court’ in case of illegal horizontal cartels.283 
7. Conclusions 
In the Manfredi judgment, the Court of Justice solved some of the most debated 
procedural aspects of civil actions based on a violation of EC competition rules (i.e., 
the entitlement to rely on the invalidity of a prohibited agreement or practice and the 
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concomitant right to claim damages; the limitation period for seeking compensation for 
harm caused, and the ability of the national courts to award punitive damages). The 
decision can be considered consistent with the Court’s case law on damage actions 
based on a violation of EU rules and confirms the judicial origins of the private 
enforcement of antitrust rules within the EU. In fact, since the Court of Justice made 
clear that national law had to provide remedies for the victims of antitrust 
infringements, 284 neither the TFEU nor Regulation no. 1/2003/EC (nor the preceding 
Regulation no. 17/62/EEC) have provided any legal rule explicitly granting damages 
throughout the Union. So far, any procedural and substantive problem related to the 
vactio legis has been solved from Luxemburg through the application of the 
effectiveness, equality and proportionality principles. 
Deciding Manfredi, the Court of Justice did not seem discouraged by the absence of 
a detailed and uniform EU regulation on private actions. On the contrary, like in 
Courage, each solution seems to fit quite well into the EU competition law system. 
This is even more evident if one tries to compare the Court’s solution of controversial 
procedural aspects (e.g., time limitation or damages quantification) with the EU 
legislator’s intervention. 
The virtues of the Court’ decision are many: they are coherent with cultural 
traditions of Member States, they do not contrast with the structure and the scope of 
private law remedies already in force and, more importantly, they do assure the 
effectiveness of antitrust rules among the EU. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN EU JURISDICTIONS 
1. Italy: state of play. 
At present, individuals and corporations may bring actions for damages arising from 
infringements of Italian or EU competition law by corporations and individuals provided 
that the individual qualifies as a "personal undertaking" (i.e., imprenditore individuale) or 
a person trading as a business.285 
A claim for damages can be brought regardless of whether a finding of infringement has 
been made by the NCA. The courts will take into account findings of the NCA when 
deciding a private competition enforcement case but are not bound to follow such 
decisions.  However, where an infringement of competition law has been identified by a 
decision of the Commission, Italian courts will consider themselves bound by the findings 
made in that decision.286  An Italian court may therefore opt to stay proceedings brought in 
reliance on a Commission decision where that decision is subject to appeal before the 
European courts so as not to reach a judgment that is irreconcilable with the outcome of 
that appeal.   
Private enforcement actions are generally based on tort. Tortious claims must be 
brought within five years of the relevant infringement occurring.  The Italian Supreme 
Court has ruled that limitation does not begin to run until the moment when the 
infringement becomes evident to the potential claimant (rather than from the date on which 
damage actually occurred).287  On the basis of Articles 2935 and 2947 of the Italian Civil 
Code, a tortious action for damages arising from an infringement of competition law is 
therefore time barred five years from the day on which the claimant acquires, or ought to 
reasonably have acquired, proper knowledge of the infringement and/or damage suffered. 
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A party who asserts that the limitation period has expired must prove the moment at which 
the claimant obtained (or ought reasonably to have obtained) knowledge of the 
infringement and/or damage suffered. According to the general principles stated by the 
Italian Supreme Court, it might be presumed that, in practice, the injured party acquires (or 
could have acquired using ordinary diligence) knowledge once a finding of infringement 
has been issued by a competition authority. 288  If the action is based on a breach of 
contract, the applicable limitation period is ten years from the date of the breach. 
Following the entrance into force of Italian Decree no. 1/2012, private actions for  
damages resulting from violations of Italian competition law289 or from violations of EU 
competition law must be filed before the Specialised Sections of the competent court or 
first instance tribunal having territorial jurisdiction.   
Any appeal must be raised before the Specialised Sections of the competent Court of 
Appeal having territorial jurisdictions and may challenge either the law or facts identified 
in the judgment of the first instance court. Court of Appeal judgments may be challenged 
before the Corte di Cassazione but – quite obviously – only on points of law or where it is 
alleged that a breach of the rules concerning jurisdiction has occurred.  
The legislative choice in relation to the specialized court must be praised and welcomed 
with favour as it entails that cases would be heard by judges with a specific expertise in the 
competition field. 
 Class actions a.
The latest legislation on class actions was enacted in Italy on January 1, 2010290 and 
was later amended so as to expand its scope.  Claims may be brought by consumers or the 
end-user. The latter are defined as any individual acting for purposes falling outside his 
trade, business or profession.  The class action mechanism chosen by the Italian legislator 
is based on the opt-in system.  Thus, consumers may (or better must) elect to join a class 
                                                     
288 In that respect see Nascimbene B., Rossi Dal Pozzo F., La prescrizione delle azioni risarcitorio antitrust 
alla luce dei principi della certezza del diritto, di equivalenza ed effettività, in Il private enforcement 
delle norme sulla concorrenza, Milan, Italy, 2009, pag. 123 et seq. 
289 Article 33 of the Italian Competition Act. 
290 Art. 49 of Law no. 99 of July 23, 2009. 
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action and consent expressly to their rights being determined as part of the proceeding. 
Consumers that do not decide to join the class are not bound by the outcome of the action. 
As amended, the law allows any consumer or representative user group seeking damages 
or declaratory relief to initiate a class action in respect of infringements or damage that are 
homogeneous with respect to the group.291 Consumers who have bought goods related to 
the same cartel – regardless of whether from the same cartel member – ought to be 
permitted to bring their claims as a class under these provisions.   
 Burden of proof b.
The claimant must prove the infringement or unlawful conduct, the amount of damage 
actually suffered and that damage suffered was caused by that infringement or unlawful 
conduct. In order to establish causation, the claimant must satisfy the but-for rule and show 
that “but for” the infringement the damage suffered would not have occurred. 
A decision by the NCA will be accepted as evidence that an infringement has occurred 
and, as noted above, a decision by the Commission will be considered binding proof of 
liability by Italian courts. 
As a general rule, the claimant is required to prove that the unlawful conduct caused the 
actual damage.  However, in practice, the courts may sometimes accept the causal nexus is 
adequately proved based on common business experience and so the court might be 
prepared to assume that unlawful overcharges were imposed as a result of cartel activity. 
This presumptive approach is often taken in respect of claims where the nature of the 
breach is such that the causal nexus between breach and damage cannot be proved - or 
would be extremely difficult to prove - in a rigorous way. 
Competition claims are considered to fall into this category. For example, the Italian 
Supreme Court has indicated that, in cases where a decision of the NCA has identified a 
restrictive agreement contrary to competition law, the causal nexus between that 
agreement and resulting damages may be presumed. It is then open to the defendant to 
provide evidence to rebut this presumption.  
                                                     
291 Interestingly, the original text of the statute required actions brought in a calls to be “identical”, a more 
difficult standard to meet. 
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 Joint and several liability of cartel participants c.
Liability for breach of competition law is considered a joint and several liability under 
Italian law and Italian courts are able to apportion liability to pay damages as between 
defendants according to its assessment of their fault for the damage caused.  Thus, as a 
general rule, the claimant is entitled to recover all damages from one or some members of 
a cartel and so need not issue the claim against all of those deemed responsible for the 
infringement. Defendants are able to join others to a claim or to seek contribution from 
them after a settlement has been agreed or judgment has been handed down. 
 Documents and evidence that can be used by claimants (for example, d.
investigation evidence) and legal privilege 
Italian law does not provide for formal disclosure. The parties to an action must produce 
the documents upon which they rely and file these with the court but there is no obligation 
to disclose documents (and other information) that is adverse to the parties’ respective 
positions. 
The court may determine to appoint its own expert in order to advise it on 
economic/accounting issues (the costs of such expert to be paid, along with all other costs, 
by the losing party to the trial).  However, the parties must apply to the court for 
permission to adduce further evidence such as for example, witness testimonies and expert 
evidence. 
In certain limited cases and under specific conditions the court may order the parties, or 
even third parties, to disclose specific documents, either on the application of the parties or 
on its own initiative. 
Such orders may include legal advice given by in-house lawyers but not by external 
legal advisers. A party applying for such disclosure will need, on one hand, to describe the 
documents requested in as much detail as possible so as to show that the claimant is not 
“fishing” and, on the other hand, to confirm that the documents requested are not in its 
possession or otherwise available to it. 
 Average length of time and cost of litigation e.
It has been estimated that the average length of time from the issue of a claim to first 
instance judgment is between two and four years.  However, the actual duration may 
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depend on many factors, including the number of defendants involved in the litigation292, 
and  the complexity of the evidential phase – which, for example, may require the 
appointment of an accounting expert to quantify the damages suffered by the claimant.  
As to litigation costs, generally many factors come into play so as to affect the costs of 
litigating this type of claim - which include the quantum claimed, the number of the parties 
involved, the number of related private enforcement may introduce, and the overall 
complexity of the case.  A rough estimate to defend a relatively straightforward claim to 
first instance judgment would be approximately €100,000.  The Court will also decide 
which of the parties bears the costs of the proceedings. As a general rule, the loser pays 
principle applies in Italy as long as the cost recovery is reasonable.  Therefore, in 
accordance with Article 91 of the Italian Procedural Civil Code, all or part of the costs 
incurred will be paid by the losing party.  As a general rule, any claim can be assigned to a 
third party but this has not yet occurred in Italy in relation to private competition 
enforcement.  It has been legal for a while for Italian lawyers to agree to act on a 
contingency fee basis.  However, since 2012 the prohibition was reintroduced. 293   
Moreover, court fees must be paid up front.  As I will illustrate infra, the lack of funding 
can be considered one of the main factors that led to under-enforcement – not only in Italy 
but, more generally, throughout Europe.   
 The developments in private enforcement actions f.
The number of private enforcement actions in Italy is likely to continue to grow.  At 
present, however, the number of actions that have actually been brought is still relatively 
small.  The first and most relevant successful actions brought pursuant to Law no. 287/90 
by and between undertakings before the Corte d’Appello of Milan and of Rome.  The 
actions brought before the Corte d’Appello of Milan were respectively concerned the 
telecommunication and tourism sectors and were decided in 1996 (the Telsystem v. SIP 
                                                     
292 For claims relating to cartels a large number of parties are normally joined into the litigation and this will 
lengthen proceedings. 
293 In 2006 the Law Decree no. 223/2006 abolished the statutory fixed maximum and minimum attorney fees, 
and lifted the prohibition on contingency fees. However, Law no. 247/2012 (Articles 13(4) and 25 (2)) 
reintroduced the prohibition for lawyers to set contingency fees.  Such prohibition was not lifted by the 
latest Ministerial Decree no. 55/2014 of March 10, 2014. 
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case)294 and in 2003 (the Bluvacanze v. Turisanda and others case).295  The action brought 
before the Corte d’Appello of Rome concerned again the telecommunication sector.  The 
Albacom v. Telecom case was decided in 2003.296 All these actions were brought for 
breach of national competition rules pursuant to Article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 . In two 
instances,297 damages were awarded after that the NCA had found the defendants in breach 
of national competition rules whilst in the other case298 damages were awarded for breach 
of Article 2 of Law no. 287/90 , following a stand-alone action.  However, for many years, 
the large majority of competition based were unsuccessful attempts ended at the 
preliminary stage of interim proceedings.  Successful actions have been brought between 
in the early 2000’s, by individuals – namely insurance policy-holders – before the Giudice 
di Pace – the Italian lowest court – pursuant to the ordinary procedural rules instead of to 
Article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 .  These were follow-on actions were, consequence of the 
NCA’s decision imposing fines to several insurance companies for having been found in 
violation of national competition rules.299  Such actions have raised a lively debate of 
scholars particularly based on the restrictive interpretation of Article 33(2) of Law no. 
287/90  given by the Corte di Cassazione 300  with reference to the standing of 
individuals/consumers to bring actions for breach of national competition rules pursuant to 
Article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 .  In particular, the Corte di Cassazione, basing itself on a 
strict interpretation of Article 33(2)of Law no. 287/90, de facto denied the standing of 
consumers in respect of damages actions for breach of national competition rules pursuant 
to Article 33(2) of Law no. 287/90 . According to the Corte di Cassazione, under said 
                                                     
294 Case Telsystem v. SIP, App. Milano, November 26, 1996, in Giur. It., 1997, I, 2, 520; app. Milano, 
December 24, 1996, in Danno e Resp., 1997, 602.  
295 Case Bluvacanze v. Turisanda and others, App. Milano, July 11, 2003, in Il diritto industriale, n. 2/2004, 
157-169, with note of Faella G.  
296 Albacom S.p.A. and others v. Telecom Italia S.p.A., App. Roma, January 20, 2003, in Foro It.; I, 9, 2474. 
In was a follow-on action, where three plaintiffs obtained damages from Telecom Italia based on an abuse 
of dominance claim. The amount awarded was €1.9 million. 
297 Namely, in the Telsystem v.SIP case and the Albacom v. Telecom case. 
298 Namely,  the Bluvacanze v. Turisanda and others case. 
299 Article 2 of Law 287/90. 
300 See judgment of Corte di Cassazione of December 9, 2002 no. 17475 in case Axa Assicurazioni v. Isvap e 
Camillo Larato. 
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Article 33(2) the Corte d'Appello would have exclusive jurisdiction for damages actions 
for breach of national competition rules as long as such actions are brought by and 
between undertakings and not by consumers. The Corte di Cassazione however also 
affirmed that such restrictive interpretation of Article 33(2) did not imply that the way to 
consumers damages actions deriving from an upstream restrictive agreement between 
undertakings is barred. In this respect the court stated that individuals may still bring 
damages actions related to a breach of national competition rules on general tort rules to 
the extent that they prove that a given right of theirs, other than those protected by Law no. 
287/90  which relates to undertakings' rights, was harmed.301  In 2005, however, this 
interpretation has been superseded by the judgment of the Joint Sections of the Italian 
Supreme Court.  The Corte di Cassazione held that consumers harmed by violations of 
national antitrust law had standing to sue for damages. The Court, relying on the Courage 
judgment, reconsidered its position and held that competition law protects every single 
person in the market, including consumers, who have a qualified interest in safeguarding 
the competitive structure. The consumer – as the final buyer of the product – is affected by 
any anticompetitive agreement that has the effect of reducing its choice between products 
by setting up just the "appearance" of a choice.  Notably, the Joint Sections confirmed that 
the Court of Appeal is the only body with jurisdiction to judge on the merits of legal 
actions brought by any party for compensation for damages, in compliance with the 
conditions laid down by Law No. 287/1990 relating to antitrust matters.  The decision 
clarified that antitrust law does not only represent a useful instrument to safeguard the 
interests of entrepreneurs competing with other entrepreneurs that have put in place an 
anticompetitive behavior, but it concerns all market-related parties, including final 
consumers that could potentially be affected by the unlawful activity.  The Supreme Court 
first underlined that competition rules never explicitly excluded consumers’ right of 
standing; to the contrary they contemplate the discretionary powers of the NCA to permit 
agreements - that would normally be considered unlawful - when consumers would benefit 
from them.  Through this example the Court stressed out that competition law not only 
takes into consideration consumers’ interests but often functional to their protection.  As 
final buyers of the product consumers close the product chain, and get affected by an 
                                                     
301 These actions should be brought before the courts which would be competent by virtue of the value of the 
claim and territorial criteria, according to the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. the 
Giudice di Pace or the Tribunale) 
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anticompetitive agreement if their actual choice between products is reduced – or 
completely eliminated by setting up just the "appearance" of a choice.  Consumers are 
affected by an anticompetitive agreement through the contracts they entered into with the 
participating entrepreneurs at the downstream level. Such contracts are considered not to 
be separable from the upstream agreement as their functionally linked to the 
anticompetitive behavior implemented by the participant parties. In essence, the contracts 
entered into after the agreement has been put in place, would be the instruments by which 
the anticompetitive behavior is tangibly implement. 302   Thus, this judgment shall be 
considered overall significant because it finally put an end to the uncertainty as to the 
identity of the competent judicial authority to be approached by consumers in order to 
request compensation for damages as the result of an anticompetitive agreement.  The 
decision of the Joint Supreme Court was paramount as it recognized the role of consumers 
in the competitive market structure, and the importance of their effective freedom of 
choice as a criterion to assess the existence of an anticompetitive behavior and the 
consequent damages. 
On a different note, it is also useful to point out to the pragmatic/commercial approach 
by the Italian courts to “tactical” delaying measures.  The so-called Italian Torpedo case 
brought by ENI before the Italian courts303 is an example of such approach. In this case, 
                                                     
302 With respect to damages, the Joint Sections have confirmed that the compensation could be granted solely 
on the basis of the annulment of the agreement by the NCA. In fact, it is also necessary for the Court of 
Appeal to assess, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the claimant, whether there are unlawful 
effects for consumers. 
303 Case ENI SPA v Pirelli SPA no. 53825/07 RG (April 29, 2009). The Italian Proceedings were dismissed at 
first instance, on grounds of inadmissibility and insufficient detail in the pleadings.  An appeal was 
lodged but the proceedings have also now been settled, vacating the expected appeal.  After receiving 
letters before action from lawyers in Milan acting for various tyre manufacturers, Eni commenced 
proceedings in Italy on July 29, 2007 against the tyre manufacturers seeking a declaration from the court 
that the cartel did not exist, or that even if it did, it had no effect on the prices for synthetic rubber. Eni 
filed against 28 defendant companies in the Pirelli, Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, Bridgestone and 
Cooper groups (“Italian Proceedings”).  
 Notably, unlike “torpedo” cases in other fields of law, there appeared good reason for Eni to commence 
proceedings in Italy, given that was where they had been threatened.  Later that year, in December 2007, 
the tire manufacturers launched the threatened claim for damages against 23 companies in the Bayer, 
Shell, Dow, Unipetrol and Trade-Stomil groups before the English courts (“English Proceedings”). None 
of the addressees of the Commission’s decision are domiciled in England and only two of the 23 
defendants listed in the English Proceedings are domiciled in England (one member of the Shell group 
and one member of the Bayer group). Eni was not included as a defendant to the English Proceedings. In 
May 2008, the Dow group intervened in the Italian Proceedings and adopted the claims made by Eni. In 
June 2008, Dow then challenged the jurisdiction of the English court, in the English Proceedings, and, in 
the alternative, applied to stay the English Proceedings until the Italian Proceedings were resolved (Dow 
Application).  The hearing of the Dow Application was stayed pending resolution at first instance by the 
Italian Courts. Unsurprisingly, the judgments of the English courts made it clear that they will resist 
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the Italian court rejected an application for a negative declaration as to damages. The 
judgment was on appeal when it was settled.304  
2. The United Kingdom 
The development of antitrust litigation continues to be a feature of the legal landscape 
in the United Kingdom (“UK”).  In the UK, private enforcement has since a long time 
been the most popular venue for private enforcement in Europe.  However, whilst there 
has been a noticeable increase in private litigation seen in the UK courts, whether follow-
on or standalone actions, this is entirely the result of companies (which many not based in 
the UK) suing for losses suffered as a result of cartels or abusive conduct.  Even in the UK, 
SMEs or individual consumers, do not often bring actions, due to the absence of 
appropriate structures for low cost group or representative actions and funding difficulties.  
A new legislation has been drafted in parallel with the drafting of the EU Directive.  
The Consumer Rights Bill 305 proposes significant changes to private enforcement, the 
most significant of which is the introduction of an opt-out procedure for collective actions.  
This contrasts with the opt-in regime embraced by the EU Damages Directive and could 
serve to further increase the attraction of the UK courts to potential claimants.  The 
introduction of the Consumer Rights Bill followed a period of consultation on reform of 
the competition litigation regime.306  At the time of writing it had proceeded through the 
House of Commons stage but remains subject to possible amendment by the House of 
Lords and in the final joint debate stage.  Against this background, the EU Damages 
Directive may not have as significant effects in England as in some other Member States 
because in areas such as disclosure of documents and limitation the position in England is 
currently advanced beyond the standard that will be mandated by the EU Directive.  
                                                                                                                                      
attempts to delay proceedings in England.  For a more detailed overview of the issue, see Stothers C., 
Gardner M., and Hinchliffe S., “Forum Shopping and “Italian  Torpedoes” in Competition Litigation in 
the English Courts”, in Global Competition Litigation review, Issue 2, 2011, Sweet & Maxwell. 
304 For further details on the Italian torpedo, see 108 et seq. 
305 Additional details on the content of the Bill are available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-rights-bill-implementing-the-measures.  The 
piece of legislation shall enter into force on October 1, 2015 
306 In April 2012, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) launched a public consultation 
on the proposed reforms, which was followed in January 2013 by the publication of a government 
response to submissions. 
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However, the EU Damages Directive will nonetheless bring along some important changes, 
such as the introduction of a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm and the 
exclusion of companies that have been granted total immunity from the principle of joint 
and several liability for the loss caused by a competition law infringement. 
While the precise impact of these reforms on the state of private enforcement of 
competition law in England is difficult to predict, what seems certain is that activity in this 
area will continue to increase. 
 Legal framework a.
The principle that infringements of competition law can give rise to claims for 
damages in the UK courts had been undisputed since the decision of the House of Lord in 
case Garden Cottage Foods.307  The leading case Crehan308 was heard and decided as an 
action for breach of statutory duty, the statutory duty in question being compliance with 
the EU competition rules.309   
Against this case law, the legislation, namely, the Competition Act 1998310 had already 
initiated a new era of competition law, by implementing the European legislation into the 
legal order of the UK.  This main source of competition law in the UK, which regulates 
cartels, anticompetitive agreements and abuse of market power, replaced earlier regulation 
of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of market power laid down in the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1976, Resale Price Act 1976 and Competition Act 1980.311   
                                                     
307 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v. Milk Marketing Boards [1984] AC 130.  This case established the broad 
position of the UK courts.  The litigation in Crehan focused on the narrower point of the ability of a party 
to an agreement which violated EU competition law to sue for damages from another party to that 
agreement. 
308 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd and Crehan [2001] ECR I- 6297. 
309 As incorporated in UK law by virtue of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972, clearly 
showing that such actions are classified by the national law as tortious: “All such rights, powers, 
liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties... are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognized and 
available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed”.  The Section 18 of the more recent European 
Union Act 2011 declares that EU law is directly applicable only through the European Communities Act 
or another act fulfilling the same role. 
310  The Competition Act of 1998, Gazette no. 19412, Notice no. 1392 dated October 30, 1998. 
Commencement date: November 30, 1998. 
311 For further details on the legislative background, see Bradgate R. and White F., “Commercial Law Legal 
Practice Course Guide”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 387. 
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At present, private actions for breach of EU or UK competition rules can be 
commenced in the High Court or in the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”).  
In the High Court, proceedings can be issued in either the Chancery Division or the 
Commercial Court.312  Claims in the High Court are most commonly brought on the basis 
of the tort of breach of statutory duty, being a breach of the duty not to act contrary to the 
competition rules set out in Chapters I and II of the Competition Act 1998 or Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.  However, it is open to claimants to found their claims on alternative bases.  
For example, the High Court has ruled that there is no reason why follow-on competition 
law claims should always be structured as a claim for breach of statutory duty and that 
follow-on actions could, alternatively, be founded on a conspiracy to use unlawful means.  
The defendants in the case in question, WH Newson Holding v. IMI and others,313 sought 
to strike out a claim brought by building material retailers against manufacturers of copper 
plumbing tube implicated in Commission’s 2004 Copper Plumbing Tubes cartel decision.  
The defendant’s argument was based on the fact that the claim was not pleaded as a breach 
of a statutory duty, but this argument was rejected on the basis that the determining 
criterion is the factual nature of the claim (i.e., an infringement of competition law) and 
not the cause of action itself. 
Claims in the CAT are brought under Section 47A of the Competition Act, which 
permits a person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a competition law 
infringement to bring an action for damages or any other monetary claim.  Under Section 
47B, certain specified bodies may also bring or continue consumer claims before the CAT 
on behalf of a group of named individuals with their consent (i.e., on an “opt-in” basis) 
where the claims included in the proceedings relate to the same infringement.  However, 
the Consumer Rights Bill proposes to expand the existing limited jurisdiction of the CAT 
to hear collective actions (currently allowing only the consumer association Which?314 to 
bring claims, and only on an opt-in basis) so that the procedure for collective actions could 
be used by any appropriate consumer representative body or trade association and claims 
could be brought on an opt-out basis. 
                                                     
312 There is provision for transfer of competition claims between the High Court and the CAT, and vice versa: 
see Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”), Rule 30 and CAT Rules, Rule 48. 
313  WH Newson Holding v. IMI and others [2012] EWHC 3680 (Ch), judgment of December 19, 2012. 
314 More information on the consumer association is available at http://www.which.co.uk/.  
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 Follow-on and stand-alone actions b.
Follow-on actions can be brought before the High Court or the CAT where there is a 
pre- existing infringement decision of the Commission, the NCA or one of the UK sectoral 
regulators in respect of a breach of EU or UK competition law.  The CAT’s jurisdiction is 
currently limited to follow-on claims – such that a claim cannot be made in the CAT until 
a decision by a competition authority has established that the prohibition in question has 
been infringed.  However, the Consumer Rights Bill proposes the extension of the CAT’s 
jurisdiction to include stand-alone claims, either as issued in the CAT or as referred to the 
CAT from the High Court.315  The Consumer Rights Bill also looks to extend the CAT’s 
jurisdiction so it may grant other forms of relief including injunctive relief.  There have 
now been a number of follow-on actions commenced in the High Court and a smaller 
number in the CAT, although a case is yet to result in a final judgment.316 
Stand-alone actions based on a breach of EU or UK competition law remain relatively 
rare and few have been successfully pursued to trial.  In the absence of a pre-existing 
decision by a competition authority, alleged competition infringements have more 
frequently been pleaded as a defence to claims on other grounds (e.g., intellectual property 
infringements), including in applications for summary judgment.317  To date, only one 
stand-alone claim has been successful in the High Court, although it was subsequently 
overturned by the Court of Appeal (Attheraces Limited v. The British Horseracing 
Board).318 
However, this lack of apparent success has not deterred stand-alone claims altogether.  
There are a number of prominent cases which, although technically stand-alone claims, 
still rely on an anticipated finding of an infringement by the Commission.  For example, in 
                                                     
315 Under the currently dormant procedure empowered by Section 16 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
316 The Cooper Tire claim settled during trial. 
317 See, for example, in Jones v. Ricoh UK Limited [2010] EWHC 1743 (Ch), the High Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that the agreement between the parties underlying the 
dispute was void and unenforceable by virtue of Article 101 TFEU. 
318 [2007] EWCA Civ. 38, judgment of February 2, 2007. 
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Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd and others v. KME Yorkshire Ltd and others319 actions were 
brought before the High Court by Toshiba Carrier UK and several associated companies 
who bought substantial quantities of industrial copper tubes, or goods incorporating such 
tubes, during the period of the Industrial Copper Tubes cartel.  The High Court concluded 
that even though the defendants were not the addressee of the Commission’s cartel 
decision, they did implement the arrangements as set out by the infringement, which 
demonstrated their knowledge of the unlawful arrangements. KME Yorkshire Ltd lodged 
an appeal against the High Court’s decision with the Court of Appeal, which upheld the 
judgment concluding that the claimants had alleged sufficiently clearly that KME 
Yorkshire Ltd had participated in, and implemented, the cartel arrangements, with 
knowledge of the cartel agreement.320 
In Emerald Supplies v. British Airways,321 Emerald brought a representative action on 
behalf of itself and other cut-flower importers, claiming loss as a result of an alleged price-
fixing cartel in the market for the supply of air freight services, to which Emerald alleged 
that British Airways had been party.  This claim was brought in the High Court before the 
conclusion of the European Commission’s investigation, in an attempt to establish a broad 
class of claimants.  As explained in more detail below, it is proposed by the Consumer 
Rights Bill that stand-alone actions, including anticipatory claims along the lines of the 
Emerald Supplies claim, should in future be permitted in the CAT. 
Despite the limited number of stand-alone cases, the High Court has granted interim 
injunctions in cases alleging competition law breaches, including in Dahabshiil Transfer 
Services Limited v Barclays Bank plc; Harada Ltd & Berkeley Credit and Guarantee 
Limited v Barclays Bank plc, 322  Adidas-Salomon v. Draper 323  and Software Cellular 
Network Limited v. T-Mobile (UK) Limited.324  None of these cases proceeded to a full 
                                                     
319 Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd and others v. KME Yorkshire Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch), judgment 
of October 2011. 
320 [2012] EWCA Civ. 1190, judgment of September 13, 2012. 
321 [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch) and [2010] EWCA Civ. 1284. 
322 [2013] EWHC 3379 (Ch). 
323 [2006] EWHC 1318 (Ch). 
324 [2007] EWHC 1790 (Ch). 
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trial. 325   However, these cases are rare because of the challenges applicants face in 
competition law cases in meeting the standard for injunctive relief (i.e., “a real prospect of 
success” at trial) without the support of an infringement decision by a competition 
authority.  This is particularly the case in abuse of dominance cases, where applicants will 
need to file sophisticated economic evidence to prove market definition in relation to the 
alleged abusive conduct.  
This was demonstrated in Chemistree Homecare Ltd v. AbbVie Ltd.326  In this case, Mr 
Justice Roth rejected the claimant’s application for an interim injunction on the grounds 
that there was little likelihood that the claimant would be able to demonstrate that the 
defendant was dominant.  The court found that insufficient evidence had been presented by 
the claimants to show that a single product market existed in this case.  Given that 
applications for interim injunctions are heard quickly (in this case within weeks of the case 
being filed) claimants have limited time in which to obtain the necessary data and conduct 
the detailed economic analysis necessary to persuade the court of a favorable market 
definition to support the granting of an injunction. 
 
 Procedural aspects c.
i. Limitation periods 
Proceedings in the High Court are subject to the general rule on limitation that applies 
to tort claims, which requires that a claim must be brought within six years from the date 
on which the cause of action accrued.327  The limitation period for tort claims starts from 
the date on which the damage was suffered by the claimant, but it is generally accepted 
that one of the exceptions to the general rule will apply to claims relating to cartels or other 
‘secret’ activities, where the period of limitation will not begin to run until the claimant 
                                                     
325 Competition law grounds were also relevant to injunctions granted in two earlier cases: Jobserve Ltd v. 
Network Multimedia Television Ltd [2001] UKCLR 814 (upheld by the Court of Appeal [2002] UKCLR 
184) and LauritzenCool AB v. Lady Navigation Inc [2004] EWHC 2607 (upheld by the Court of Appeal 
[2005] EWCA Civ. 579). 
326 [2013] EWHC 264 (Ch), judgment of February 11, 2013. 
327 Limitation Act 1980, Section 2. Contribution claims are subject to a two-year limitation period from the 
date on which that right accrued under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (i.e., the date of 
judgment, arbitration award or settlement agreement, whichever applies – Limitation Act 1980, Section 
10). 
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has discovered the concealment or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.328  
In follow-on damages cases, this may not be until a competition authority has announced a 
decision or reached a settlement with a cartel participant, although the English courts are 
yet to rule on how the deliberate concealment exception applies in these cases.329  
Special limitation provisions currently apply to claims for damages in the CAT.  A 
claim under Sections 47A or 47B must be made within a period of two years beginning 
from the later of the date on which the decision can no longer be appealed (including the 
determination of any appeals), or the date on which the action accrued.330  Importantly, the 
limitation period does not begin to run until this time, which means a claim cannot be 
commenced in the CAT before the infringement decision has become final, unless the 
CAT grants special permission.  The CAT limitation rules are the subject of proposed 
reform.  The Consumer Rights Bill proposes that the CAT limitation rules should be 
brought into line with the civil standard (i.e., the six-year rule that applies to High Court 
claims) to avoid discrepancies between the two regimes.  However, the EU Damages 
Directive is expected to require Member States to provide that claims can be brought for a 
period of at least one year following an infringement finding331 and the UK is likely to 
include provision to this effect in the Consumer Rights Bill before it is enacted. 
The operation of the CAT limitation rules has been considered in detail in three sets of 
cases.  First, in Emerson Electric v. Morgan Crucible 332  (“Emerson I”) the CAT 
considered whether time had begun to run against Morgan Crucible – which had been 
granted leniency and had not therefore appealed the relevant Commission decision – in 
circumstances where the other cartel participants had appealed to the (then) Court of First 
Instance.  The CAT held that time had not started because appeals by some of the 
defendants against the Commission’s findings of infringements were still pending before 
                                                     
328 Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. 
329 An obvious limitation point might be raised if the NCA’s investigation was made public and the claimant 
does not issue a claim until more than six years after that point or for a different period if the law of 
another jurisdiction (not English law) is deemed to be the applicable law and that law provides for a 
different limitation period), but it is unclear whether a court would allow such a defence. 
330 See CAT Rules, Rule 31. 
331 Article 10.2. 
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the Court of First Instance, and that permission was therefore required to bring the claim 
before the determination of the appeals.  In response to a subsequent application in 
Emerson II,333 the CAT exercised its discretion and granted the claimants permission on 
the basis that, on the facts, there was an enhanced risk that documents in the possession of 
the defendant would not be available for disclosure if proceedings could not be brought 
until the exhaustion of all rights of appeal. 334   On May 19, 2010, the CAT granted 
permission for the claimants to add the other cartel participants (who were unsuccessful in 
their appeals to the European Court) to the claim. 
Second, in BCL Old Co v. BASF the CAT and then the Court of Appeal considered the 
extent to which an appeal restricted to the level of fine imposed (and not concerning the 
finding of an infringement itself) could suspend the start of the limitation period.335 
The Court of Appeal overturned the CAT’s decision that time had not yet started to run 
and held that an appeal that merely seeks an annulment or reduction in the penalty imposed 
by the Commission is not sufficient to suspend the limitation period.  
Accordingly, the trigger point for the start of the time period for bringing a claim in the 
CAT cannot be delayed by an appeal merely against the level of the fine imposed.   
The result of the Court of Appeal’s decision was that the BCL Old claims were time-
barred.  The CAT subsequently refused an application requesting that the CAT exercise its 
case management powers and extend the time period for bringing the claim.336  The appeal 
of that decision was rejected by the Court of Appeal, which ruled that the CAT Rules did 
not empower the CAT to extend the time for bringing a follow-on action under Section 
47A.337  The point was appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the claimant’s 
arguments, stating that Section 47A of the Competition Act and the CAT Rules are 
sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable to enable individuals to ascertain when the 
limitation period commences and do not render it excessively difficult for claimants to 
                                                     
333 [2007] CAT 30. 
334 In contrast, the CAT refused an application by Emerson for permission to bring proceedings against the 
other cartel participants, which had appealed against the European Commission decision, before the 
conclusion of the European Court appeal proceedings (“Emerson III” [2008] CAT 8). 
335 [2008] CAT 24; [2009] EWCA Civ. 434. 
336 [2009] CAT 29. 
337 [2010] EWCA Civ. 1258. 
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exercise their rights to bring follow-on damages actions.338  Following this judgment there 
is clarity that the limitation period under Section 47A of the Competition Act is not 
suspended by an appeal that relates exclusively to the level of penalty imposed.  
Furthermore the Supreme Court has confirmed that the CAT does not have the power 
under the CAT Rules to grant an extension to the statutory deadline for bringing a damages 
action once it has expired. 
Finally, in Deutsche Bahn v. Morgan Crucible 339 – another claim against Morgan 
Crucible and the other members of the carbon and graphite products cartel – the CAT 
ruled in May 2011 that the claims against Morgan Crucible should be struck out on the 
ground that they had not been brought within the time limit set out in the CAT Rules.340  
The CAT held that the time limit for bringing the claim against Morgan Crucible in the 
CAT expired two years after the last date on which Morgan Crucible could have appealed 
against the Commission’s decision regardless of the fact that other addressees of the 
decision had appealed that decision to the EU General Court.  By considering that the time 
limit was not affected by the appeals of the other cartel members, this decision appeared to 
conflict with Emerson I.  In July 2012 the Court of Appeal overturned the CAT’s decision 
on the basis that – endorsing Emerson I – an appeal against a cartel decision should not be 
viewed as challenging only the decision as addressed to that particular appellant, and the 
limitation period before the CAT does not begin to run until appeals by all addressees of 
the infringement decision have been exhausted.341  The position has since been reviewed 
by the Supreme Court, which overruled the Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court 
confirmed that the fact that another addressee has elected to appeal against the decision 
does not affect the limitation position. This is because even if the appeal of the other 
addressee is successful and the infringement finding is annulled in respect of that 
                                                     
338 UKSC 2012/45, Judgment by the Supreme Court dated October 24, 2012. 
339 [2011] CAT 16. 
340 CAT Rule 31. 
341 Case C3/2011/1995, Deutsche Bank AG v. Morgan Crucible Company Plc, judgment given July 31, 2012 
(unreported). 
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addressee, the annulment would have no effect on an addressee that is not party to the 
appeal proceedings.342 
It should be noted that in relation to claims in the High Court, parties to potential 
litigation may be able to suspend time for the purposes of limitation by entering into a 
standstill or “tolling” agreement. However, in the Emerson I case, the CAT expressed the 
view that the two-year limitation period in the CAT could not be extended by the 
agreement of parties to potential litigation. 
ii. Extraterritoriality 
A foreign-domiciled defendant served with a claim issued in the English courts can 
indicate an intention to challenge the jurisdiction when acknowledging service. The 
jurisdictional challenge will then be heard at a preliminary hearing. 
Whether the English courts (including the CAT) have jurisdiction to hear a private 
action concerning an infringement of competition law will, in general, be determined by 
the relevant EU law rules, as set out in Regulation no. 44/2001 (“the Judgments 
Regulation”).343 
The general rule under the Judgments Regulation is that a defendant domiciled in an 
EU Member State should be sued in the courts of that Member State (Article 2). Two 
relevant exceptions apply to this general rule, allowing the possibility in certain 
circumstances of a competition claim being brought in the English courts against a 
defendant domiciled outside the UK and in another EU Member State – these exceptions 
are found in Article 5(3) and Article 6(1) of the Judgments Regulation. 
Article 5(3) applies to tort claims, which will include a competition claim for breach of 
statutory duty. It provides that a defendant domiciled in a Member State can be sued in the 
courts of “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”.  General tort case 
law has interpreted this phrase to mean the place where the damage occurred or the place 
                                                     
342 Deutsche Bahn AG (and others) v. Morgan Advanced Materials Plc (formally Morgan Crucible Co Plc) 
[2014] UKSC 24. 
343  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 L 012, p. 1.  Jurisdiction concerning claims against EFTA 
countries that are not also EU Member States will be determined according to the rules set out in the 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
which are substantively equivalent to those set out in the Judgments Regulation. For non-EU or EFTA-
domiciled defendants, the jurisdiction of the UK courts will be determined by the private international 
law rules found in the common law and the CPR that apply to applications to serve claims outside the UK. 
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where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.  However, the two cases in which this 
basis of jurisdiction has been considered by the English courts demonstrate that Article 5(3) 
may have limited application in competition cases. 
Cooper Tire v. Shell in particular illustrates the difficulties in founding jurisdiction 
under Article 5(3) in cartel follow-on actions. That case involves claims by a consortium 
of tire manufacturers against 23 defendants said to have been involved in, or to have 
implemented, the synthetic rubber cartel established by the European Commission. Only 
three defendants named in the action were domiciled in England. In hearing an application 
challenging jurisdiction, the High Court briefly considered Article 5(3) and commented 
that in the context of a Europe-wide cartel where cartel meetings (the event giving rise to 
the damage) took place in several countries, it would be difficult to contend that the place 
where the harmful event occurred was England, as the harmful events took place in a 
number of countries.344  The court therefore considered that the claimants could only rely 
on Article 5(3) in relation to the place where the damage caused by the cartel occurred. 
However, were jurisdiction established on that basis, that would only be in respect of the 
damage that occurred in England (i.e., concerning sales in England), representing in the 
Cooper Tire case a small proportion of the damages claimed against the defendants. 
In an earlier case,345 involving an allegation of abusive licensing practices concerning 
MP3 technology against defendants domiciled outside England, the High Court insisted 
that real evidence of harm was required for damage to have occurred in England under 
Article 5(3). In that case, the court rejected the claimant’s argument that the payment of 
higher royalties could constitute harm in England, as those payments were not made in 
England.346 
The UK courts have demonstrated a more liberal approach to the application of Article 
6(1) to establish jurisdiction over follow-on claims against defendants domiciled in other 
Member States.  Article 6(1) provides that where the jurisdiction of the UK courts has 
                                                     
344 [2009] EWHC 2609 (Comm).  The claimants had argued that the fact that the first and last cartel meetings 
had taken place in London was sufficient for the harmful event to have occurred in England. 
345 SanDisk v. Philips Electronics, [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch). 
346 The court therefore declined jurisdiction on the basis that any harm would have been suffered by the 
claimant in its place of domicile, the United States. 
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been established over one defendant,347 additional defendants domiciled in other Member 
States can also be sued in UK in the same action, provided the claims are “so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.”  The High Court’s 
interpretation of this phrase in follow-on damages cases has allowed claimants to bring 
claims against all EU-domiciled cartel participants based on the identification of a single 
“anchor” defendant in the jurisdiction, although there are now signs that the High Court 
could in the future apply greater scrutiny to the anchor defendant’s link to the infringement. 
The application of Article 6(1) in follow-on cases was first considered in the context of 
a jurisdictional challenge in Provimi v. Roche 348  – an action following on from the 
Commission’s 2001 vitamins cartel decision. In Provimi, the claimants sought to rely on 
the UK subsidiaries of non-UK parent companies as Article 2 anchor defendants, so that 
jurisdiction could be established against the parent companies that were addressees of the 
Commission decision using Article 6(1).  Importantly, the UK subsidiaries were not 
addressees of the decision, and had not at any time had a trading relationship with the 
claimants.  The High Court’s consideration of the application of Article 6(1) was limited to 
an interim hearing on a strike-out application, but the case established the basis for a broad 
approach to the scope of Article 6(1).349  First, the High Court held that there was “a good 
arguable case” that the “so closely connected/risk of irreconcilable judgments” test was 
met in the context of a cartel follow-on action that named the members of a cartel as co-
defendants, in particular because the claims for damages against the defendants arose out 
of the same cartel finding.  More controversially, the High Court accepted that it was 
arguable that such claims could seek to recover losses against defendants that were 
subsidiaries of the parent companies addressed by the Commission infringement decision, 
on the basis that they were part of the same undertaking and so could be said to have 
(perhaps unknowingly) “implemented” the cartel in England. 350   This allowed the 
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348 Provimi Ltd v. Roche Products Ltd and other actions [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm). 
349 The case was subsequently settled so did not go to a full trial and the decision of the High Court was not 
appealed. 
350 Under the EU concept of “undertaking” parents and subsidiaries within a corporate group are considered 
part of a single economic entity for the purposes of competition law. 
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claimants to claim against the English subsidiary – as the anchor defendant under Article 2 
– in the absence of any assertion about a trading relationship. 
In the Cooper Tire case, the claimants also sought to establish jurisdiction against non-
English addressees of the Commission’s decision using Article 6(1) in the same way as in 
Provimi – through including three anchor defendants that were domiciled in England and 
subsidiaries of the cartel participants (but not themselves addressees of the decision). 
Following Provimi, the High Court agreed with the claimants that it was arguable that a 
subsidiary of a party named in an infringement decision could be liable in a follow-on 
damages claim even where it was not party to, or aware of, the infringement of 
competition law but based on mere implementation of the cartel arrangements.  
Specifically, the court held that the claimants had demonstrated that the anchor defendants 
had sold synthetic rubber within the jurisdiction, which provided a sufficiently arguable 
case that they had implemented the cartel arrangements.  The court therefore concluded 
that it had jurisdiction under Article 6(1) to also hear the claims against the non-English 
subsidiaries on the basis that those claims were sufficiently closely connected to the claims 
against the anchor defendants. 
Certain of the defendants in the Cooper Tire case appealed the Article 6(1) findings to 
the Court of Appeal, arguing that the High Court had erred by accepting that it was 
arguable that a subsidiary that was not an addressee of the infringement decision could be 
liable for the activities of its parent by “mere implementation” as part of the same 
undertaking, in the absence of knowledge or awareness of the cartel.  They also argued that, 
in the alternative, this question merited a reference to the ECJ.351  The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal on the basis that the claimants’ particulars of claim also alleged that 
each of the defendants, including the anchor defendant subsidiaries, were a party to the 
infringing arrangements, and were not therefore limited to a claim that they were liable on 
the basis that they had merely implemented the cartel arrangements as a subsidiary of a 
parent that was an addressee of the Commission’s decision.352   
This meant that the claim would survive even if it was correct that mere 
implementation was insufficient for liability to be established against the subsidiary and 
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that part of the claim was struck out. The Court of Appeal was therefore able to sidestep 
the issue of whether a reference to the ECJ was necessary on the question of whether a 
subsidiary of a party named in an infringement decision could be potentially liable – and 
thus used to anchor jurisdiction against defendants domiciled outside the UK under Article 
6(1) – even where it was not party to, or aware of, the infringement of competition law. 
However, in coming to this conclusion the Court of Appeal observed that, had 
implementation without knowledge been the sole allegation, then it would have been 
inclined to make a reference to the ECJ before coming to a conclusion on jurisdiction.  
The UK damages claim was eventually settled in May 2014 – one week before the trial 
was due to start – bringing an end to the lengthy proceedings. 
The Court of Appeal again considered Article 6(1) and the so-called Provimi principle 
in another case, Toshiba Carrier v. KME.353  Toshiba Carrier involves claims structured in 
a similar way to Cooper Tire, with the claimants attempting to found jurisdiction against 
the non-UK companies named in the Commission’s 2003 Copper Tubes cartel decision by 
including three English subsidiaries (which were not addressees of the decision).  The 
English defendants sought to strike out the claims on the basis that the claimants had not 
provided sufficient evidence to allege participation in the cartel and, on this basis, that the 
High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the claims against them.  At first instance, the High 
Court – following Provimi and Cooper Tire – found against the defendants and concluded 
that there was jurisdiction to hear the claims against the non-English defendants.354  The 
case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the High Court’s 
decision.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the claimants had alleged sufficiently 
clearly in their pleadings that, although the companies in question were not addressees of 
the infringement finding, they had participated in and implemented the cartel arrangements 
with knowledge of the cartel.  On this basis, the Court found that it was in accordance with 
Article 6(1) to bring an action against a UK defendant that in turn can be used as an anchor 
defendant enabling connected actions against non-English defendants.355  The Court of 
Appeal reiterated the position that the claims against national and non-domiciled 
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defendants must be so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
The High Court’s relatively liberal approach to jurisdiction has not been followed by 
the CAT.  In the follow-on action of Emerson Electric v. Morgan Crucible (Emerson 
IV)356 an English subsidiary (Mersen UK Portslade) of a non-English addressee of the 
European Commission’s decision in the carbon and graphite products cartel applied to the 
CAT to dismiss certain claims for damages against it.  The English subsidiary argued that 
there was no infringement decision against it on which the claimants could base their 
claims and furthermore that it was not referred to anywhere in the Commission decision.357  
The CAT agreed and struck out the claim, subsequently refusing the claimants permission 
to appeal its judgment.  Although the claimants were granted permission to appeal by the 
Court of Appeal on October 11, 2011, the decision to strike out the claim against Mersen 
UK was upheld on November 28, 2012. 358   Ultimately, on May 1, 2013, the CAT 
published a Supreme Court order consenting to the withdrawal by the applicants of their 
application to appeal, after a settlement was reached.359  The judgment of the Court of 
Appeal upholding the CAT’s decision in Emerson IV illustrates the limited application of 
Article 6(1) for founding jurisdiction in the CAT by identifying English subsidiaries that 
can be used as anchor defendants to found jurisdiction under Article 6(1) for claims 
against non-English addressees of a European Commission cartel decision.  This follows 
from the inherent limitation of the CAT’s jurisdiction in relation to follow-on claims, 
which requires that the subsidiary itself must have been found to infringe Article 101.  
This will be clear where the defendant has been named in the operative part of the decision 
as an addressee.  However, it may be less clear in relation to an English subsidiary that is 
not listed as an addressee but where its involvement in an infringement is expressly 
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referred to in the recitals to the decision – a possibility that in Emerson IV the CAT 
considered but did not rule on whether it might have jurisdiction. 
The lis pendens provisions in the Judgments Regulation provide scope for a potential 
defendant to a competition action to issue declaratory proceedings pre-emptively in 
another jurisdiction (an “Italian torpedo”) and frustrate a claimant’s attempt to bring the 
action in England.360  Under Article 27, where proceedings involving the same cause of 
action between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any 
court other than the court first seized must stay its proceedings.  This principle has been 
applied by the English courts without controversy in other contexts. Article 28 sets out a 
similar requirement in relation to related actions (i.e., not between the same parties) in the 
courts of different Member States, providing that any court other than the court first seized 
has the discretion to stay its own proceedings pending the outcome of the action in the first 
court seized. 
The application of the lis pendens provisions was considered by the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal in Cooper Tire. Upon becoming aware of a potential action in England, 
one of the cartel participants named in the Commission’s decision issued proceedings in 
Italy seeking a negative declaratory judgment.361  The claimants then issued proceedings in 
England against the other cartel participants and a slew of subsidiaries.  One of the 
defendants in the English proceedings subsequently sought a stay on the basis of lis 
pendens pending the outcome of the Italian proceedings (i.e., under Article 28, on the basis 
that the actions were related).  The High Court accepted that there was a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments but declined to order a stay because the matters relevant to 
exercising its discretion under Article 28 weighed against doing so.  In particular, the risk 
of irreconcilable judgments could not be avoided by a stay as some of the defendants had 
submitted to the English jurisdiction and those proceedings would continue.  Further, the 
High Court considered that the delays in the Italian system meant it was more likely that 
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the English court would arrive at a substantive decision before the case was finally decided 
in Italy.  The approach of the High Court (subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal) 
suggests that the English courts will be reluctant to let a torpedo sink a damages claim 
unless the stricter terms of Article 27 apply to remove its discretion (i.e., the claim would 
need to be a mirror image both in substance and in identity of parties).  The recent 
settlement of the UK damages action in the Cooper Tire case has brought an end to the 
Italian lawsuit together with the UK proceedings. 
The Judgments Regulation might also allow jurisdiction to be resisted where a 
jurisdiction clause in a contract provides for the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
Member State (Article 23).  The application of this provision to competition actions was 
considered in Provimi, where some of the vitamins supply contracts included exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses naming courts in other Member States.  However, the High Court 
concluded that by referring to ‘disputes arising out of’ the sales contracts, those clauses 
were too narrow to cover cartel damages claims.  This suggests that a jurisdiction clause 
could only be relied on to oust the jurisdiction of the UK courts if it unambiguously refers 
to competition or tort claims (or both).362 
An issue related to, but separate from, jurisdiction is applicable law, which arises in a 
case involving a tort that contains a foreign element. Applicable law refers to the court’s 
choice of which law to apply in determining the substance of a claim. Although this 
subject is complex, it is worth summarizing the considerations that apply in determining 
applicable law in the context of competition law claims. 
Applicable law can arise as an issue in competition law actions because infringements 
(e.g., cartels) can often have effects in more than one jurisdiction and the national laws that 
apply to their determination can vary considerably between different Member States. This 
makes the question of which law should be applied to questions of substantive law – for 
example, issues such as causation, attribution of liability, the nature of the remedies that 
can be awarded and rules relating to settlements 363  – an important consideration for 
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claimants and defendants that can provide incentives for applicable law shopping.  Two 
particular issues where there are significant divergences in the laws of Member States 
could turn on applicable law in competition law claims: limitation (where applicable 
periods in the EU range from one year to anything up to 10 years or more); and passing on 
(which has been expressly accepted as applying in the law of some Member States, and 
may be more uncertain in others).  For both issues, a court’s acceptance of one law over 
another could effectively extinguish a claim.  These issues are therefore often a key 
consideration in claimant and defendant strategies in competition claims, although an 
English court is yet to consider arguments that a foreign law should apply to a competition 
law claim brought in the jurisdiction.  The choice of law rules has now been harmonized 
across the EU by the Rome II Regulation.364  Rome II includes a specific provision for 
competition law claims. This provides a general rule that the applicable law shall be the 
law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected.365  Most importantly for 
the purposes of infringements that might have effects in, or defendants from, multiple EU 
Member States, this rule is subject to an exception so that the applicable law may be the 
law of the forum in the case of either the market affected being in more than one country, 
or where there are co-defendants, for example where Article 6(1) of the Judgments 
Regulation has been employed.366  In both situations the claimant can choose to base the 
claim on the law of the forum, as long the market of the Member State of that court has 
also been “directly and substantially affected”. 
However, the rule provided by Rome II has little practical relevance to cases currently 
before the English courts as it only applies to damage that has occurred after January 10, 
2009.367  The question of applicable law in the cases currently before the English courts – 
in many cases relating to cartels found to have operated as far back as the 1980s – falls to 
be determined under the English tort law rules on choice of law, which are a mix of 
                                                                                                                                      
designed to provide for greater harmonization on some of the issues that might be viewed more favorably 
under the law of some Member States than others. 
364 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 11, 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”), OJ 2007 L199, p.40. 
365 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007, Article 6(a). 
366 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007, Article 6(b). 
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common law and statute. These rules are complicated and a detailed description is beyond 
the scope of this publication, but, in summary, claims relating to conduct and damage prior 
to May 1, 1996 will be determined under the common law rule of “double 
actionability”,368 while conduct and damage that occurred between May 1, 1996 and the 
entry into force of Rome II on January 11, 2009 are determined under the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1996.369  The application of these rules 
to a competition law case, in particular one where the infringement might fall both sides of 
the dividing line of May 1, 1996, adds further complications and has not been considered 
in reported cases.  
iii. Standing 
Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of an infringement of either 
UK or EU competition law may bring a claim for damages in the CAT.370  The same 
criterion applies to claims before the High Court on the basis that the law of tort applicable 
to breach of statutory duty confers a right of action on any persons harmed by a breach that 
is directly enforceable. 
Most obviously, this will include direct purchasers of a product whose price was 
inflated as a result of a competition law infringement and competitors excluded from a 
market. Also, the ability of indirect purchasers to bring claims has not, to date, been 
disputed in the English courts.371  In Devenish Nutrition v. Sanofi-Aventis372 – a claim by 
indirect purchasers of animal vitamins following the Commission’s 2001 vitamins cartel 
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defendant’s conduct is actionable under both the law of the forum and the law of the place where the 
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decision – it was assumed in interim proceedings on points of law that indirect purchasers 
were entitled to claim damages, including before the Court of Appeal.  In BCL Old Co v. 
BASF – a similar claim by indirect purchasers – the defendants did not challenge the 
standing of the indirect purchasers to bring the claims, although the CAT and the Court of 
Appeal held that the claim was time-barred. There has been at least one subsequent case in 
the CAT where indirect purchasers have brought claims and this point is yet to be 
disputed.373  The ECJ’s judgment in Courage v. Crehan374 dealt with a claim for damages 
by a party to an anticompetitive agreement against another party to that agreement.  It held 
that where one party bears “significant responsibility” for the infringement of competition 
law, that party is likely to be barred from making a claim under the principle of English 
law that a person should not be permitted to claim where it arises from his or her own 
illegal act (ex turpi causa non oritur actio).  However, on the facts of Crehan, the claim 
was allowed to proceed.  Certain designated groups can also have standing to bring 
representative actions for damages before the CAT. 
 Discovery d.
Generally, all parties to civil proceedings before the courts in England must give 
disclosure of those documents relevant to the case.375  The ability to inspect a defendant’s 
documents is potentially attractive to a claimant in proving its case and is one of the 
features of the English court system that makes England a popular forum, in particular, for 
follow-on damages actions. 376   However, disclosure is a double-edged sword, as the 
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claimant must also disclose relevant documents, which might allow a defendant to 
challenge causation or make out the passing-on defence, or both. 
The disclosure obligation continues throughout the proceedings and extends to 
documents that are created following the commencement of legal proceedings unless they 
are protected by privilege. The timing for disclosure in follow-on actions was the subject 
of dispute in National Grid v. ABB, a continuing claim relying on the Commission’s 2007 
decision concerning the gas-insulated switchgear cartel.377  The High Court refused to 
order a stay of proceedings until the outcome of appeals against the European 
Commission’s decision, ruling that procedural steps up to trial, including disclosure, 
should take place before a Masterfoods stay378 is imposed.  The consequence of this 
decision is that claims before the High Court can be expected to proceed at least to 
disclosure while appeals to the European courts remain unresolved. 
In a case management ruling in National Grid v. ABB on July 4, 2011, the High Court 
granted an application by the claimant for two of the 23 defendants to disclose certain 
documents obtained from the European Commission’s file despite acknowledging the 
possibility that the Commission might reopen its investigation into the gas-insulated 
switchgear cartel if the defendants were successful in their appeals to the ECJ.379  The 
High Court held that disclosure between parties to English court proceedings, under the 
protection of a confidentiality ring, would not undermine a Commission investigation. 
Even before proceedings are afoot, disclosure may be ordered against any person that 
is likely to be a party to the legal proceedings, at the discretion of the court, in 
circumstances where the court considers that this is desirable to dispose fairly of the claim, 
assist the resolution of the dispute without proceedings, or save costs.380  There is no scope 
to apply for pre-action disclosure of documents that would fall outside the respondent’s 
duty under standard disclosure had the proceedings commenced.  Pre-action disclosure 
may be of particular relevance in competition cases in which a defendant’s anticompetitive 
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conduct tends to have been concealed and a potential claimant may require documents 
from a potential defendant to establish whether it was affected by the infringement. 
In Trouw UK v. Mitsui381 the court stressed that pre-action disclosure should only be 
available in exceptional circumstances and that the main purpose of the procedure is to 
avoid litigation. This approach was followed in Hutchison 3G v. O2,382 where the court 
refused an application for pre-action disclosure by H3G – the smallest player and most 
recent entrant into the UK mobile phone market – against its competitor mobile network 
operators.  H3G sought broad pre-action disclosure to support a potential claim that the 
other operators were engaging in anticompetitive practices to prevent mobile number 
portability rules being liberalized.  The application was refused on the ground that it was 
not possible for the court to be satisfied that the evidence requested would fall within the 
scope of standard disclosure. In any event, the court doubted that pre-action disclosure 
would serve a useful purpose as the claimant had admitted that it could plead its claim 
without pre-action disclosure, which would have been disproportionately expensive. 
The English courts have the power to order disclosure against a non-party to 
proceedings in circumstances where this is considered necessary to dispose fairly of the 
claim or to save costs.383  An applicant must satisfy the court that each document or class 
of documents sought is likely either to support the case of the applicant or to affect 
adversely the case of another party to proceedings. 
On its face, this is an onerous standard for an applicant to meet, but the courts have 
applied the test liberally in other (non-competition law) contexts, and have shown that they 
are prepared to consider the class of documents sought rather than each document in 
isolation.384 
The CAT operates a more flexible procedure.  Although its discretion to order 
disclosure is generally exercised, there are examples of cases where it has refused to do so. 
In Claymore Dairies Ltd v. OFT385 the CAT stressed that disclosure is not automatic and 
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should only be ordered where the CAT is satisfied that it is “necessary, relevant and 
proportionate to determine the issues before it”.  Claymore Dairies sought access to the 
Office of Fair Trading’s (“OFT”) file following a closed investigation by the OFT into the 
alleged abusive conduct of a competitor.  The CAT found that disclosure was not 
necessary or proportionate given the confidential nature of the information (relating to the 
claimant’s closest competitor) and the fact that the claimant was able, in any event, to 
advance a detailed pleaded case without further information. 
Confidentiality is not a bar to disclosure of documents either in the High Court or the 
CAT.  However, it is relevant to the court’s discretion in making disclosure orders.  In 
competition cases, the parties are commonly competitors and the disclosure of confidential 
information might therefore be damaging to the disclosing parties’ business interests.  The 
English courts are sympathetic to this and confidentiality rings are routinely set up to 
restrict the number of individuals permitted to review confidential information (commonly 
limited to counsel, external solicitors and experts). 
In the application for disclosure in the National Grid case, the claimant sought 
disclosure of the responses to the European Commission’s information requests of two 
defendants and certain material under the defendants’ control obtained as a result of their 
access to the European Commission’s file during the Commission’s administrative 
proceedings.   The High Court granted the application for disclosure on the basis that 
additional protection would be granted to the confidential information through a 
confidentiality ring.386 
In the same case, and following the ECJ judgment in Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt,387 
– which held that there is no absolute protection for leniency material, but that the court 
should perform a balancing act between competing interests – National Grid also sought 
disclosure of the confidential version of the Commission’s infringement decision from the 
defendants together with documents that may have included leniency material. The High 
                                                     
386 [2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch). 
387 In Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt (Case C-360/09) [2011] WLR (D) 196 the ECJ held that, in 
principle, no person who has been adversely affected by an infringement of EU competition law and is 
seeking to obtain damages should be prevented from being granted access to documents relating to the 
leniency procedure involving the addressee of the infringement finding.  However, the conditions under 
which such access should be permitted or refused should be determined by the national courts and 
tribunals of the individual Member States on the basis of national law and having regard to both 
protecting the leniency regime and facilitating damages claims. 
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Court adjourned this part of the initial application to a further hearing, to enable the 
European Commission to make submissions on the issues raised.388  The Commission 
wrote to the High Court making observations on the application in light of Pfleiderer 
under Article 15(3) of EU Regulation no. 1/2003. 389   It drew a distinction between 
“corporate statements” (voluntary statements made by a company specifically for its 
application for leniency) and “other documents” (such as replies to a request for 
information).  The Commission took the view that ‘corporate statements’ should not be 
disclosed given the importance of leniency applications to the competition enforcement 
regime. For “other documents”, the Commission submitted that national courts should, on 
a case-by-case basis, balance the respective interests  of the parties involved and consider 
whether disclosure would increase the leniency applicants’ exposure to liability compared 
with the liability of non-cooperating parties.  The Commission stated its view that 
disclosure should only be ordered when it is proportionate in the light of its possible 
interference with leniency programs and that a national court should take into account the 
relevance of the requested document to the claim and whether there are other available 
sources of evidence that would be equally effective but would not give rise to the concerns 
about the impact on the functioning of leniency programs. 
In April 2012 the High Court handed down its judgment. 390   It held that the 
Commission should not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the disclosure of leniency 
materials submitted under its leniency program as it is less well placed than the national 
court to assess the relevance and importance of the disclosure being sought.  Mr Justice 
Roth considered that the Commission decision ought to be treated differently from the 
other requested documents. The redactions in the decision had been made either on the 
grounds of commercial confidentiality or in line with the Commission’s policy not to 
disclose the source of its evidence. On the basis that the findings of the Commission are 
likely to be binding on the court, Mr Justice Roth took the view that the court (and 
consequently the claimant) should see some (but not all) of the confidential parts of the 
decision.  He considered that any confidentiality concerns could be met by restricting 
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disclosure to a narrow confidentiality ring and, in any event, disclosure would not affect a 
leniency applicant’s defence to the damages claim. In respect of each of the other 
documents, the court conducted the balancing exercise prescribed by the ECJ in Pfleiderer 
(i.e., balancing the importance of disclosure against the need to maintain an effective 
leniency program).  Disclosure was ordered of some limited extracts of the responses by 
the leniency applicants to the Commission’s information requests, which provided an 
explanation of documents supplied as part of the leniency application, the way the cartel 
operated and the nature of the discussions at cartel meetings.  It is unclear whether the 
information subject to such a disclosure order will be of use to the claimants in proving 
causation for the damages they are claiming or quantifying those damages.  However, 
claimants will be encouraged that the High Court has been willing to order disclosure of 
some leniency material.  The High Court decision did not fully resolve this issue, as on 
April 10, 2012 Alstom and Areva applied to the EU General Court in a bid to prevent 
disclosure to National Grid.  They argued that the European Commission was wrong to 
provide the High Court with their responses to the statement of objections.391  Pending the 
conclusion of the appeal, Alstom applied to the General Court for interim measures and on 
November 29, 2012 the Court published an order suspending transmission of the 
confidential documents to the High Court.392  The Court considered that, weighing the 
various interests involved, granting the interim measures would have the least impact on 
the proceedings as it would maintain the status quo. In June 2014, a week before the case 
was scheduled to go to trial, National Grid reached an out-of-court settlement with 
members of the cartel, including ABB, Siemens and Alstom. 
Similarly, British Airways was recently ordered393 to disclose a redacted version of the 
Commission’s cartel decision to claimants seeking damages. British Airways has been the 
target of several damages actions in the UK as customers of the airline seek compensation 
for the excessive prices they paid as a result of anticompetitive conduct.  
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The permitted redactions to the Commission’s cartel decision include details provided 
by British Airways while cooperating with competition authorities and any information 
that is protected by legal privilege.  
The ECJ has recently had several opportunities to consider the question of whether 
information obtained by a competition authority in the course of a cartel investigation may 
be disclosed in subsequent damages actions in national courts. 
In Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and others394 the ECJ held that 
disclosure of documents should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that the risk that 
disclosing such documents could undermine a leniency program is “liable to justify the 
non- disclosure” of the documents in question. The ECJ made it clear that Member States 
should not draft national legislation that would hinder the effective enforcement of the 
competition rules or the rights of claimants to seek damages.  
 The Commission has plans to legislate in this area to resolve any remaining uncertainty. 
The EU Damages Directive sets out principles to facilitate damage claims by victims of 
antitrust violations.  This states that, as a general rule, disclosure of evidence should be 
subject to “strict and active judicial control as to [its] necessity, scope and 
proportionality”.  To prevent disclosure from undermining the enforcement activities of a 
competition authority, the Directive would limit disclosure of evidence held in the file of a 
competition authority.  In particular, leniency statements and settlement submissions will 
be immune from disclosure.  Documents that have been prepared specifically for the 
purpose of the enforcement proceedings, or that the competition authority has drawn up in 
the course of its proceedings will be immune from disclosure until after the competition 
authority has closed its proceedings.  The EU Directive may not affect national 
proceedings for some time as Member States will have two years to implement the 
provisions.  In the meantime, uncertainty remains as to the extent of disclosure that 
claimants can expect to obtain through a disclosure order.  Although claimants are 
dependent on the discretion of the judge in carrying out the balancing act prescribed in 
Pfleiderer they will be encouraged that there are prospects before an English court for 
obtaining access to official documents held by defendants to assist in supporting the detail 
of a claim for damages.  Although the National Grid judgment and the recent 
developments at a European level provide some guidance on the approach that the courts 
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might take, each document will be assessed by the court on a case-by-case basis and the 
extent of disclosure that will be permitted will depend on the contents of the documents in 
question. 
 Use of experts e.
Parties are entitled to apply to the court to appoint an expert to provide evidence on 
technical matters.395  The court has control over the extent and form of expert evidence 
and will restrict expert evidence to cases where it will genuinely assist the trial judge in 
determining the matters at issue.396  In contrast to witnesses of fact, whose evidence must 
be confined to their knowledge of the facts of the case, expert witnesses are entitled to 
express opinions.  The expert’s primary duty is to assist the court, which overrides any 
duty that the expert owes to the party that is paying him or her.397  An expert’s report must 
contain details of the instructions that the expert has received, which are not privileged 
against disclosure.398 
Expert evidence is of particular relevance in competition law cases as economic 
analysis will often go to the heart of competition law questions. Expert evidence is 
commonly adduced on issues such as market definition, causation and the loss suffered as 
a result of an infringement (and, in particular in follow-on actions, whether this loss was 
passed on to subsequent purchasers).  The court encourages discussions between experts 
away from court, for example in the context of discussions attempting to settle the 
litigation. The content of these discussions should not be referred to at trial without 
agreement to the contrary. 
However, following a joint meeting, experts are encouraged to produce a joint 
statement setting out areas of agreement and areas of disagreement together with reasons 
for their disagreement.399  In Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services v. Amalgamated 
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Racing400 an expert expressed views on issues in a joint report that he had not considered 
(or been instructed to consider) in his report. The court consequently held that the joint 
report did not form part of the expert’s evidence. 
 Class Actions f.
i. Section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 
Class actions – in the US sense of the term – are not permitted under English litigation 
procedural rules, and the English courts have resisted attempts to use the more limited 
collective action proceedings that are available to establish US-style claims, where a group 
of claimants purports to bring an action on behalf of a general class who have not 
individually consented to representation.401  
However, legislative reform of this area is very much on the horizon.  After previously 
consulting on collective redress, the Commission has now adopted a recommendation that 
sets out a series of non-binding principles for collective redress mechanisms in Member 
States,402 albeit on an opt-in basis.  The UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
(“BIS”) has gone further in the Consumer Rights Bill, which proposes the introduction of a 
new opt-out damages regime in addition to the existing opt-in regime.403 
In the meantime, three procedures under English law currently provide some limited 
scope for the bringing or continuation of a claim by or on behalf of more than one claimant, 
or for multiparty claims to be established and further claims added.  Section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998 permits the bringing of follow-on claims on behalf of at least two 
consumers (the provision does not extend to businesses) for damages arising from an 
infringement of competition law. Claims under Section 47B may only be brought in the 
CAT, and only by a body that is specified in secondary legislation as being permitted to do 
so. To date, the only ‘specified body’ is the UK Consumers’ Association (known as 
Which?).  Section 47B also permits specified bodies to take over and continue a claim that 
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has already been brought by a consumer, provided that it will join into the action at least 
one other consumer who claims loss as a result of the same infringement. 
If the claim is successful, any damages must be awarded to the individual consumers 
on whose behalf the claim was brought, unless the CAT orders that the sum awarded 
should be paid to the specified body.  Only one claim has so far been brought under 
Section 47B: the Consumers’ Association claimed for damages against JJB Sports on 
behalf of some 130 consumers who had been overcharged as a result of price fixing in the 
supply of replica football shirts.404  The case was ultimately settled with JJB agreeing to 
refund £20 per shirt to the claimants named in the action and to make provision for 
payments of £10 to compensate other consumers who could provide proof of purchase.  
The case demonstrates the difficulties faced by specified bodies in signing up a sufficient 
weight of claims under the Section 47B opt-in process. 
ii. Representative actions 
Part 19 of the CPR makes certain provisions for the bringing, or joint management, of 
representative actions, which might be thought of as a form of ‘class’ action. 
Under the representative action procedure,405 where two or more parties have the same 
interest in a claim, the claim may be brought, or (if it has already been brought) continued, 
by one or more of the parties as representatives of the other parties. The procedure requires 
that the relief sought in the action must be equally beneficial to all members of the ‘class’.  
In Emerald Supplies v. British Airways,406 Emerald brought a representative action on 
behalf of itself and other cut-flower importers, claiming loss as a result of an alleged price-
fixing cartel in the market for the supply of air freight services, to which Emerald alleged 
that British Airways had been party.  This claim was brought in the High Court before the 
conclusion of the Commission’s investigation, in an attempt to establish a broad class of 
claimants. 
British Airways successfully applied for the representative aspect of the action to be 
struck out.  First, the court considered that Emerald was purporting to represent all direct 
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and indirect purchasers of air freight from any of the airlines alleged to have been involved 
in the cartel.  This was held to be insufficiently certain to meet the criteria of Part 19.6 of 
the CPR, which requires the identification of the other persons with the ‘same interest’ as 
the representative claimants; as long as the claimants were unidentified, assessing whether 
they shared the same interest as Emerald was considered to be impossible. Further, even if 
the identity of all the claimants could be established, the claimants could not have the same 
interest, since it would be in the interests of direct purchasers to claim that the overcharge 
was not passed on, and in the interests of indirect purchasers to claim the opposite.  The 
relief sought would therefore not be equally beneficial to all members of the class.  The 
Court of Appeal upheld the order of the High Court and reiterated the requirement that 
those represented in the action have the “same interest” at all stages of the proceedings.407 
Part 19 of the CPR also provides the court with the power to make a group litigation  
order (GLO), which allows for the collective management by the court of a number of 
separate cases that give rise to common or related issues of fact or law (GLO issues). A 
GLO can be made either on the initiative of the court or following an application by either 
a claimant or a defendant. 
The GLO will contain directions relating to the establishment of a group register on 
which the claims managed under the GLO will be entered and the GLO issues identified, 
with the claims to be managed as a group under the GLO. The GLO also gives the court 
the power to make a judgment or to give directions in relation to one or more GLO issues, 
which are then binding on all cases on the GLO register. New claimants can apply for their 
action to be included on the GLO register if their claim deals with the GLO issues.  To 
date, no GLOs have been made in claims relating to competition law infringements, but 
the procedure provides the potential for a number of claims relating  
to the same infringement (e.g., a cartel) to be consolidated in the High Court. 408 
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iii. The Consumer Rights Bill  
Separate from the European Commission’s reform in this area but published just a day 
later on June 12,  2013, the UK’s BIS issued the Consumer Rights Bill.  Significantly, this 
proposes the introduction of an opt-out collective action regime for both stand-alone and 
follow-on competition law claims brought before the CAT.  This would allow a 
representative claimant to bring a claim for damages in the CAT on behalf of all persons 
and entities that fall within a defined class (with the exception of those persons that 
explicitly ‘opt out’).  This will expand the existing position under Section 47B of the 
Competition Act (which allows only the consumer association ‘Which?’ to bring claims 
and only on an opt-in basis) and is designed to address the perceived inadequacies of that 
procedure.  The Consumer Rights Bill contains safeguards to protect against unmeritorious 
claims. In particular, the claimants would need to apply to the CAT for certification of the 
class by way of a collective proceedings order.  The action would need to be advertised to 
enable potential class members to opt out.  However, foreign parties would need to 
expressly opt in. The losing party would be required to pay the successful party’s costs, 
and there would also be provision for collective settlements under which the alleged 
infringer and parties claiming to have suffered loss could apply to the CAT to approve a 
settlement on an opt-out basis. 
In addition, the number of potential representative claimants will be expanded 
significantly under the new regime, which provides for collective actions to be brought by 
any appropriate consumer representative body or trade association.  To further encourage 
claimants to come forward, only the representative body – and not the underlying 
claimants – would be liable for costs awarded against the claimant group.  The issue of 
collective redress, and in particular the proposal of an opt-out system, has led to an 
articulated debate in the UK.  Notwithstanding the checks and balances in place to 
discourage unmeritorious claims – which may blunt the commercial incentives for 
claimant-focused law firms to take the risks associated with bringing such claims – it 
seems highly likely that a test case will be brought under the new regime as and when it 
enters into force.  How any such action proceeds in practice – in terms of the certification 
process, trial management, legal costs recovery, among other critical issues – will be 
critical to the future development of litigation in this area.  
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 Quantification of damages g.
Claimants can seek to recover damages for losses suffered as a result of 
anticompetitive conduct, including for lost profits, and interest on those losses.  This is in 
line with the ECJ’s statement in Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico409 that any person harmed by 
anticompetitive behavior can claim compensation where there is a causal relationship 
between the harm and the infringement of EU competition rules.  Devenish Nutrition v. 
Sanofi-Aventis410 – a follow-on action for damages pursuant to the Commission’s 2001 
Vitamins cartel decision – remains the leading case in this area. It confirmed that the 
appropriate measure for the calculation of damages in competition law claims in England 
should be tort-based compensatory damages (which aim to put the claimant in the position 
it would have been in ‘but for’ the infringement). 
In Devenish the claimants argued that the calculation of compensatory damages was 
too difficult, and that other types of relief, including restitution (in the form of an account 
of profits made by the defendants) and exemplary damages (i.e., an award of damages to 
punish the defendant and deter it from repeating the behavior) should be available to the 
claimants. 
The High Court and the Court of Appeal both rejected these arguments, emphasizing 
that the English courts are willing to take a “pragmatic view of the degree of certainty with 
which damages must be pleaded and proved”.411  Arguably, the complications inherent in 
the largely counterfactual calculation of compensatory damages should not therefore be a 
bar to recovery in competition actions. 
As regards exemplary damages, the High Court in Devenish noted that a fine imposed 
by a competition authority for an infringement of competition law served the same 
punitive and deterrent purpose. In view of the principles of ne bis in idem in EU law, and 
double jeopardy in English law, the High Court considered that exemplary damages were 
unlikely to be available where a competition claim was being brought on the back of an 
infringement decision by a NCA. 
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However, two judgments illustrate the CAT’s view that exemplary damages may be 
available in circumstances where an authority has already ruled on anticompetitive conduct 
and a fine has not been imposed. 
First, in Albion Water Limited v. Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig412 – an action for damages 
following the CAT’s decision that Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh Water) had abused its 
dominant position by implementing abusive pricing practices – the CAT made a number of 
interesting decisions. In the first instance it refused to grant an application to strike out the 
parts of Albion Water’s claim relating to exemplary damages, ruling that Devenish was not 
an authority for any broad proposition prohibiting claimants from claiming exemplary 
damages and that there was no principle that the mere availability of the domestic power to 
fine for a competition law infringement precludes a claim for exemplary damages.413 
As a fine had not been imposed on Dwr Cymru, the CAT held that there was no 
practical possibility of a fine being imposed by any enforcement body in the future, and 
thus there was no danger of double jeopardy.414  In a further hearing on an application to 
amend particulars of claim in 2012 the CAT held, citing the leading tort case on exemplary 
damages, Rookes v. Barnard,415 that exemplary damages may be justified in circumstances 
where a defendant ‘with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff’s rights has calculated that the 
money to be made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk’. The 
CAT considered what kinds of allegations and evidence Albion could put forward to prove 
the element of ‘cynical disregard’ on the part of Dwr Cymru and held that only the key 
issues in the case were relevant to the issue. The CAT ultimately did not award exemplary 
damages, on the basis that it found no evidence of an intention by Dwr Cymru to issue an 
unlawfully excessive price or recklessness as to whether the price was unlawfully 
excessive.  In addition, the CAT found that the factors that led to the price being abusive 
were not so obviously wrong and unlawful that Dwr Cymru must have realized that the 
price was indefensible. 
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In a second case – 2 Travel Group v. Cardiff City Transport,416 a claim based on the 
OFT’s infringement finding against a dominant bus company for predatory pricing against 
a new entrant (and another case where a fine had not been imposed) – the CAT went a step 
further and awarded exemplary damages as well as compensatory damages for lost profits.  
The CAT awarded exemplary damages on the basis that the defendant’s conduct clearly 
fell within the Rookes v. Barnard test as being outrageous and was such that a 
compensatory award was insufficient.  However, the CAT emphasized that the Rookes v. 
Barnard standard required more than a breach of competition law, and that a claimant 
must plead specific facts and matters alleging that the infringement was executed either 
intentionally in breach of the law or recklessly so as to be regarded as sufficiently 
outrageous. 
The availability of exemplary damages in follow-on private damages actions cannot 
therefore be excluded, in particular where an administrative fine has not been imposed. 
However, it is perhaps more likely that exemplary damages will be sought in stand-alone 
actions, where no investigation has been carried out by a competition authority, although 
the Rookes v. Barnard standard will still apply. 
The Court of Appeal in Devenish determined that an award of restitution in the form of 
an account of profits (to award the claimant the profits the defendant has earned from its 
breach) is generally not available in competition law claims.417  Interestingly, in Albion 
Water, at application stage, the CAT refused to strike out the claims for restitutionary 
damages in respect of those parts of the claim that the CAT did not consider to be 
“unarguable”.418  However, at trial the CAT ultimately rejected this aspect of the claim. 
The position remains uncertain, but, even if restitution was found to be available, such 
damages would probably only be awarded where compensatory damages are considered 
inadequate (which may be only in limited circumstances given the views of the Court of 
Appeal in the Devenish case). 
An additional measure of compensatory damages that might be available before the 
English courts is so-called “umbrella” damages (i.e., compensation for the loss caused by a 
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person not party to the cartel who, as a result of the increased market prices, raises their 
own prices by more than they would have done in the absence of the cartel).  Such losses 
are claimed not against the party that supplied the relevant goods or services but against 
the cartel members.  This question was the subject of a reference by an Austrian court to 
the ECJ,419  which held that a victim of umbrella pricing may obtain compensation for the 
loss caused by an increase in the prices charged by market participants that were not 
members of the cartel if it can demonstrate that that price increase was caused by the 
cartel.  An English court is likely to adopt a similar approach, awarding umbrella damages 
where a claimant can establish causation between the unlawful activity and effects on 
prices set by non-cartel parties, in line with the general approach to compensatory damages 
under the English system. 
In resisting a claim for compensatory damages, a defendant may seek to challenge 
causation and argue that ‘but for’ its actions the claimant would still have suffered loss. 
Two types of causation defence have typically been relied on to date.  First, in Arkin v. 
Borchard420 the defendant argued that the losses claimed arose from the claimant’s 
mismanagement of its affairs. In that case, it was held that the claimant’s failure to leave 
the market and its price cutting was so unreasonable and incomprehensible that it 
represented an intervening cause, such that it was the predominant cause of the losses the 
claimant suffered.  By contrast, in Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Company421 the High 
Court rejected a similar argument that Mr Crehan’s downturn in sales was caused by 
mismanagement, as this could not have made him responsible for the effects of a network 
of restrictive agreements.  Second, defendants may seek to argue that an external cause, 
such as a downturn in general market conditions, was responsible for the claimant’s losses 
(as the defendant also argued in Crehan v. Inntrepreneur). 
The quantification of damages in cartel cases will inevitably involve a number of 
complex issues, in particular concerning the most appropriate economic approach. 
Crehan v. Inntrepreneur remains the only competition case where an award of final 
damages has been made (although the (then) House of Lords subsequently quashed the 
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award on appeal). There has been one award of interim damages in a competition case by 
the CAT in Healthcare at Home v. Genzyme422 (subsequently settled), but the calculation 
made was a relatively straightforward estimate of lost profits based on a margin squeeze, 
which took the supplier’s pricing and applied the discount that should have been available 
to wholesale purchasers. 
Recent cases have shown that the English courts are likely to prefer a “but for” 
approach to the assessment of damages, as outlined in Arkin v. Borchard. In that case, 
although it concluded that there was no breach of competition law, the High Court 
suggested that any damages should be assessed by comparing a hypothetical scenario 
based on the situation immediately prior to the infringement and asking what, “as a matter 
of common sense”, was the loss directly caused by the infringement.423  Using this 
approach, the English courts can be expected to favor a comparison of the market 
conditions observed during the infringement period with a reconstruction of the market 
conditions that might have prevailed in the absence of the infringement.  For example, in a 
cartel follow-on action, it is likely that this would involve an economic analysis of the 
price paid by the claimant and hypothetical ‘but for’ prices based on prices observed 
before or after the existence of the cartel or as observed in a comparable market. 
In Enron Coal Services v. English Welsh & Scottish Railway424 the Court of Appeal 
held that a claimant cannot rely on an infringement decision by a competition authority to 
establish causation and loss. Rather, the claimant must prove that ‘but for’ the 
infringement, a different outcome would have resulted, in which the claimant would not 
have suffered loss (or would have suffered a lesser loss).  In fact, the CAT concluded that 
the claimant had not suffered any loss, because in the counterfactual scenario the claimant 
would have been no better off. In the recent predatory pricing case 2 Travel Group v. 
Cardiff City Transport,425 the CAT applied the ‘but for’ test in awarding compensatory 
damages for lost profits.  To assist national courts in quantifying damages, on June 11, 
2013 the Commission published a Communication on quantifying harm in actions for 
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damages together with a final version of a practical guide.426  This Communication draws 
on the report by the economic consultants Oxera in December 2009, which sets out a range 
of methodologies that could be used for the calculation of compensatory damages and the 
Draft Guidance Paper on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU published in June 2011. 
Although not binding on national courts, the practical guide provides practical methods 
and techniques to assist national courts as well as claimants and defendants when 
calculating damages.  Relevant considerations include: whether a certain method or 
technique meets the standard required under national law; whether sufficient data is 
available to the party charged with the burden of proof to apply the method or technique; 
and whether the burden and costs involved are proportionate to the value of the damages 
claim at stake.  The general approach to the quantification of harm in the practical guide 
confirms the approach taken to date by the English Court; that is, to put the injured party in 
the position it would have been in ‘but for’ the infringement.  Damages are therefore 
envisaged to be of a compensatory nature, encompassing reparation for the actual loss 
suffered as well as the loss of profits and interest payments.  The practical guide proposes 
methods and techniques to establish a suitable reference counterfactual scenario, which 
needs to be constructed to give effect to the “but for” analysis.  There is also further 
specific guidance for harm suffered from price rises and for harm suffered from 
exclusionary practices. 
Interest can make a significant difference to the total quantum of damages, in particular 
in follow-on claims where the infringement may have continued for many years. 
In Manfredi the ECJ held that interest must be available in respect of claims for 
damages based on infringements of competition law.  The general rule under English 
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procedure is that the court has the discretion to award simple interest on all or any part of 
the damages awarded, for all or any part of the period from the date on which the cause of 
action accrued to the date of judgment. 
The court has the discretion to award interest at either the judgment rate or the 
commercial rate.427  The commercial rate is usually applied by the English courts as this 
seeks to compensate the claimant for the time value of money that it has lost at the rate at 
which the claimant typically borrows money. 
Where the claimant’s typical borrowing rate is unclear, the court will apply “a fair 
commercial rate” – typically the Bank of England base rate plus 1 per cent.428  
Claimants in cartel damages actions tend to claim compound interest. There is no authority 
directly on point concerning whether compound interest is available in a cartel damages 
action. However, claims for compound interest are likely to rely on the judgment of the 
(then) House of Lords in Sempra Metals v. Inland Revenue.429  
In that case – which concerned a claim in restitution for overpaid tax – the Lords made 
an award of compound interest to deprive the defendant of its unjust enrichment. The 
judgment also contained non-binding obiter dicta suggesting that compound interest might 
be available in a claim for breach of statutory duty provided certain requirements are 
satisfied.  The Lords expressed the view that the burden of proving that compound interest 
should be recoverable rests on the claimant, which is required to particularize and prove its 
interest loss.  Although the application of this principle to competition claims is untested, a 
claimant in a cartel damages action would probably have to prove that it had to borrow to 
fund the overcharge that resulted in loss that should be compensated at a compound rate of 
interest.  This is likely to present a high hurdle. 
Under the English system the successful party will normally be awarded its costs, in 
particular where the losing party has made a Part 36 offer that the successful party has 
failed to match or beat at trial,430  although the courts have discretion as to the amount that 
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should be paid. In a typical case, the successful party can expect to regain approximately 
two-thirds of actual costs incurred.  This can vary depending on how the parties conduct 
themselves.  The CAT adopts a similar approach, although it is less prescriptive and can 
often award less to the successful party than the High Court. 
The Civil Procedure Rules enable defendants to apply for an order granting ‘security 
for costs’ to protect a defendant from the risk that a claimant is unable to pay a costs order 
should the claim fail.  A defendant to any claim, including a Part 20 claim (i.e., a 
counterclaim or a contribution claim) may apply for an order for security for costs under 
CPR 25.12. Such an order requires the claimant to deposit money with the court or provide 
a guarantee as security for the defendant’s costs. The High Court may award security for 
costs if it is satisfied, having regard to all circumstances of the case, that it is just to make 
such an order and provided certain conditions are satisfied.431  The most common 
conditions are that the claimant is resident out of the jurisdiction (and not domiciled in an 
EU or EFTA contracting state) or that the claimant is a company and there is reason to 
believe it will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so.   
Similar rules apply in the CAT,432 which has considered recent applications for 
security for costs in BCL Old Co v. Aventis433 and Albion Water Limited v. Dwr Cymru 
Cyfyngedig.434 
In BCL Old Co. the CAT did not award security for costs as it was not satisfied ‘having 
regard to all the circumstances of this case, that it is just to make an order for security for 
costs in favor of the defendants’.435  The basis for the CAT’s reasoning was that as the 
claim was made under Section 47A of the Competition Act, liability had already been 
established.  The CAT therefore ruled that the claimants should not face the financial risk 
of the litigation; rather, the defendants should bear that risk as they were the infringers of a 
public law prohibition (i.e., Article 101 TFEU).  An important factor in the CAT’s 
reasoning was that the defendants had pleaded a passing on defence.  The CAT ruled that 
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the claimants had a ‘good’ claim and that the only reason for awarding costs against them 
would be if it was established in law that the passing-on defence was a good defence and 
that it applied to the facts.  As the CAT determined that these were ‘novel and important 
issues’ and that it had yet to decide on the exercise of its jurisdiction to awarding costs 
(especially as this was the first damages claim under Section 47A), the CAT decided that, 
at that stage of the proceedings, it was premature to rule on costs. The claim was later 
dismissed by the CAT.  In the Albion Water case the CAT again refused to grant the 
applicant security for costs as it considered that doing so would risk extinguishing a 
genuine claim by an impecunious company in circumstances where the possibility that the 
CAT might ultimately conclude that the loss was caused by the defendant could not be 
excluded. 
The general costs rules in England have recently undergone significant reform.  
The government enacted the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 in response to recommendations from Lord Justice Jackson.  The Act includes 
provisions that abolish the recoverability in costs awards of success fees under conditional 
fee arrangements and of ‘after the event’ insurance premiums from unsuccessful opponents 
under costs orders. The concession for claimants is that contingency fees (through so-
called “damages-based agreements”) are now permitted, and the courts have the ability to 
apply a premium to damages awards where a defendant fails to beat a claimant’s 
settlement offer. There is also a provision for unsuccessful claimants to pay only a 
proportion of defendants’ costs provided they have acted reasonably. Although the Act 
received Royal Assent on May 1, 2012, the application of Part 2 – which covers success 
fees and insurance premiums – only came into force on April 1, 2013, because of 
significant opposition to the reforms, including from the Law Society. 
 Pass-on defences h.
Under the compensatory measure of damages, claimants in the English courts can only 
recover damages that represent their actual, unmitigated losses. The defendant may be able 
to claim that the claimant in fact suffered no loss, as it passed on the effects of the 
infringement (e.g., an overcharge) to its own customers. The burden of proof is on the 
defendant to show that the claimant mitigated its loss in this way. 
There is no precedent in the English courts for the availability of the passing-on 
defence, although the ECJ cases of Manfredi and Courage v. Crehan support the view that 
the defence will be recognized in England.  In addition, although the question of whether 
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the passing-on defence is available under English law was not the subject of the appeal, in 
the Devenish case the Court of Appeal remarked that if the claimant has in fact passed a 
charge on to its customers “there is no very obvious reason why the profit made by the 
defendants (albeit undeserved and wrongful) should be transferred to the claimant without 
the claimant being obliged to transfer it down the line to those who have actually suffered 
the loss.” 
However, in its response to the BIS Consultation,436 the UK government gave a clear 
signal that the passing-on defence should be recognized by the courts.  Although it decided 
not to introduce legislation to this effect, taking into consideration the majority of 
respondents’ views, the government stated that, under general principles of English tort 
law, there is no reason why the passing-on defence should not be allowed.  The 
government took the view that the finer legal details of its application would be better 
addressed through judicial consideration than via legislation at UK level.437  In the 
proposed EU Damages Directive the European Commission recognizes the availability for 
the defendant to rely on the passing-on defence, provided it is legally possible for the end 
user (i.e., the customer to whom the cost was passed on) to claim compensation. 
 Follow-on litigation i.
Section 58A of the Competition Act provides that the English courts are to be bound in 
a subsequent damages action by a prior infringement decision by the NCA or the CAT, 
provided the decision is no longer appealable.  This reflects the position under EU law in 
relation to infringement decisions by the European Commission, in particular as set out in 
the duty on national courts under Article 16(1) of Regulation no. 1/2003 not to rule counter 
to a decision that has established an infringement of EU competition rules.  There are, 
however, limits to the binding force of prior infringement decisions on the English courts. 
For example, in Inntrepreneur v. Crehan, the House of Lords ruled that a court is not 
required to follow a prior decision that relates to an agreement different from the subject of 
the claim, even if the surrounding facts are similar.  In such cases, the competition 
authority’s observations may be relevant as evidence, but this does not excuse the court 
from undertaking its own factual enquiries.  This contrasts with the situation in the CAT, 
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where the Court of Appeal has emphasized that the jurisdiction of the CAT is inherently 
limited by the infringement finding established by the relevant decision and does not 
extend to allowing the CAT to make a finding of infringement on facts set out in the 
decision for the purpose of awarding damages.438  In terms of awards against parties that 
have already been fined by a competition authority or benefited from immunity under a 
leniency program, there is no restriction on private litigants seeking to recover damages for 
loss, as long as there is no risk of double jeopardy as established in the Albion Water case. 
 Indemnification and contribution j.
Although not yet formally confirmed by any case, liability for competition law 
infringements – both before the High Court and the CAT – is almost certainly on the basis 
of joint and several liability, which means that a claimant might elect to sue only one (or 
all) of the addressees of the relevant decision for the entirety of the loss suffered as a result 
of the anticompetitive conduct.  To date, most follow-on actions have been initiated 
against a number of defendants, in some cases all of the addressees of the relevant decision 
and in others only those defendants from whom the claimants had purchased cartelized 
products. 
A recently observed tactic is for a claimant to sue just one (or two) defendants and 
force that defendant to join others to the action to seek a contribution in respect of any 
damages that might be awarded.  This leaves the defendant singled out to initiate 
contribution actions under Part 20 of the CPR.  The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
provides that any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may 
recover a contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage.439  The 
court then has discretion to award such contribution as it considers just and equitable 
having regard to each person’s responsibility for the damage.440 
Contribution claims can be made in the context of the primary action, where they may 
be consolidated and heard together, or after judgment in the main action.  Alternatively, a 
                                                     
438 See Enron Coal Services v. English Welsh & Scottish Railway, [2009] EWCA Civ. 647; [2011] EWCA 
Civ. 2. 
439 Section 1(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
440 Section 2(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
142 
contribution may be sought even where a party has already settled the claim with the 
claimant.441 
How contribution might be assessed in a cartel damages action is yet to be considered 
by an English court but the High Court and the CAT are likely to look to apply the 
principles developed in respect of other types of civil claims to assist a court in exercising 
its discretion to assess contributions, including looking at: the extent to which a party has 
profited from the wrongdoing; the causative potency of each wrongdoer’s actions with 
regard to the claimant’s loss; and relative degrees of blameworthiness.   
Related to this, it is now clear that a company found to have committed a competition 
law infringement cannot look to recover the resulting fine from the individuals that were 
involved in the wrongdoing. In Safeway Stores v. Twigger,442 companies in the Safeway 
Group brought an action for damages and equitable compensation against former 
employees and directors to recover the fine and the costs incurred by the company as a 
result of the OFT investigation into the dairy products cartel.443  The High Court refused 
the defendant employees’ application for summary judgment and decided that the case 
should proceed to trial, principally on the basis that there was a real prospect that 
Safeway’s liability was not ‘personal’ and that the defendant employees and directors were 
the “directing mind and will” of the Safeway companies.  However, the Court of Appeal 
overturned the High Court decision, dismissing the claimants’ claims. The Court of Appeal 
considered that Safeway’s liability for the competition law breach was indeed “personal”: 
Safeway was liable for intentionally or negligently breaching competition law and it was 
not being made vicariously liable for its employees’ actions.  The Court of Appeal held 
that the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (which bars a claimant from pursuing 
an action if it arises in connection with its own illegal act) applied, and that to allow the 
company to recover the financial costs from the individuals involved would undermine the 
policy of the Competition Act. 
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 Future developments and outlook k.
The Consumer Rights Bill, coupled with the EU Damages Directive designed to 
encourage competition litigation, could potentially transform the landscape of private 
enforcement in England, particularly if the opt-out collective redress proposals are enacted.  
The Consumer Rights Bill proposes private enforcement reforms in four main areas: 
establishing the CAT as a major venue for competition actions in the UK, which would 
involve, among others, allowing the CAT to hear stand-alone as well as follow-on cases 
and giving it the power to grant injunctions; introducing a limited opt-out collective 
actions regime for competition law claims; promoting alternative dispute resolution in 
competition litigation; and ensuring that private actions complement the public 
enforcement regime, in particular, by implementing measures to protect the attractiveness 
of the NCA’s leniency program.  
The most interesting and controversial element is the introduction of an opt-out 
collective action procedure.  There will inevitably be arguments that this will introduce the 
perceived excesses of the US class action system that BIS acknowledges should be 
avoided and led the Commission to recommend collective redress on an opt-in basis (albeit 
allowing Member States to deviate from this recommendation if justified by ‘reasons of 
sound administration of justice’).  Regardless of the precise form that these proposals will 
ultimately take, they represent a clear sign of the UK government’s determination to 
encourage the victims of competition law infringements to recover their losses. 
A number of important legal issues remain to be finally determined: for example, how 
principles such as parent-subsidiary liability, joint and several liability and contribution – 
well understood in the context of other types of civil disputes – will be applied to 
competition claims.  These issues may be dealt with in preliminary hearings in the near 
future, in particular given the emergence of the tactic of claimants electing to sue only one 
or a limited number of cartel members (rather than all those involved in the cartel) for all 
of the loss caused by the cartel, forcing the named defendants to issue contribution 
proceedings and ‘make the running’ against the other cartelists. 
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3. Germany 
The Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen or Act against Restraints of 
Competition (“ARC”) is the legislative basis for private enforcement in Germany.444  The 
legislation was first enacted in 1998 and amended in 2005.  Currently the ARC is applied 
primarily by the Bundeskartellamt (the German Federal Cartel Office, “FCO”).  However, 
the number of private actions related to antitrust cases, especially cartel cases, has 
increased in recent years.  Also, the number of cases based on the abuse of a dominant 
position, especially refusal-to-supply cases, has been relatively high for a number of years. 
The increase in the number of actions brought, was at least in part due to the 
amendment of the ARC in 2005.445  The changes to the ARC came into effect on July 1, 
2005 after a lengthy debate that lasted more than two years.  Before then it was very 
difficult for customers of cartel members to sue their suppliers before the German courts 
successfully.  Therefore, the German legislature introduced the new rules to enforce 
private litigation, especially in cartel cases, to protect competition on the markets and as an 
additional means of compensating losses suffered as a consequence of the cartel conduct 
besides the administrative proceedings by the FCO. 
 Legislative framework a.
In Germany, private competition actions can be brought before the courts seeking an 
injunction, removal of the infringement or damages.  These claims can be based on cartel 
infringements or abusive behavior by dominant (or market-strong) undertakings under 
either German cartel law  or EU competition law.  The legal basis for private competition 
enforcement is Sections 33 et seq. of the ARC. 
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Section 33(1) of the ARC provides that any entity infringing a provision of the ARC, 
Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU, or a decision taken by the cartel authority shall be obliged 
to compensate the persons affected by its behavior and, where there is a chance of the 
conduct reoccurring, to refrain from so doing.    
Section 33(3) of the ARC further provides that whoever intentionally or negligently 
commits an infringement of competition law shall be liable for the damages arising 
therefrom. Therefore, the assessment of damages pursuant to Section 287 of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessrecht, “ZPO”) may take into account, in particular, 
the proportion of the profit which the infringing party has derived from the infringement.  
Most of the measures proposed by the Commission were in principle already available in 
German law, including the general ability of associations for the promotion of commercial 
or independent professional interests with legal capacity taking legal action,446 a provision 
regarding the passing-on defence,447 the requirement that the infringing party pays interest 
on financial obligations from the occurrence of the damage,448 the binding effect of final 
decisions by the European Commission, the FCO or any other national competition 
authority of a Member State, 449  and the suspension of the limitation period where 
proceedings are initiated by the FCO for infringement within the meaning of Section 33(1) 
of the ARC, or by the European Commission or a national competition authority of another 
Member State for infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.450 
Thanks t these provisions, Germany has been considered one of the most favorable 
jurisdictions in the EU to bring a private action against breaches of competition law. 
 Procedural aspects of private enforcement in Germany b.
For the purposes of private enforcement actions, the binding effect of competition 
authorities’ findings is limited to claims for damages.451  Thus, in principle, binding effects 
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cannot be invoked by defendants if they are sued for performance.  The same applies for 
actions for injunctions as well as proceedings for administrative fines.  However, this does 
not apply to findings of the European Commission; rather, it follows from Article 16(1) of 
Regulation no. 1/2003 that national courts are at all times prevented from ruling against 
decisions of the European Commission regardless of the procedural setting in the national 
court.  Thus, the binding effects of the Commission’s decisions are not limited to damages 
claims. 
While in principle only final decisions are binding, Article 278 TFEU provides that 
findings of the European Commission are binding immediately, in other words, as soon as 
they have been issued and before they become incontestable. 
It is only the operative provisions of a decision that are binding and not the reasons 
given for the decision.  Thus, Section 33(4) of the ARC only relieves the claimant of 
proving an infringement of competition law.  All additional requirements for bringing a 
successful damages claim, such as causation of harm, size of commercial harm inflicted, 
still have to be demonstrated and, if necessary, proven by the claimant.  What is unclear, 
however, is whether the claimant has to prove the cartel member’s bad intention, even if 
the operative part of a decision already ascertains that the infringement has been 
committed intentionally. 
Section 33(4) of the ARC is criticized for being too broad, as the provision does not 
limit the binding effect of administrative decisions to claims that are brought against those 
parties who are the addressees of the infringement decisions, i.e., the members of the cartel.  
Therefore, Section 33(4) of the ARC may have the effect that a claimant may rely on an 
infringement decision in a lawsuit against a party that has not been involved in the cartel 
proceedings at all.  In these circumstances, the defendant lacks due process with regard to 
the infringement decision as he could not defend himself in the (foreign) infringement 
proceeding or through an appeal of the infringement decision.  This seems to be a clear 
violation of the party’s right to a hearing as protected by the German Constitution and in 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  Thus, the German Constitutional Court, upon 
review, will most likely limit the binding effects imposed by Section 33(4) of the ARC to 
defendants in civil proceedings being addressees of the infringement decisions in the first 
place. 
The limitation period for damages actions pursuant to Section 33(3) of the ARC is of 
three years and it is consistent with Sections 195 and 199 of the German Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, “BGB”).  Pursuant to Section 33(5) of the ARC and Section 
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204(2) of the BGB, the suspension of the limitation period due to current investigations by 
the European Commission or another NCA ends six months after the final adjudication.  
However, if more than one competition authority has initiated such proceedings, the 
suspension might endure until all of the authorities have finished their investigations. 
With respect to extraterritoriality, the enforcement of an antitrust suit in accordance 
with German law requires the applicability of the ARC, which, pursuant to Section 130(2), 
is applicable to all restraints of competition having an effect within Germany, even if they 
take place outside Germany (so-called “effects doctrine”).  However, Section 130(2) of the 
ARC is only one-sided: it regulates whether and under which conditions German antitrust 
law is applicable, but does not dictate whether foreign antitrust law has to be adopted.452  
The term “restraints of competition” in Section 130(2) of the ARC sums up the 
restraints of competition regulated in the relevant ARC provisions. To interpret the term 
“domestic effect”, the protective purpose of the relevant provision of the ARC to be 
applied in each case must be considered.453  
The ARC is also applicable in cases where the market is, or is likely to be, affected in 
more than one Member State, including Germany, and the defendant has its seat in 
Germany.  The same applies in situations where there are several defendants, provided that 
the restriction of competition on which the claim against each defendant is based directly 
and substantially affects the market in Germany.454  
The general jurisdiction of German cartel authorities is therefore only questionable in 
exceptional cases whereby foreign states participated in the restriction of competition. 
According to Articles 4 to 10 of the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity, which 
has been applicable in Germany since 1990, the principle of “restricted immunity” applies.  
Immunity for foreign states exists only if the action of the foreign state is of a sovereign 
                                                     
452 In this sense, see Loewenheim U., Meessen K. M. and Riesenkampff A., Kartellrecht Kommentar, 
Section 130, Rn. 40. 
453 Federal Supreme Court (BGH) decision of 12 July 1973, WuW/E Ölfeldrohre; Section 98(2) of the old 
ARC; see also FCO leaflet on domestic effects (January 1999): 
www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter/Merkblaetter_englisch/99_Inlandsauswi
rkung_e.pdf. 
454 In practice, the coming into force of the Rome II Regulation should not lead to a difference in the 
applicability of German cartel law for private enforcement matters, compared with the situation under 
Section 130(2) of the ARC. The criterion for the extraterritorial application of German law remains the 
presence of domestic effect within Germany. 
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nature. Should the state, however, act like a private person or propose restrictions of 
competition, the German jurisdiction shall apply.  Nevertheless, there remains controversy 
over the issue of whether a foreign state carrying out sovereign tasks via a controlled legal 
person under private law is able to rely on the state immunity. 
As to standing, the claiming of relief in the civil court is governed by Section 33 of the 
ARC.  This provision states that a person concerned can claim for injunctions, removal of 
the infringement or damages because of the infringement of a provision of the ARC, 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU or a decision taken by the cartel authority.  The affected person 
can be either a competitor or another market participant impaired by the infringement.  
With regard to damages claims, according to Section 33(3) of the ARC, in principle the 
same applies: the affected persons have standing.  This is indisputable for those persons 
who are directly affected by the infringing behavior, i.e., the direct suppliers and direct 
purchasers or in some cases the competitors of the infringing parties.  
Today this principle also should apply to indirectly affected persons, such as retailers 
or end-consumers, as long as they are able to prove that their losses were caused by the 
infringing behavior.  
Prior to the 2005 amendment of the ARC, the question of standing had to be answered 
by following normal civil law principles.  A claim for damages was only possible when the 
infringed provision was intended to protect the claimant.  The provision in question, 
therefore, had to serve the protection of individual interests beyond the protection of 
general competition concerns.  This change was also a result of the ECJ judgment in the 
case Courage Crehan.  In this case the court stated that the intended prohibition in Article 
101(1) TFEU would be undermined if it were not possible for anybody who has suffered a 
damage due to anticompetitive behavior to claim damages.455  
As a result, it is expected that German courts are willing to interpret the term ‘person 
affected’ within the meaning of Section 33(1) and (3) of the ARC very widely. However, 
in fact it will prove to be rather difficult for an indirect purchaser to claim damages 
successfully due to the evidential burden, e.g., having to prove that the intermediary has 
passed on the excessive prices. Not only are there difficulties regarding proof of evidence 
but also the damage suffered by an indirect purchaser is relatively minor compared to the 
                                                     
455 ECJ judgment of September 20, 2001, C-453/99 Courage, para. 26.  Reasoning of the seventh amendment 
of the ARC (Regierungsbegründung) of May 26, 2004, BT-Drucks. 15/3640, p. 53 to Section 33. 
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cost risk and thus the practical relevance of such cases is reduced. In this respect, it is also 
important to note that the possibility of class actions does not exist in Germany. 
 Discovery c.
Another interesting issue to analyze throughout the different jurisdictions, starting from 
Germany, concerns the discovery.  Discovery is a US legal term that does not have a real 
equivalent in the German legal system.  In the German legal system, the issue is therefore 
whether parties are entitled to obtain documents, written responses and testimony from 
opposing and third parties.  In a nutshell, there are fairly limited circumstances in which 
one can oblige an opposing or third party to produce documents or to give statements; in 
practice, these options do not play any significant role in the German legal process. 
 
i. Options to obtain documents from opposing party in legal proceedings  
The German understanding of fair legal proceedings is that no party should be obliged 
to provide the opposition with material that the requesting party requires to win the case: 
nobody is under an obligation to act against his own legitimate interests.  It is accepted that 
this restrictive attitude might be seen to subvert pure conceptions of justice and equity in 
favor of the practical realities rendered by the courts in regular proceedings.  
There are, however, a few exceptions to the general rule.  First, if a party bearing the 
burden of proof argues that its opponent is in possession of a relevant document, and the 
burden of proof may be satisfied by the party’s application for that document, then the 
court shall order that the opponent has to produce the document.  Second, the opposing 
party is obliged to produce any documents in its possession to which it has made reference 
in the course of the proceedings and in its written submissions.  Third, the opposing party 
is obliged to produce any documents that the party bearing the burden of proof is entitled 
to request on the basis of existing substantive law.  Lastly, the court may order ex officio a 
party to submit documents in its possession.   
The enactment of this provision gave rise to some fervent discussions amongst German 
scholars relating to perceived Americanization of German civil procedure.  Those fears 
were largely exaggerated as, compared to the wide-reaching possibilities of US-style 
discovery, the powers of the tribunal under Section 142 of the ZPO are subject to 
considerable limitations: the tribunal may only order a party or a third party to produce a 
document if that document is in that party’s possession and if one of the parties to the 
proceedings has referred to it.  Moreover, the German Federal Supreme Court (“BGH”) 
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has clarified that, in order not to come into conflict with the principle of party presentation, 
an order to submit documents may not lead to investigation into elements of the facts of 
the case that have yet to be presented to the court.  Thus, Section 142 of the ZPO does not 
authorize a party to conduct “fishing expeditions” whose sole purpose would be to gain 
access to documents that may lead to further evidence.  Moreover, the requesting party’s 
interests in production of the documents must be balanced against the interests of the other 
party not to produce the documents. 
 
ii. Grounds to refuse the production of documents 
The ZPO does not explicitly state under which circumstances the opposing party may 
refuse to produce the requested documents.  Rather, it is for the tribunal to assess the 
details of each individual case carefully in order to balance the requesting party’s right to 
efficient legal protection and the opposing party’s right to privacy.  It seems to be widely 
accepted that interest or rights protected by the German Constitution may be invoked to 
refuse production. Thus, the production of personal documents (e.g., personal letters, 
diaries and photographs) may be refused. Furthermore, the protection of trade secrets may 
justify refusal. 
The tribunal does not have the power to enforce an order, e.g., by way of subpoena. 
Where, however, the opposing party disobeys and does not produce the ordered documents, 
the tribunal may draw its own inferences and take this refusal into consideration when 
assessing the facts of the case.  In this context, Section 427 of the ZPO explicitly provides 
that if the opposing party refuses to produce a document, the allegations made by the 
requesting party may be considered proven as far as they could have been proven by the 
requested document. 
 
iii. Options to obtain statements from opposing party in legal proceedings 
Allegations can also be proven by way of oral statements made by witnesses or by the 
parties. Accordingly, a statement by the opposing party may be admissible evidence. To 
clarify this point: in German civil procedure, it is up to the parties to state the evidence that 
they rely on in their written submissions for the allegation to be evidenced. Admissible 
evidence comprises the following five categories: documents, statements by third-party 
witnesses, statements by the parties themselves, expert opinion and visual inspection. The 
distinction between statements by third-party witnesses and statements by the actual 
parties to the proceedings is unusual in the international context but justified by the 
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consideration that, while a party statement may be useful for establishing the facts, such 
statement may be less reliable as a party to the process has a vested interest in the outcome 
of the case. Given that a company’s legal representative, i.e., its CEO, would be 
considered a party to the proceedings, the practical significance of this distinction is 
evident. 
Under German civil procedure law, it is at the tribunal’s discretion whether or not it 
hears witnesses or parties. The nominating party has no power to force the tribunal to hear 
a specific person. The tribunal is not necessarily limited to the evidence as presented by 
the parties. If it sees fit, it might also decide to hear any of the parties, even if this party’s 
statement was not presented as evidence.  
Against this backdrop, a party may produce the opposing party’s statement as evidence 
to substantiate its allegations, provided that this party cannot otherwise prove its 
allegations.  Evidence by way of statement by the opposing party is therefore a last resort. 
Finally, the interview of the party or witness will be carried out by the presiding judge; 
there is no cross-examination. If the opposing party refuses to make a statement, the 
tribunal may take this behavior into consideration when assessing the facts  and draw an 
adverse inference. 
 
iv. Right to obtain documents or statements from third parties  
Upon request by one of the parties to the proceeding, the tribunal may order a third 
party to produce documents, provided that the relevant documents are in the third party’s 
possession.  Any third party may be nominated as a witness and thus be called by the 
tribunal if it believes that the statement might be relevant to the outcome of the case. 
The third party may refuse to produce the documents on the same grounds that would 
entitle a witness to refuse giving a witness statement, i.e., the grounds stated in Sections 
383 to 385 of the ZPO (specific personal reasons, including family ties, danger of self-
incrimination or of a close relative and the risk of subsequent public prosecution).  
According to Section 142(2) of the ZPO, there is no obligation to produce documents if 
such obligation would be ‘unreasonable’.  Considering the rather broad scope of Sections 
383 to 385 of the ZPO, the unreasonableness limitation does not have much scope. 
If the third party refuses to comply with an order, the tribunal may enforce the order 
and execute the measures provided for in Section 142(2)(2) of the ZPO, in particular to 
impose a monetary fine or subpoena a witness. 
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 The use of experts d.
In the context of cartel damages claims, expert opinions might be necessary to prove 
all the various facts that justify the claims substantially, such as market definitions, injury 
and the amount of damages suffered.  The focus is likely to be on economic issues. 
German procedural law permits the use of experts, but there are particular characteristics 
that may be uncommon to users from foreign jurisdictions. 
An expert opinion can be used to prove or ascertain facts.  Experts can describe facts 
that people without such expertise would not see or the importance of which they could not 
assess.  Unlike a witness, the expert does not report about personal perception, but rather 
he draws conclusions from facts and elaborates on his hypothesis. 
German procedural law distinguishes between two different types of experts: party-
appointed and tribunal-appointed experts. 
 
i. Tribunal-appointed experts 
The ZPO only deals with tribunal-appointed experts who, unlike party-appointed 
experts, give admissible evidence.  Accordingly, the tribunal selects and appoints one or 
more experts as the case may be, possibly after consultation with the parties.  The tribunal 
instructs and supervises the experts and may give directions.  The parties may challenge 
the appointment of a particular expert if they doubt his or her impartiality or independence.  
Depending on the instructions given by the tribunal, the expert usually delivers an opinion 
in writing. Upon delivery of the report, the expert may be examined by the parties and by 
the tribunal at the court hearing.  The appointed expert is supposed to confirm the accuracy 
of the report and his impartiality and effectively acts as an ‘assistant’ to the tribunal. 
 
ii. Party-appointed experts 
The parties are free to submit opinions rendered by experts that they have appointed. 
Such opinions will be considered as part of that party’s written submissions.  Such 
opinions do not carry any particular evidentiary value.  Nonetheless, their submission may 
be useful to help the tribunal better understand the case and to form an educated opinion as 
to what questions need to be elaborated on by a tribunal-appointed expert.  Hence, while it 
often may be advisable to submit a report prepared by a party-appointed expert, there may 
also be some risks associated with such approach: the more specialized the question that 
needs to be answered by an expert, the fewer experts likely to be skilled in that particular 
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field of expertise. ‘Wasting’ one or more of these experts for preparation of a ‘partisan’ 
expert report might be a bad choice as the pool for potential qualified tribunal-appointed 
experts thus would be reduced and possibly no other suitable expert might be available to 
be appointed by the tribunal.  Obviously, an expert who already has prepared an opinion 
for one of the parties cannot then be appointed by the tribunal as an independent expert. 
 
iii. The President of the Federal Cartel Office 
Pursuant to Section 90(2) of the ARC, the President of the FCO may act as amicus 
curiae in pending proceedings.  The President may hand in submissions and statements, 
point to facts and give evidence.  While the amicus certainly does not qualify as an expert 
in a procedural sense, the FCO disposes of superior knowledge and therefore, in a 
functional sense, may be considered an expert in the area of its legally assigned scope of 
work. Furthermore, considering the FCO’s authority, its President’s statements may have 
considerable impact on the opinion of the tribunal. 
Section 90a(2) of the ARC deals with the European Commission’s right to act as 
amicus curiae in legal proceedings. In essence, the Commission’s position is comparable 
to that of the President of the FCO and thus the above considerations apply accordingly. 
 Class action e.
German civil procedure law is based on the individual filing of an action.  Thus, apart 
from the contractual possibility of agreeing on a model suit clause, German procedural law 
does not provide for a representative action by one member of a group of potential 
claimants with a binding effect of res judicata towards and against all the other members of 
the group.  However, it is possible for potential claimants to agree to settle the dispute 
following the outcome of a suit, which therefore may be considered a ‘model suit’.  Such 
settlement however is not tantamount to the extension of the res iudicata effect to all 
possible claimants. 
Section 33(2) of the ARC provides for associations with legal capacity for the 
promotion of commercial or independent professional interests to seek an injunction. 
Additionally, there is a subsidiary claim providing for the disgorgement of benefits under 
Section 34a of the ARC, whereby the economic benefit is to be surrendered to the federal 
budget. 
German law allows for the transfer of damages claims to a third party, who may then 
enforce them collectively.  In fact, German courts have allowed the purchase of damages 
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claims by professional claimants from companies that have been affected by cartel conduct.  
The mechanism is such that the affected company assigns its claim to the professional 
claimant who is then able to bring a damages action in its own name. 
In addition to this, German competition law provides for consumer associations to 
bring proceedings against companies who have infringed EU or German competition laws 
to recover the proceeds from the infringement.  However, given that any awards from 
successful actions are to be paid into the Federal budget, the knock-on effect is that these 
actions are rare as there is no economic incentive for consumer associations to bring a 
claim. 
 Calculation of damages f.
A claimant is entitled to damages pursuant to Section 33(3)(1) of the ARC, provided 
that the infringement of German or European antitrust rules was committed negligently or 
deliberately.  However, based on established principles of German civil law, a claimant is 
only entitled to compensation for the loss suffered from the anticompetitive behavior of the 
defendant.  Essentially, this means that the financial and commercial situation of the 
claimant at the time of judgment is compared to its hypothetical situation were it not for 
the defendant’s infringing conduct.  The difference between the two scenarios reflects the 
amount of damages to which the claimant may be entitled.  If, and to what extent, the 
courts are willing to hear the passing-on defence invoked by defendants is as yet unclear. 
The notion of “damage” in the German law of damages does not include the concept of 
‘punitive’ damages.  The sole purpose of damages payments is to provide compensation 
for damages actually suffered.  By the same token, the injured (natural or legal) person 
should not profit from the illegal act, as would be the case if punitive damages were 
awarded.  Likewise, the costs of bringing the legal action are not taken into consideration 
when determining the amount of the damages to be awarded.  However, the successful 
party to legal proceedings is entitled to reimbursement of its costs from the losing party.  
Against this background, there is no need or justification to include legal costs into the 
notion of damages. 
In complex antitrust litigation it is often a complex task to determine the economic loss 
caused to the claimant.  Whilst it is difficult even in price-fixing cartels to determine the 
hypothetical marginal (i.e., competitive) price for a product or service, it is considerably 
more difficult to assess the economic impact of other forms of restrictive behavior.  
Generally, anticompetitive agreements imply the existence of inefficiencies that lead to 
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higher costs on the demand side.  However, it is very complicated to quantify the loss 
suffered by a particular claimant.  Therefore, Section 33(3)(3) of the ARC gives courts 
discretion to assess the size of damages in the case at hand.  Furthermore, the same 
provision allows a court, in determining the amount of damages, to consider the pro rata 
profit generated by the defendant through the competition law infringement. 
However, even if a cartel member can demonstrate that the anticompetitive scheme 
was an unprofitable venture, this would not excuse the payment of damages to a claimant 
who can demonstrate that he has actually suffered a loss. In addition, claimants are not 
entitled to ask for the (potentially high) profits on the defendant’s part if they exceed the 
economic disadvantages suffered by the claimant. 
According to Section 33(3)(4) of the ARC, monetary debts accrue interest from the 
date that the damage occurred. The interest rate is dictated by Section 33(3)(5) of the ARC 
and Section 288 of the BGB.456  However, claimants may argue that they are entitled to 
demand higher interest payments on other legal grounds. 
No additional interest payments will be incurred by the defendant for late payment of 
damages, but the claimant is free to demonstrate that, as a result of the late payment, the 
damages he or she incurred have increased. 
 Passing-on defences g.
Currently, it is unclear and subject to legal debate whether or not passing-on defences 
are permitted under the ARC.  Therefore, it’s not possible to provide a conclusive answer 
yet on whether and to what extent this defence could be invoked successfully in court 
proceedings. 
Section 33(3)(2) prevents defendants in private enforcement litigation from arguing 
that claimants did not suffer a loss because they were able to sell on the products or 
services at a price that, owing to the restrictive practices of a cartel, exceeded the marginal 
price (i.e., the competitive price).  At first glance, this section could be construed as a total 
ban on cartel members from invoking the passing-on defence in the sense that their 
conduct cannot be excused on the ground that the direct and indirect purchasers have been 
able to pass on the damage to their respective customers.  However, when examined in 
                                                     
456 The interest rate is approximately 5 per cent above the basic interest rate fixed twice a year by the German 
Central Bank. 
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greater detail, it appears that aspects of the provision are not entirely clear.  In fact, the 
provision refers to the resale of the goods or services only.  This means that the defendant 
is not barred from asserting passing-on defences against direct or indirect purchasers if the 
claimant has further processed the goods before reselling them.  The passing-on defence 
should be permitted even if the claimant has not processed the goods before reselling them 
– a view commonly held by legal commentators. This interpretation is based on the 
consideration that German law (like all civil law countries) disapproves of the idea of 
punitive/treble damages and thus, in principle, damages can only be awarded to recover 
actual loss.  If, as Section 33(3)(1) of the ARC sets forth, both direct and indirect purchaser 
are entitled to claim damages, barring antitrust defendants from invoking the passing-on 
defence may lead to an unjustified enrichment of the claimant who was able to pass on the 
increased prices.  This would be contrary to the principle that actual loss shall be recovered 
but awards should not unduly benefit the plaintiff to the detriment of the defendant.  
Therefore, the passing-on defence should arguably be allowed if the direct purchaser’s 
actual loss has been compensated by the profit gained from reselling, unless it was entirely 
due to the claimant’s superior marketing efforts that he – unlike other resellers – managed 
to sell the products or services even at a superior competitive price.  Furthermore, it is still 
unclear whether the burden of proving the passing-on is on the claimant or the defendant.  
The only court decisions referring to this aspect were taken in 2003/2004 and thus might 
not be considered good law following the 2005 amendment. Two courts held that, in line 
with common practice, the claimant has to prove that he actually suffered a loss, i.e., that 
the alleged damage has not been compensated through the profit gained from reselling the 
product or service to the end-customers.457  However, in another case the court declined to 
consider whether or not the claimant’s loss had been compensated since the defendant did 
not invoke the passing-on defence.  We take the view that Section 33(3)(2) of the ARC 
should be interpreted as imposing the burden of proof on the antitrust defendant: its 
wording clearly indicates that a loss shall not be excluded due to the resale of the products 
or services that were part of an anticompetitive agreement. Further, taking into account the 
conduct that gave rise to the litigation, on balance it seems fair to conclude that the burden 
of proving the conditions for invoking the passing-on defence remains with the defendant. 
                                                     
457 LG Mannheim, judgment of July 11, 2003 (7 O 326/02), GRUR 2004, 182, 184; OLG Karlsruhe, 
judgment of January 28, 2004 (6 U 183/03), WuW DE-R 1229, 1232. 
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At this point, none of these aspects has been resolved by court decisions since the latest 
amendment of the ARC.  In particular, it remains to be seen in which cases defendants and 
members of a cartel may invoke the passing-on defence and who will bear the burden of 
proof. 
 Follow-on Litigation h.
Section 33(4) of the ARC provides procedural tools for the promotion of follow-on 
actions.  The provision stipulates that where damages are claimed for an infringement of 
the ARC or of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, German courts are bound by a finding that an 
infringement has occurred to the extent that such a finding was made in a final decision by 
German cartel authorities, the European Commission or NCAs (or courts acting as such)  
of other Member States. 
Section 33(4) of the ARC stipulates that findings are binding on the courts that have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a civil enforcement action, not only if they are issued by the 
European Commission or the German cartel authorities, but also if they are issued by 
competition authorities of other Member States.  However, the reference to decisions of 
the European Commission is only meant to clarify the scope of Section 33(4) of the ARC: 
Article 16(1) of Regulation no. 1/2003 prohibits national courts’ ruling against decisions of 
the European Commission when assessing the legality of agreements or practices with 
respect to Article 101 or 102 TFEU. 
A decision is binding only if it establishes that an infringement of the ARC or of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU has occurred.  If a decision is appealed, Section 33(4)(2) of the 
ARC provides for the resulting final judgment to have binding effect. 
Whether a competition authority’s finding that the objected behavior does not infringe 
competition law has binding effect is unclear. With regard to Article 16(1) of Regulation 
1/2003, it appears that such acquittals are binding if issued by the Commission. 
 Quantification of damages i.
In private enforcement matters, the claimant may sue either one single company that 
belongs to a cartel, or all companies constituting the cartel as joint and several debtors. If 
the claimant(s) opt for the first possibility, the defendant may want to ensure that it can 
seek reimbursement from the other members of the cartel in case the claimant’s action 
succeeds.  To this end, the defendant has to make sure that the other members of the cartel 
are barred from challenging the existence of the judgment and its binding effect.  In 
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essence, the defendant should seek to expand the binding effect of the judgment.  As set 
out above,  generally under German law it is not possible to expand the res iudicata effect 
beyond the parties.  However, the defendant has one option available to it in these 
circumstances: it may give third party notice to the other members of the cartel. 
The recipient of third-party notice does not become a party to the proceedings, but he 
or she has far-reaching procedural rights, including the right to file submissions.  Thus, the 
judgment on the claim brought against the defendant will have limited legal effect with 
respect to the recipients of the notice.  However, in relation to the defendant, the recipients 
will be precluded from arguing that the judgment is wrong or that the defendant’s defence 
was insufficient.  On that basis, it is much easier for the defendant to pursue possible 
indemnification or contribution from the other members of the cartel. 
If the claimant initiates proceedings against all alleged wrongdoers as joint and several 
debtors, a judgment in the claimant’s favor will, as a matter of course, have legal force 
against all defendants. If one of the defendants chooses to pay the due amount in its totality 
to the claimant on the basis of the judgment, and then unsuccessfully seeks 
indemnification or contribution from his co-defendants, the defendant may need to bring a 
separate new claim against his co-defendants. 
Whether the defendant finally succeeds in seeking indemnification or contribution 
from third parties or co-defendants will depend on questions of substantive law and the 
facts of the case, particularly on the allocation of responsibilities.  Also, a situation may 
arise where the defendant has accepted a decision of the public cartel authorities (e.g., by 
cooperating as chief witness) but a third party or co-defendant has appealed the decision 
and this appeal is pending.  Final and binding decisions of public cartel authorities must be 
respected by the court.  The outcome of the claim brought against the defendant and the 
claim brought by the defendant against the other wrongdoers may therefore differ in these 
circumstances. 
4. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is increasingly being chosen as forum for the private enforcement of 
European competition law.  Numerous cartel damages claims have recently been submitted 
to the Dutch courts and it is to be expected that in the future the Netherlands will continue 
to compete with – notably – the United Kingdom and Germany as the preferred forum for 
bringing this type of claim. 
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Recent years have shown a significant rise in Dutch private competition law 
enforcement cases and connected damages claims.  Since 2010, follow-on damages claims 
have been brought before the Dutch courts with regard to the gas-insulated switchgears,458 
bitumen,459 air cargo,460 sodium chlorate,461 candle waxes,462 and elevator and escalator 
cartels. 463 
So far, there have been two judgments published on the material merits of claims in 
relation to the gas-insulated switchgears464 and elevator and escalator cartels465 as well as 
an interim judgment regarding procedural defences raised by the defendants in a claim 
with regard to the candle waxes cartel.466 
 Legislative framework a.
The legal framework for cartel damages claims is formed by the general rules 
regarding liability for wrongful conduct;467 the specific competition legislation prescribed 
in the Competition Act (“CA”) and TFEU; and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  For 
a cartel damages claim to succeed, the claimant must establish that the defendant has acted 
in a wrongful manner that can be attributed to him or her, and that the claimant has 
suffered damage as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  Whether a breach of 
national or European competition legislation in itself will amount to wrongful conduct 
depends on whether the breached rules are aimed at preventing the damage suffered by the 
defendant.468 
                                                     
458 Commission Decision January 24, 2007, Case COMP/38899. 
459 Commission Decision  September 13, 2006, Case COMP/38456. 
460 Commission Decision November 9, 2010, Case COMP/39258. 
461 Commission Decision June 11, 2008, Case COMP/38695. 
462 Commission Decision October 1, 2008, Case COMP/39181. 
463 Commission Decision February 21, 2007, Case COMP/38823. 
464 Oost-Nederland District Court, January 16, 2013, LJN BZ0403. 
465 Midden-Nederland District Court, March 13, 2013, LJN CA1922. 
466 The Hague District Court, May 1, 2013, LJN CA1870.  
467 Article 6:162 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (the Dutch Civil Code, “CC”). 
468 Article 6:163 of the CC. 
160 
Claims for damages can be brought within five years the claimant has become aware of 
the infringement and the person liable for the damages.  In any event, no claim can be 
brought 20 years after the damage-causing event.469  For the shorter limitation period to 
run the claimant must be subjectively aware of the damage and liable person – “ought to 
have been aware” is insufficient.  Depending on the circumstances of the case, it is 
therefore possible that the limitation period will have started (and run out) before the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) or the Commission decides 
there has been a breach of Article 6 of the CA or Article 101 of the TFEU.  For instance, in 
2007 the Rotterdam District Court found that a claim for damages by CEF, a wholesale 
distributor of electrotechnical fittings, against the individual directors of FEG, a Dutch 
association in the electrotechnical fittings sector, was time-barred.470  The court ruled as 
irrelevant that the Commission had only given its decision that FEG had breached Article 
101 of the TFEU in 1999:471 CEF was held to have already been aware of the damage and 
the liable person in 1991 when it submitted a complaint to the Commission regarding 
FEG’s conduct.  Because CEF first sent a letter claiming damages from the individual 
directors in 2000, and the limitation period had not been interrupted in time, the claim was 
dismissed.  In contrast, a more recent judgment relating to the gas-insulated switchgears 
cartel, the Oost-Nederland District Court rejected the defendants’ defence that the 
limitation period had started in May/June 2004 when the Commission and the defendant 
issued a press release indicating that an investigation into a possible gas-insulated 
switchgears cartel in which the defendant may have participated.472  The court ruled that 
the publication only stated that an investigation had started, which, in the circumstances, 
was insufficient to make the claimant aware of the fact he may have suffered damage.  The 
court did not accept that the claimant should have started an investigation of its own in 
response to the May/June 2004 publication, citing that according to the Commission, the 
cartel members had done their utmost to keep the cartel’s activities secret.  On the other 
hand, the Midden-Nederland District Court ruled that a claim to annul a maintenance 
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contract for the service of elevators was time-barred as the three-year period of limitation 
for such an annulment had run; according to the claimant, the period of limitation had 
started when the Commission cartel decision was published in 2007, while the claimant 
first brought its claim for annulment four years later, in 2011. 
With respect to territoriality, the CA applies to all competition restricting decisions, 
agreements or conduct that aims to restrict or limit competition in (part of) the Dutch 
market or that has such an effect.473  Foreign parties are not exempted and do not enjoy 
any immunity in that regard.474 
Dutch courts have jurisdiction to hear cartel damages claims that are instigated against 
(legal) persons having their domicile in the Netherlands475 or when the basis of the claim is 
a wrongful act and the harmful event occurred in the Netherlands.476  Under Article 7(1) of 
the CCP – the Dutch equivalent of Article 6(1) of Council Regulation no. 44/2001 – a 
claim for cartel damages against persons who do not have their domicile in the 
Netherlands and whereby the cartel had no influence in the Netherlands may still be 
brought before the Dutch courts, but only if this is done together with a claim against a 
cartelist that is domiciled in the Netherlands and both claims are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together. On May 1, 2013, the District Court of 
The Hague found the damages claims against the various defendants based on the candle 
waxes cartel to be sufficiently connected. 477  The court held the fact that the anchor 
defendant – Shell Petroleum NV, the only defendant company with its domicile in the 
Netherlands – had not itself directly participated in the cartel, but had been found guilty by 
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the Commission of cartel infringement because of its influence as (sole) shareholder of its 
subsidiary that had directly participated in the cartel, did not preclude assuming a 
sufficiently close connection with the damages claims against the other defendants (who 
had directly participated in the cartel) and that all the Commission decision addressees 
could have reasonably foreseen that they might be summoned to appear before the court of 
one of the other cartel participants.  The court also rejected one of the defendant’s appeals 
to forum choice clauses in the sale contracts; the defendant was not a party to the contracts 
(instead, its subsidiary was) and was unable to show that the forum choice clauses had also 
been entered into on her behalf.  On October 26, 2011, the Arnhem District Court decided 
that it had jurisdiction to hear a claim brought against a number of producers of gas-
insulated switchgears, including the Alstom Group, even though none of the defendants 
was domiciled in the Netherlands.  The court decided that as regards one of the defendants, 
Cogelex, jurisdiction could be based on Article 5(3) of Council Regulation no. 44/2001 
because both the wrongful act and the place where damages were suffered was in Arnhem. 
The district court then invoked Article 6(1) of Council Regulation no. 44/2001 – even 
though this rule only applies if jurisdiction is first based on domicile – to justify 
jurisdiction as regards the other defendants because the claim against all defendants would 
have to be decided on the same factual and legal grounds and otherwise there would be a 
risk of contradictory decisions.478  
As to the rules of standing, to bring a claim for cartel damages in the Netherlands the 
claimant must be a natural or legal person.  Associations that, according to their articles of 
association, promote and protect the interests of others affected by a cartel may start 
proceedings as well, but may not claim damages.  Whether indirect purchasers of goods or 
services may claim damages from the cartel members has yet to be decided. In order for 
such a  claim to succeed, the competition rules that have been breached must serve to 
protect the claimant suffering the damage.479  There does seem to be – within Dutch legal 
literature – a communis opinio that competition rules also serve to protect the interests of at 
least consumers, and possibly also middlemen. However, even if it is held that the 
competition rules of the CA and the TFEU do not aim to protect consumers or middlemen 
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from suffering damage due to cartels, the courts could still hold that the defendant has 
acted wrongfully by having breached a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social 
conduct. 
 Discovery b.
Dutch courts have a general discretionary power to demand information from either or 
both of the parties. 480  This power covers both a demand for clarification of certain 
statements and the submission of specific documents. Parties may refuse to cooperate with 
such a demand, but do so at their own risk. Unless parties can show they have sufficiently 
compelling reasons, the court may at its discretion draw the conclusions it wants from such 
a refusal. This usually leads to the point of contention being decided in the other party’s 
favor. The court may also order a party to submit documents that it, as a legal person, is 
legally required to have (e.g., bookkeeping documents or annual accounts).481  Again, 
refusing to do so is done at the risk of the court drawing its own conclusions from that 
refusal. 
While parties may request the court to use its above-mentioned discretionary powers to 
order another party to disclose certain information or documents, the court is not obliged to 
grant such a request.  Instead, the CCP provides parties a special discovery action by way 
of a claim under Article 843a of the CCP – as a motion in ongoing proceedings or in 
separate proceedings – parties can demand specific written or digital documents and 
information from any person who has those documents or that information in their 
possession.  In order for a claim under Article 843a of the CCP to be successful, the 
claimant must first show a legitimate interest in obtaining the requested documents and 
information.  A legitimate interest may be found if the claimant is unable to obtain the 
documents or information in another way and without them would be at an unreasonable 
disadvantage in the proceedings.  Second, the claimant must show that the requested 
documents and information pertain to a legal relationship to which the claimant is a party. 
Legal relationships based on wrongful acts are included.  As a third requirement, the 
claimant must be able to specify the documents and information they want to receive. This 
requirement aims to prevent the so-called “fishing expeditions”.  The claimant must be 
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able to show that it is sufficiently likely that the information and documents are at hand 
and describe them in such an exact way that it is clear which documents and information 
are meant. This requirement does not go so far that the claimant must be able to specify the 
contents of such documents and information, but a request to obtain “all correspondence” 
or “all financial documentation” is insufficiently specific and will lead to a refusal by the 
court.   
A claim under Article 843a of the CCP may be denied if the defendant does not have 
the documents or information, the documents or information are not necessary for a fair 
trial and decision of the case (e.g., if the information could reasonably be obtained another 
way, such as through witness testimony) or if the defendant can show sufficiently 
compelling reasons for refusal. Compelling reasons may be that the documents and 
information are confidential or that disclosure may harm another’s privacy.  Finally, if the 
request pertains to documents or information that has been obtained (or produced) by 
professionals who by way of their job or position are entitled or obliged to observe 
confidentiality – such as lawyers, notaries, trustees in bankruptcy and medical 
professionals – and the request is aimed at such a professional, it will be refused. 
a. The use of experts 
The Dutch civil law of evidence states that, unless otherwise provided by law, parties 
may use any and all means to prove their propositions and that the courts are free in their 
assessment of the evidence provided.482  Expert evidence is one of the means through 
which parties may prove their propositions, for example by way of submitting a report by a 
renowned economist on the quantum of damages in a cartel claim for damages.  Parties 
may also request the court to appoint one or more independent experts to give evidence 
and their advice on certain issues, or the court may at its own initiative appoint an 
independent expert.  Courts are not obliged to appoint experts. It is at the court’s discretion 
whether or not it deems such an appointment necessary for its decision of the case.483  It is 
also up to the court to decide the evidentiary value of a party, or a court-appointed expert’s 
testimony or report. The courts may deviate from the conclusions of court-appointed 
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experts. In such a case, however, the court must provide sufficient grounds for such a 
decision.484  
 Class actions c.
Since July 1994, associations that, according to their articles of association, promote 
and protect the common and similar interests of various (legal or natural) persons may start 
a class action to obtain any type of court order, with one noteworthy exception – namely, 
an order to pay damages.485  For a claim to be admissible in court the association must 
have first attempted to obtain their claim out of court in consultation with the 
defendants.486  Finally, the interests that the association aims to promote and protect must 
be sufficiently similar and thereby suitable to be represented and decided upon collectively.  
As stated, the possibility of the court ordering the defendant in a Dutch class action to pay 
damages has been excluded by the legislature. It is up to individuals who have suffered 
a loss to start follow-up proceedings to obtain damages.  Usually class actions are therefore 
aimed at obtaining a declaration under law that the defendant has by certain actions acted 
wrongfully.  Although such a decision, strictly speaking, has no legal effect with regard to 
potential individual claimants, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is logical that in 
individual follow-on proceedings, the courts will take such a decision on, for example, the 
wrongfulness of certain actions as their point of departure.487  Probably because of the 
inability under Dutch law to claim damages through class, this mechanism has not yet been 
used in antitrust cases. Instead, individual actions are usually combined into one court case.  
This is done either by a number of claimants acting together in their own name, or by so-
called claim vehicles buying up claims and, after assignment, asserting these claims in 
court in their own name. 
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 Quantification of damages d.
Dutch civil law aims to compensate a claimant for the damages he or she has suffered 
due to another’s wrongful act or default to perform.  This means on the one hand that both 
actual loss and lost profit may be claimed, as well as the claimant’s reasonable costs to 
prevent or reduce damages suffered, to determine their amount and another’s liability or to 
obtain compensation out of court.488  On the other hand, exemplary or punitive damages 
are not available.  Furthermore, a profit the claimant has enjoyed as a consequence of the 
same wrongful act will be deducted from any damages to be awarded, but only insofar as 
this is reasonable. 
Unless specifically provided otherwise in legislation or by party agreement, it is up to 
the court to determine the most appropriate manner in which damages should be calculated 
in a given case. If the loss cannot be accurately determined, the judge may use his or her 
judgment to estimate its amount.489  As a rule, damages are calculated by a comparison of 
the claimant’s assets as a consequence of the wrongful act and the hypothetical situation 
had there been no wrongful act.  All possible relevant circumstances of the case are taken 
into account in this “actual damage calculation”.  By way of alternative, the court may 
calculate damages abstractly, thereby not taking certain actual circumstances of the case 
into account.  Whether the court will choose actual damage calculation or an abstract 
calculation depends on the nature of the damages claimed and the liability.  As yet, there 
have been no definitive court decisions on whether an actual or an abstract damage 
calculation should be used in calculating antitrust claims. 
The court also has a discretionary power to award damages based on the profit made 
by the defendant thanks to his or her wrongful act or failure to perform, provided the 
claimant asks the court to do so.490  To date, this power is used only sparingly, mainly in 
intellectual property disputes.  A claimant is entitled to compound legal interest annually 
over the amount of damages claimed (in cases of wrongful acts, to be calculated from the 
day the loss is suffered until the damages have been paid).491  It is irrelevant whether the 
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claimant actually suffered any loss due to not immediately receiving monetary 
compensation for his or her loss, while at the same time a claimant cannot claim more than 
the legal interest for the delay in receiving monetary compensation.492  The legal interest 
percentage is determined by the Dutch government.493   
Unlike in, for example, the United Kingdom, awards for legal costs in the Netherlands 
are limited.  As a rule, the losing party will be ordered to pay the legal costs of the winning 
party, but the court may decide to apportion costs if both parties have been found to be 
wrong on certain aspects of the case.494  Awards for legal costs will cover the full amount 
of court fees,495 court-appointed experts and witnesses. However, for attorneys’ fees only a 
limited and fixed amount is awarded, which generally speaking does not begin to cover a 
party’s actual attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fee awards are determined on the basis of points 
awarded for procedural actions (e.g., two points for an oral hearing) and set tariffs 
depending on the amount claimed. 496   Only in intellectual property law cases and 
exceptional circumstances (e.g., abuse of proceedings) do courts award actual 
compensation for attorneys’ fees. 
 Pass-on defences e.
To date, there is no Dutch decisive case law on whether defendants to cartel damages 
claims can successfully argue that the claimant has in full or part passed on their damage 
to other parties.  In its judgment in the gas-insulated switchgear cartel case, the Oost-
Nederland District Court included some preliminary thoughts on the passing-on defence 
that had been raised, suggesting that it might not be reasonable to deduct the costs that 
were passed on to the claimant’s buyers, based on the assumption that the damages the 
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claimant would receive would be passed on to its buyers in the future. 497  Given the 
claimant’s very specific circumstances (an electricity network provider whose tariffs are 
regulated by the ACM), it is unclear whether these preliminary thoughts can or will be 
applied in other cartel damages cases.  The Dutch government has stated – already in its in 
response to the Commission’s 2005 Green Paper on Damages498 – that the pass-on defence 
is available in the Netherlands.  Although there has been, and still is, considerable debate 
in legal literature about whether the pass-on defence is or should be available in the 
Netherlands, given the general principle of “compensation for actual loss suffered” 
underlying the Dutch law of damages, defendants to an antitrust action should in principle 
be able to raise this defence. 
 Follow-on litigation f.
So far, cartel damages claims in the Netherlands have arisen following a decision and a 
fine by the Commission or the ACM. Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation no. 1/2003, 
Commission decisions on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 of the 
TFEU that are no longer open for appeal bind the national courts, effectively meaning that 
in a claim for cartel damages following such a decision by the Commission, the Dutch 
courts will have to accept and apply the breach of Article 101 TFEU found by the 
Commission as a fact.  For example, in the gas-insulated switch gear case, the Oost-
Nederland District Court held that it was bound by the Commission decision that the 
defendant – ABB Ltd. – had participated in the cartel from March 15, 1988 until March 2, 
2004, even though ABB Ltd. had shown that it didn’t exist before March 5, 1999.499  ABB 
Ltd. stated that it must assume that the Commission had identified it with one of the other 
ABB companies that did exist (and did participate in the cartel) in the period from March 
15, 1988 to March 5, 1999.  
The court further held that it was up to the defendants to convincingly show that the 
project for which damages were claimed – and which had not been a subject of the 
Commission investigation – had not been influenced by the cartel, as all the prospective 
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participants in the project had been found to have participated in the cartel, which covered 
the entire EU market.  A Commission decision and fine for participation in a cartel is no 
guarantee, however, for a successful damages claim, as demonstrated by the Midden-
Nederland District Court’s decision in a lift cartel damages claim case.  The court rejected 
the claim on the basis that the claimants (an owner–occupiers’ association and local 
council) had failed to prove that the cartel arrangements found by the Commission had 
also influenced the specific maintenance contract for which damages were now claimed.  
In 2011, in a claim for damages in connection with the bitumen cartel, the Rotterdam 
District Court decided – for the first time in the Netherlands – a request for a stay of the 
civil claim proceedings pending an appeal by the defendants against the Commission 
decision.500  According to the court, the decision whether to grant an (immediate and full) 
stay hinges upon the demands of fair proceedings, whereby unnecessary and unreasonable 
delays should be avoided.  The court took a nuanced view. Because one of the defendants 
had not appealed the Commission decision, the court decided that, as regards that 
defendant, at the very least questions involving the legitimacy of assignments and statute 
of limitations could be dealt with already and without delay.  These issues would, 
according to the Rotterdam District Court, have to be decided according to Dutch law and 
their decision would not depend on the validity of the contested Commission decision.  In 
the gas-insulated switchgear case, the defendants also raised a request for a Masterfoods 
stay501 of the proceedings; this request was denied with little or no reason given.  Similarly, 
the District Court of The Hague rejected a request for stay of the proceedings pending an 
appeal by a number of the defendants against the Commission decision arguing that it 
could be assumed that a number of issues might be debated and decided independently of 
the contested Commission Decision, particularly given that not all the defendants had 
appealed the Commission decision.  Furthermore, the court found that it would be contrary 
to due process – in particular the prevention of unnecessary and unreasonable delays – to 
stay the proceedings at this time until (likely many years later) all appeals had been finally 
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decided.  On the other hand, on March 7, 2012, the Amsterdam District Court stayed the 
proceedings in one of the air cargo cartel claim cases pending the outcome of the EU 
appeals of the airlines against the Commission decision.502  The Amsterdam District Court 
based its decision on the fact that the claimant (Equilib) had based the validity of its claim 
entirely on the EC decision, invoking that decision as proof of the defendant airlines’ 
wrongdoing (Air France, KLM and Martinair), and had not provided any concrete date 
from which it may follow that certain claims are not related to facts or other points in 
dispute before the European Court. In the court’s view, the European Court’s judgment on 
the specific nature, duration and extent of the participation in the cartel (and the soundness 
of the Commission’s arguments on these points) would be relevant to the answer to the 
question whether the defendant airlines had acted unlawfully.  On the same grounds, in 
November 2012 the Amsterdam District Court stayed another air-cargo damages claim by 
a different claim vehicle (East West Debt).  Both claimants have appealed the Court’s 
decision to stay the proceedings.  As regards the status of ACM decisions in follow-on 
civil litigation, there is no provision similar to Article 16 of Regulation no. 1/2003. The 
Dutch courts are free regarding the amount of weight they attach to such a decision. 
Possibly the Dutch courts may be bound to accept the outcome or decision of the ACM to 
which no further appeal is open as correct on the basis of the rule that administrative 
decisions that have not been successfully contested through administrative proceedings 
have legal force.503  This is, however, a matter of debate in Dutch legal literature and has 
not yet been decided in case law. In any case, according to the doctrine of administrative 
legal force, the finding of facts by the ACM is not binding upon the Dutch civil courts.504  
Therefore, should the defendant to a claim for cartel damages and an addressee of an ACM 
decision contest the facts as found by the ACM in a sufficiently convincing manner, he or 
she should at least be allowed the opportunity to disprove the presumption that the facts 
found by the ACM are correct.  
Dutch competition and civil law impose no restrictions on the damages claims in civil 
proceedings on the basis that the defendant has already been subject to a competition law 
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enforcement action and been fined, or towards defendants that have been granted leniency 
or immunity. 
5. France 
A new class action regime was introduced in France by the Law of March 17, 2014, 
also known as the Hamon Law.505  The French consumer class action scheme has been 
defined as an opt-in with publicity procedure that enables a group of individuals 
represented by an association authorized by the government 506  to claim damages for 
material harm resulting from a contract or from an anticompetitive behavior.   
Already in 2012, a noteworthy reform was introduced507 to regulate, in particular, the 
disclosure of documents in the NCA’s 508  files, with an exception for those obtained 
through leniency applications.  Furthermore, Law of June 17, 2008509 modified the statutes 
of limitations, reducing the period for the introduction of a private action to five years 
from the moment at which the victim was aware of the damage.  Following to the 
amendment, several actions have been time-barred, such as the claim introduced by the Île-
de-France regional administration against several building companies previously 
sanctioned by the NCA for bid-rigging practices relating to tenders for the construction of 
schools. 510  Although this recent decision was based on the previous regime (since it 
concerned facts that occurred more than a decade earlier), it underlines the fact that 
identifying strategic options as early as possible is a key element in any private damages 
procedure. 
As mentioned above, French courts’ approach to antitrust damages is strictly based on 
traditional civil law principles, according to which the claimant must prove the existence 
of an infringement (“faute”), a damage suffered, and a causal link between them.  This 
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provides a clear and certain legal frame, and allows the parties to refer to the corpus of 
damage case law developed in other areas. 
Considering the difficulty of proving damages in certain antitrust cases, French courts 
may have, in the past, adopted somehow simplistic solutions, particularly concerning the 
passing-on defence.  However, case law is becoming increasingly precise and clear in this 
area, and a recent decision in a follow-on action relating to the Lysine cartel has brought 
welcome clarification in this respect.  This decision illustrates the increasingly pragmatic 
approach adopted by French courts, which are more inclined to grant damages.511  
Recent case law confirmed the French courts’ preference for follow-on actions, the 
admissibility of which was clearly established by the Supreme Court in Lectiel v. France 
Telecom. 512   For instance, in an action against Google, the Paris Commercial Court 
decided to stay proceedings due to a pending procedure before the European 
Commission.513  Even in stand-alone actions, competition authorities also have a key role, 
since French courts may use the option offered to them by law to request an opinion from 
the Competition Authority.  For example, the Paris Court of Appeal has recently requested 
an opinion to determine whether Google has abused its dominant position in the online 
mapping market, following a judgment of the Paris Commercial Court, which had granted 
€500,000 compensation to the claimant, Bottin Cartographes.514 
Finally, following the Semavem case in 2010,515 several cases had addressed the issue 
of the rights, both for claimants and defendants, to access documents of the Competition 
Authority and produce them as evidence in follow-on actions. However, the rules are still 
somewhat unclear concerning documents obtained by the NCA in cases where the parties 
have offered commitments or chosen not to challenge the objections. 
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 Legislative framework a.
Private competition enforcement in France is based on the general tort law provisions 
of Article 1382 of the Civil Code in combination with the specific competition law 
provisions, Articles L420-1 and L420-2 of the Commercial Code and Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.  
Article 1382 of the Civil Code (tortious liability) requires the claimant to prove that a 
fault on the part of the defendant caused the alleged damage.  Under the general tort law 
regime, the infringement of any legal provision – whether administrative, civil or criminal 
– constitutes a fault for the purposes of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. French courts 
clearly consider that an infringement of French or EU competition law provisions 
constitutes a fault.  However, the Supreme Court has specified that a mere reference to the 
decision relating to the infringement, without any description of the behavior concerned, is 
not sufficient to establish the fault.  
It then remains for the claimant to establish the damage suffered and a causal link 
between the competition infringement and that damage.  Tortious liability claims falling 
within the general regime, such as antitrust claims, are time-barred after five years from 
the knowledge of the behavior causing the damage.  
Damages actions may also be based on contractual claims.  The statutory basis for such 
actions is Article 1147 of the Civil Code, in combination with the relevant antitrust 
provisions. 
Traditionally, the competent courts were the general civil or commercial courts, until a 
Decree of December 30, 2005 created sixteen specialized courts.  Eight of these courts are 
commercial courts, competent over litigation between professionals,516 the other eight are 
civil courts with jurisdiction over cases between private litigants.517 
Criminal courts may award damages for breach of competition law in a criminal law 
proceeding based on Article L420-6 of the Commercial Code.  When awarding damages, 
the criminal judge will apply the same statutory provisions as a civil judge. 
                                                     
516 Commercial courts of Marseilles, Bordeaux, Lille, Lyons, Nancy, Paris, Rennes and Fort de-France. 
517 Courts of First Instance situated in the same cities as the commercial courts. 
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In March 2008, the Administrative High Court confirmed in the SNCF case that 
administrative courts are competent for claims resulting from anticompetitive practices 
concerning a public tender. 
 Procedural aspects of private enforcement in France b.
First, with respect to extraterritoriality, Articles L420-1 and L420-2 of the Commercial 
Code are limited to anticompetitive practices that have been implemented or that have 
effects within the French territory, regardless of where the undertaking implementing those 
practices is located.  Tort actions can be commenced in France if the anticompetitive 
practice was implemented in France or the damage was suffered in France.  There is no 
exception for conduct by foreign parties: the jurisdictional link to the French courts is 
formed once the practice is implemented in France or the damage from the practice is 
suffered in France; thus the individual’s nationality or the undertaking’s location is 
irrelevant. 
Second, to bring an action before the French courts, the claimant must be a natural or 
legal person.  The claimant must allege a fault on the part of the defendant that caused it to 
suffer damage.  For private antitrust cases, the claimant must therefore allege that the 
defendant implemented anticompetitive practices that caused it to suffer damage, for 
example, increased costs or loss of profit or sales. 
Third, under French law, there is no discovery process comparable to that found in the 
United States.  The principle in French law518 is that each party must prove, according to 
the law, the facts necessary for the success of its claim.  This sets a high standard 
according to which parties are only required to disclose the documents they rely on. 
However, this standard is modified inter alia by the two rules:519  Article 10 of the 
Civil procedure code (“CPC”) states that the judge may order any measures of inquiry 
deemed necessary to enable the court to decide the case where it does not have sufficient 
elements.  These measures may consist of personal verifications of the judge, auditions of 
the parties or third parties, statements of third parties, or the appointment of an expert. 
Moreover, Article 11 of the CPC allows a party to ask the court to order the other parties to 
proceedings or a third party to communicate any kind of document necessary to prove the 
                                                     
518 Stated at Article 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (“CPC”). 
519 See also Article 138 et seq. of the CPC. 
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facts alleged. It provides that third parties are not obliged to communicate documents 
where there is a legitimate impediment.  This includes documents and information covered 
by attorney-client privilege520 and in cases of force majeure. 
The burden of proof lying with the claimant has been facilitated with the adoption, in 
2012, of a new second paragraph of Article L462-3 of the Commercial Code, which 
authorizes the NCA to disclose documents related to anticompetitive behavior, with an 
exception for leniency documents.521  
In the Semavem judgment of January 19, 2010,522 the Supreme Court held that where a 
party to a follow-on action can prove that the disclosure of certain documents is necessary 
for the exercise of its rights of the defence, French courts may either: (i) order the NCA to 
disclose the relevant documents; or (ii) allow one of the parties to disclose the relevant 
documents. 
Following this ruling, in the Outremer Telecom case, the Paris Commercial Court 
rejected Outremer Telecom’s claim for breach of confidentiality against the defendants, 
considering that the documents that had been disclosed before the court were: (i) necessary 
for the defence of the parties who had disclosed them; and (ii) known to all the parties to 
the proceedings.523 
                                                     
520 The Attorney–client privilege or professional secrecy between a lawyer and a client is established in 
French law by Article 66-5 of Law No. 71-1130 of 31 December 1971.  It includes consultations (i.e., 
attorney work product), correspondence between lawyer and client and between lawyers (except for the 
latter when their correspondence mentions “official letter”), and notes from lawyers’ meetings with 
clients. Advice from and correspondence with in-house lawyers is not covered by professional secrecy.  It 
should be remembered that, as France is a signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, changes in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg may have an effect on the delimitation and implementation of the concept of 
attorney-client privilege in France.  The European Court of Justice’s case law also has some bearing on 
the French notion of attorney–client privilege.  When information or documents are provided to 
competition authorities, these are included in the administrative file of the case, to which all parties will 
be given access after they have been notified of the statement of objections during the period in which 
they have the right to reply.  The parties may request that part of this information or documents be 
concealed on the basis that it contains business secrets:  these will then be classified in a confidential 
annex of the file. However, if one of these documents is deemed necessary to the procedure, it may be 
declassified by the NCA .  See Article L463-2, Articles L463-4, R463-13, and Article R463-15 of the 
Commercial Code. 
521 This is in line with the Directive on actions for damages under national law recently adopted by the 
European Parliament, which requires that oral and written statements by leniency applicants not be 
disclosed, thereby excluding documents obtained through leniency applications, which will significantly 
reduce the scope of what can be provided. 
522 Semavem v. JVC France, Supreme Court, January 19, 2010. 
523 Outremer Telecom v. Orange Caraïbes and France Télécom, Paris Commercial Court, November 8, 2011. 
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This was confirmed in the Ma Liste de Courses case, 524  which was introduced 
following a decision of the Competition Authority involving commitments from the parties.  
The Paris Commercial Court ordered the Competition Authority, on the ground of Article 
138 of the CPC,525 to disclose documents it had obtained during its investigation. 
Following the NCA’s reluctance to provide the documents, the Paris Commercial 
Court confirmed in a second judgment its previous decision ordering the disclosure of the 
concerned documents.526  However, this decision was appealed against before the Paris 
Court of Appeal, which held that the NCA and its agents should not bear the risk of a 
breach of confidentiality in lieu of the party which is the only one to be able to determine 
which documents are necessary for the exercise of its rights of defence.527  Thus, the 
principle set in the Semavem case is nuanced: in cases where the claimant has had access 
to the documents during the procedure before the NCA, the risk of breaching 
confidentiality is borne by the claimant, who must prove that each document disclosed is 
necessary for its claim. 
French law has no generalized pretrial discovery procedures either.  The only 
procedural possibility to obtain evidence before the proceeding starts is provided in Article 
145 of the CPC, which permits the court to order preparatory enquiries to preserve 
evidence of the facts on which a claim is based or to establish the existence of such 
evidence.  The claimant must adduce a legitimate reason for doing so. 
With respect to the appointment of independent experts, French courts sometimes use 
experts in antitrust litigation to establish the existence of an anticompetitive practice, but 
their intervention is more often aimed at quantifying damages.  Common methods entail 
the comparison between the price actually paid during the period of the anticompetitive 
practices and that usually paid in the absence of the practices; and the evaluation of the 
profit that would have been earned in the market in the absence of the anticompetitive 
practices.  Experts such as economists may intervene in two ways.  All parties may 
                                                     
524 Ma Liste de Courses v. Highco, Paris Commercial Court, 24 August 2011; see also DKT  International v. 
Eco Emballages and Valorplast, Paris Commercial Court, 16 March 2012.  
525 Article 138 of the CPC allows the judge to order, at the request of one party to the proceedings, a third 
party, such as the NCA , to disclose a document to which such party  did not have access.  
526 Ma Liste de Courses v. Highco, Paris Commercial Court, 16 March 2012.  
527 Ma Liste de Courses v. Highco, Paris Court of Appeal, 20 November 2013. 
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produce an expert’s report or opinion to support their claims; the court, however, is not 
obliged to hear the expert, but may choose to do so.  The court may also appoint an expert 
(either at the request of the parties or by its own initiative) pursuant to the rules set forth in 
Article 263 et seq. of the CPC.  
In addition, courts have the power to refer a case to the NCA to obtain an opinion on 
competition issues (such as market definition, abusive nature of conduct, etc.). This power 
has recently been used in the Bottin Cartographes v. Google case,528 where the Paris Court 
of Appeal has requested an opinion from the NCA on Google’s alleged abuse of dominant 
position in the online mapping market, in a case in which the Commercial Court had 
granted a €500,000 compensation to the claimant.  This power was also previously applied 
in the Luk Lamellen v. Valeo case.529 
 Quantification of damages c.
The general principle of damages in French law is to put the claimant in the position he 
or she would have been in had the fault not occurred.  For competition cases, this implies a 
very precise evaluation of the increase in costs or loss of profit suffered by the claimant. In 
certain cases, the French courts may grant damages resulting from a loss of opportunity, 
but this is rare and such claims are considered under very strict conditions.530 
In recent judgments,531 the Supreme Court has reiterated that it is for the claimant to 
specify the types of damage it aims to recover; courts cannot, at their own initiative, grant 
a different type of damage – for instance loss of opportunity instead of increase in costs. 
Damages do not serve a punitive purpose and punitive damages do not, therefore, exist 
                                                     
528 Bottin Cartographes v. Google, Paris Commercial Court, 31 January 2012 and Paris Court of Appeal, 20 
November 2013.  
529 Luk Lamellen v. Valeo, Paris Court of First Instance, 26 January 2005, and Opinion of the Competition 
Council No. 05-A-20 of 9 November 2005 relating to a request from the Paris Court of First Instance 
concerning the case between Luk Lamellen and Valeo, BOCCRF No. 10, 8 December 2006, p. 1006.  
530 For example, Subiteo v. France Télécom, Paris Court of Appeal, 21 December 2012, in which the  court 
admitted a loss of opportunity for Subiteo in not being able to supply alternative ADSL access, as 
compared with France Telecom services. However, in Lectiel v. France Télécom, the Supreme Court 
quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal for excluding the claim related to the loss of opportunity 
due to the claimant’s illicit behavior (Supreme Court, 3 June 2014).  
531 Doux Aliments v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Supreme Court, 15 June 2010.  
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under French law. 
Article 695 of the CPC limits the categories of costs related to the proceedings that are 
awarded to the successful party under Article 696 of the CPC.  Attorneys’ fees are not 
included in the exhaustive list set out at Article 695 of the CPC. Instead, they come under 
the expenses that the judge can, under Article 700 of the CPC, award to the successful 
party.  In exercising this discretion, the judge will take into account the fairness of an 
award and the economic situation of the losing party.  The judge is not obliged to award 
attorneys’ fees and often the amount granted is symbolic rather than compensatory. 
The pass-on defence tallies with the objectives underlying damages awards in French 
law: to compensate the concerned party only for the damage suffered.  If the party has 
passed on a part of any price increase, he or she has reduced the damage suffered. General 
principles of French law therefore favor recognition of the pass-on defence. However, his 
imposes a high burden of proof on claimants, who are required to prove that any price 
increase suffered by them was not passed on to their own clients.532 
In the past, due to the difficulty of establishing whether price increases have been 
passed on, French courts have adopted decisions that have drawn some criticism.  This was 
the case, for example, in a widely noted application of the pass-on defence by a French 
court in a follow-on action related to the Vitamins cartel.533  On the issue of the loss of 
profit claim, the court held that it was, in fact, a claim for loss of opportunity (the 
opportunity for the claimant to increase its turnover) and that in this case, the claimant had 
not established “the certain and direct nature of the prejudice necessary to open the right 
of reparation”.  Turning to proof of the passing-on, the court readily accepted the 
defendant’s argument: instead of requiring documentary evidence that the passing-on had 
occurred, the court based its acceptance on the European Commission’s Vitamins decision 
and a press release of December 2001, which stated in general terms that price increases 
resulting from cartels were likely to be passed on to consumers.  The court elaborated that 
the claimant had the possibility to pass on the overcharges and that in not doing so, it “had 
freely decided its pricing policy so that the liability of the defendants could not be 
engaged.”  The claimant was therefore dismissed.  
                                                     
532 Gouessant and Sofral v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Paris Court of Appeal, 16 February 2011 and Supreme 
Court, 15 May 2012.  
533 Arkopharma, Nanterre Commercial Court, May 11, 2006.  
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A similarly simplistic approach was adopted in another vitamins cartel case, 534  
although this seems to have been mainly motivated by the clumsy evidence brought by the 
claimant. 
In an action against a supplier, Ajinomoto, which took part in the Lysine cartel 
sanctioned by the European Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the 
Paris Court of Appeal, which considered the claimants, la Coopérative Le Gouessant and 
la Société Française d’Aliments, had not sufficiently proved the damage and the causal 
link, by relying on general, theoretical and academic econometric studies and failing to 
submit a tangible analysis of the evolution of effective prices.  The Paris Court of Appeal’s 
ruling was to a very large extent based on the fact that passing on costs to clients was the 
‘normal commercial practice’, thereby creating a presumption of passing-on in indemnity 
claims, which is, in practice, difficult to rebut.535 
However, in another case involving Ajinomoto, the Supreme Court has clarified this 
issue and the Paris Court of Appeal has subsequently modified its initial unclear stance. In 
a first decision, the Paris Court of Appeal had dismissed the pass-on defence alleged by 
Ajinomoto, surprisingly considering that the fact that its co-contractor involved in the 
cartel, Doux Aliments, was able to pass the excessive prices on to consumers would not 
affect the extent of the compensation requested. 536  The Supreme Court quashed this 
judgment in June 2010,537 holding that the Paris Court of Appeal had failed to ascertain 
whether Doux Aliments had actually passed on the price increase to its customers. Referred 
back to the Paris Court of Appeal (but with different judges), the burden of proof on the 
claimant was confirmed.  However, the Paris Court of Appeal applied a pragmatic 
approach by noting that lysine represents only 1 per cent of the total cost of the chicken 
feed and therefore concluding that the price increase was not likely to cause an automatic 
                                                     
534 For example, in January 2007, in a follow-on action from the European Commission’s Vitamins  decision 
(Decision of November 21, 2001, COMP/37.512 Vitamins), the Paris Commercial Court rejected Juva’s 
claim for damages on the grounds that the evidence adduced to prove the damage suffered was 
insufficient (Juva v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Paris Commercial Court, January 26, 2007).  
535 Gouessant and Sofral v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Paris Court of Appeal, February 16, 2011 and Supreme 
Court, May 15, 2012.  
536 Doux Aliments v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Paris Court of Appeal, June 10, 2009.  
537 Doux Aliments v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Supreme Court, June 15, 2010.  
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and mathematical adjustment of Doux Aliments’ price to its distributors. In addition, Doux 
Aliments faced very strong countervailing negotiating power from its clients, essentially 
big distributors. It was therefore highly unlikely that passing-on had occurred. Thus, 
Ajinomoto was ordered to compensate Doux Aliments with an amount over €1.5 
million.538 This decision is important in that it demonstrates that it is possible, in practice, 
to rebut the passing-on presumption; this requires, however, that the claimant presents 
clear and convincing evidence, even if not all calculation elements are available. 
However, the implementation of the newly adopted EU Damages Directive may lead to 
a modification of this regime: on the basis of the Damages Directive, where the claimant is 
the direct victim of the cartel, the burden of proof lies on the defendant to demonstrate that 
the additional cost has been passed on to the end customers.539  On the contrary, when the 
claimant is the final customer, he or she has to prove that the overcharges have been 
passed on to him or her.540 
In France, although some cases are stand-alone actions, such as the case introduced by 
Bottin Cartographes against Google in the Paris Commercial Court, which, in a judgment 
of January 31, 2012, condemned Google for having abused its dominant position in the 
market of online cartography and awarded damages to the claimant,541 follow-on litigation 
is often the most frequent way for claimants in France to satisfy the court that there has 
been an infringement of antitrust provisions. Thus, most recent cases have been follow-on 
actions from NCA or European Commission decisions condemning undertakings for 
anticompetitive practices: the enforcement decision establishes the fact of the practice 
which, in turn, establishes the fault necessary to obtain damages at civil law. It then 
remains for the claimant to prove damage and causation. 
The Supreme Court has confirmed that anticompetitive behavior already sanctioned by 
the competition authorities constitutes a fault, and that the victims of such behavior are 
                                                     
538 Doux Aliments v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine, Paris Court of Appeal, February 27, 2014 and  corrigendum June 
19, 2014.  
539 Damages Directive, Article 13.  
540 Damages Directive, Article 14.  
541 Bottin Cartographes v. Google, Paris Commercial Court, January 31, 2012. Nevertheless, on  appeal of 
the present case, the Paris Court of Appeal ordered the NCA  to issue an opinion on the existence of the 
infringements to competition law (Paris Court of Appeal, November 20, 2013).  
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entitled to claim damages.542 This position was recently followed by courts.543 
While Regulation no. 1/2003 explicitly provides that European Commission decisions 
are binding on national courts,544 no legislation provides so for the NCA’s. These do, 
however, have a very high probative value. It could be assumed that decisions of other 
national competition authorities would also have high probative value. This has yet to be 
tested before the French courts, however. In this respect, it is also important to note that, to 
ensure consistency, a judge may decide to stay the proceedings until the NCA has adopted 
a decision on the alleged anti- competitive practices at stake that has final authority. 
French judges most frequently take this option.545 
Fines imposed by the NCA are not taken into account by the courts in assessing 
damages.  However, Article L464-2 of the Commercial Code states that the amount of 
fines imposed by the Competition Authority must take into account, inter alia, the 
“damage to the economy”.  If this damage has been calculated in detail – with the 
assistance of the economic team of the NCA – the decision may provide elements that may 
be useful for claimants in private actions. 
Finally, French civil law generally provides that one may claim damages from any of 
the authors of the damage suffered.546  The latter are jointly and severally liable for the 
damage suffered.  Where several defendants are held severally liable for anticompetitive 
behavior, the victim will therefore be able to recover the full amount of damages from any 
one of the offenders.  In this case, the defendant or defendants who have paid the award 
retain a right of action for contribution against the other defendants.  The court determines 
the amount of each defendant’s contribution based, in particular, on the degree of 
                                                     
542 Lectiel v. France Télécom, Supreme Court, March 23, 2010.  
543 Switch v. SNCF, Paris Commercial Court, April 26, 2013; Sté JCB Service, Paris Court of  Appeal, June 
26, 2013.  
544 Article 16(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the  implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,  OJ L 1, January 4, 2003, pp. 1–25.  
545 For example, Digicel v. Orange Caraïbes and France Telecom, Paris Commercial Court, May 11, 2012; 
1plusV v. Google, Paris Commercial Court, June 7, 2012; Fédération régionale des syndicats 
d’exploitants agricoles de la Région Bretagne v. Compagnie Financière et de participations Roullier and 
Timab Industries, Rennes Court of First Instance, October 17, 2013, following the Commission decision 
in the Animal Feed Phosphates cartel. 
546 Supreme Court, 11 July 1892; Conflicts Tribunal, February 14, 2000.  
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seriousness of the fault committed by each, namely, the level of their respective 
participation in the anticompetitive practice. 
 Class actions in France d.
Before the Hamon Law of March 17, 2014 was enacted, three types of consumers 
actions enabled consumers who were victims of anticompetitive practices to claim 
damages.  However, consumers faced significant obstacles to bring such legal actions 
since they were subject to strict procedural conditions and consumer associations were 
banned from publicizing their claims in order to gather claimants.  
Following the enactment of the Hamon Law, the new Article L423-1 of the Consumer 
Code provides for a French consumer class action described as an “opt-in with publicity” 
procedure.  In this respect, an authorized association – out of the 15 currently approved by 
the government – can bring actions on behalf of a group of individuals who have suffered 
material harm under a contract or following anticompetitive behavior.  One of the main 
features of the scope of this class action is certainly the monopoly of authorized 
associations to bring actions. In addition, the class action is available only for physical 
consumers, excluding businesses and professionals and the compensation is limited to 
material harm, not corporal or moral damages.  The class action involves a three-step 
procedure. First, the action is brought before a court of first instance, which will decide the 
matter on the basis of individual cases – at least two – presented by the association and 
will issue a single judgment, referred to as a declaratory judgment on liability.  Second, 
consumers may join the class after publication of the judgment. Third, consumers who 
joined the class may request for compensation according to the conditions of 
indemnification specified in the declaratory judgment on liability, which can provide either 
for direct payment by the business to the members of the class or indirect payment through 
the association or the person assisting the association. 
Article L423-10 of the Consumer Code also provides for a simplified procedure 
consisting in an “opt-in system with individual publicity”: when affected consumers are 
identified547 and have suffered similar harm, it will be possible to inform them by an 
individual letter, including a response slip. Subject to its implementation in practice, this 
system is expected to be as efficient as an ‘opt-out’ system. 
                                                     
547 For instance, clients of a gas or telephone service provider. 
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Finally, regarding claims for damages originating from undertakings, in January 2012, 
the Paris Commercial Court was seized of the validity of a collective action financing 
system implemented by an Irish company named CFI.  CFI brought claims against some 
of the members of a freight cargo cartel, and these companies tried to challenge the 
validity of the CFI system, in particular the creation of a damage claims vehicle (a French 
company called Equilib), before the French courts.  The Paris Commercial Court stated 
that the action was not admissible without going into the merits, since an action had 
already been brought before the Dutch courts. 
 Future developments and outlook. e.
The Damages Directive is now into force after it has been approved by the Council of 
the European Union.  Owing to the need to implement the Directive within two years, 
substantial changes of the current French regime relating to individual claims are to be 
expected. 
Regarding the impact of additional cost due to the rebuttable presumption that a cartel 
causes harm, the rules related to the passing-on defence would require a change as to 
ensure compliance with the principles laid down in the above-mentioned Directive. Indeed, 
although both the current regime and the Directive are based on the same presumption that 
an overcharge levied on a direct purchaser was passed on to an indirect purchaser, French 
case law requires the claimant to prove that no passing-on has occurred, whereas the 
Directive differentiates the rules depending on the claimant: if the plaintiff is the direct 
purchaser, it is on the defendant to prove that the overcharge has been passed on to the end 
customers, but if the claimant is the indirect purchaser, the burden of proof lies on him or 
her to demonstrate that additional cost has been passed on to him or her. In the second 
assumption, he or she can benefit from a rebuttable presumption in certain conditions. 
Concerning the effect of final national decisions, the principle whereby a decision of 
the Competition Authority does not bind the courts would be in contradiction with the 
provisions of the Directive, which indicate that when a national court hears an action for 
damages, the final decision of the competition authority of the same Member State or its 
courts of appeal establishes conclusively the infringement of competition law, while before 
the courts of another Member State, such a decision must be presented and constitute at 
least prima facie case of infringement.  Therefore, the final decision of the Competition 
Authority shall constitute the irrefutable proof of the fault before French courts. 
With regard to the limitation period of five years, the current rules would necessitate 
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clarification in two ways to be entirely compliant with the Damages Directive: (1) 
specifying the date of the starting point, which shall run from the date of knowledge of the 
infringement and the identity of its author and the resulting harm but shall not begin before 
the infringement has actually ceased; 548  and (2) creating a suspension mechanism 
complying with the rule according to which the limitation period shall be suspended or 
interrupted by the initiation of proceedings by a competition authority and is resumed only 
after a minimum period of one year following the final decision or termination of the 
procedure.549 
6. Spain 
Although Spain adopted competition legislation already in 1963,550 in reality there was 
no private enforcement action while it was in force.  The 1963 Act on Repression of 
Anticompetitive Practices created a specialized jurisdiction for the enforcement of its rules, 
making provision also for strong government intervention in any potential enforcement 
action.  Follow-on actions were the only actions permitted.  Victims of anticompetitive 
violations could only bring a claim in court when a decision by the Competition Defence 
Tribunal was considered to be definitive.  However, as no relevant public enforcement 
took place while the legislation was in force, there were no private claims filed before the 
civil courts.  Competition law enforcement only started in Spain when in 1985 the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty rules on competition became directly 
applicable in Spain and a new Competition act was adopted in 1989.551 
Yet, until 2007, private enforcement of domestic competition law was only possible as 
a follow-on action, whereas stand-alone actions for damages were not feasible.  This 
represented a significant obstacle and delay in any claim for damages by private parties.  
Some of the first few successful competition damages claims based on domestic law 
reported were actually based in the 1991 Unfair Competition Act, condemning as an unfair 
                                                     
548 Article 10.2 of the Damages Directive on limitation periods.  
549 Article 10.4 of the Damages Directive on limitation periods.  
550 Ley de Represión de Pràcticas Restrictivas de la Competencia, Law no. 110/63 of July 20, 1963. 
551 Law no. 16/1989 of July 17, 1989. 
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act any business conduct in breach of market legal rules.552  Unfair competition claims 
were used as a channel to claim damages for anticompetitive business behavior, either as a 
sole legal basis or supplementary to a claim based on a competition law violations which 
would allow for cease and desist orders. 
At the same time, although private enforcement of the EEC Treaty competition 
prohibitions should have been available because of their direct effect, a half-hearted 
decision by the Spanish Supreme Court in 1993 (CAMPSA case)553 kept private suits based 
on European competition rules out of the Courts. This jurisdictional bar against claims 
based on competition grounds was later confirmed by other Supreme Court judgments,554 
but in a 2000 ruling the Supreme Court unquestionably affirmed civil jurisdiction in these 
cases (DISA Case).555 
                                                     
552 Law no. 3/1991 of January 10, 1991.  For early commentaries on this alternative, see Fernàndez López J. 
M., Aplicación jurisdiccional de los artículos 85 y 86 TCE y de las normas internas de Comeptencia, 
Anuario de la Competencia 1997, pp. 227-228 and Fernàndez López J. M., La aplicación jurisdiccional 
de la legislación interna y comunitaria sobre competencia en la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera del 
Tribunal Supremo. Situación actual y perspectivas de future, Anuario de la Competencia 2000, p. 131 
and 142-143. 
553 Supreme Court Judgment of December 30, 1993, Isidoro R.S.A. et al. v. CAMPSA, RJ\1993\9902 (abuse 
of dominant position by the main Spanish oil retailer who allegedly overcharged fishing firms, and the 
Supreme Court rejected the claim arguing that it was not empowered to apply the EEC Treaty 
competition prohibitions nor the 1963 Spanish Act of Repression of Anticompetitive Practices). On this 
case, see Fernàndez López J. M., Anuario de la Competencia 1997, pages 233-236 and Anuario de la 
Competencia 2000, pages 134-136; Petitbò A. and Berenguer L., La aplicación del Derecho de la 
competencia por órganos jurisdiccionales y administrativos, Anuario de la Competencia 1998, pp. 41-45 
and Moreno-Tapia I. & Fernández C., La judicialización del Derecho comunitario de la Competencia, 
Anuario de la Competencia 2001, pp. 193-195. 
554 See Supreme Court Judgment (Civil Ch.) of November 4, 1999, United International Pictures y Cia. v. 
Salsas Hermanos, RJ\1999\8001 (annulling the Barcelona Provincial Court of October 19, 1994 which 
had declared null and void the contract between United international Pictures and Salsas Hermanos, 
which had successfully used the domestic equivalent to article 101 TFEU as a shield in the contract and 
damages claim filed by UIP) and November 30, 1999 (Catalonia Motor v. Nissan Motor Ibérica, 
RJ1999\8439). 
555 See Supreme Court Judgment of June 2, 2000, José Carlos C.C. v. DISA & Prodalca (RJ2000\5092). See 
also Supreme Court Judgments of March 2, 2001, Autolugo v. Mercedes Benz (RJ 2001\2616) and of 
March 15, 2001, Gabai v. Petronor (RJ\2001\5980). 
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After EU Regulation 1/20003, 556  national courts “shall have the power to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (article 6) and a copy of any such judgments should be sent by 
Member States to the European Commission (article 15.2) 
At present, under Spanish law, claims for damages find their legal basis in Article 1902 
of the Código Civil.  The provision, which regulates liability in tort, established that any 
individual causing damage, either by act of commission or negligence, shall repair the 
damage caused.  The Article shall be read in conjunction with the second additional 
provision of the national competition law, the Ley de defensa del a competencia,557 which 
modified the law on civil procedure558 in order to facilitate the brining of damages claims 
for violation of Article 1 and 2 of the Ley,559 the substantive equivalents of Article 101 and 
102 TFEU. 
In this respect, it is the general regime of tort law that applies.  Therefore, in addition 
to the actual loss suffered, the claimant will also be able to claim for lost profits, as well as 
interest. 
Recently, antitrust litigation in Spain has largely focused on contractual disputes (often 
in the petrol station sector) in which parties invoke EU or Spanish competition rules to 
combat contractual breach arguments or, occasionally, to directly request a declaration 
from the courts invalidating the restrictive contractual clause. Claims of compensatory 
damages often accompany disputes on contractual issues. The following sections present 
an overview of the most emblematic judgments rendered in the past few years. 
                                                     
556  Council Regulation (EC) nº 1/2003 of December 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1–25). 
557 Law no. 15/2007 of July 3, 2007. 
558 Ley de enjuiciamento civil, Law no. 1/2000 of January 7, 2000. 
559 It is worth noting that the new regime came into force with the latest version of the Ley de defensa de la 
competencia.  Although the previous version (Law no. 16/1989, which expired on September 1, 2007 
with the entry into force of the new legislation) contained a specific provision on claims for damages.  
This provision, namely, Article 13(2) was ineffective.  In fact, Article 13(2) did not facilitate access to 
damages but, on the contrary, made such access disproportionately difficult and time-consuming by 
making civil damages claims contingent on the prior exhaustion of all judicial remedies available in 
relation to administrative acts. 
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 Recent case law developments a.
On March 29, 2012, the Supreme Court rendered the judgment in the Sogecable and 
Audiovisual Sport/Tenaria case.  The court held that the termination of a contract by an 
undertaking with a dominant position due to a partial breach by the other party was 
considered an abuse, despite Spanish law expressly allowing a party to terminate a contract 
if the other party fails to comply with its terms. 
On May 9, 2011, the Supreme Court in the Gobergas/Repsol Comercial case held that  
when applying EU or Spanish competition rules, Spanish civil courts should protect 
private interests without taking into account public interest goals.  This entails that civil 
courts may choose not to declare the nullity of anticompetitive agreements in cases where 
the party invoking competition rules acts in bad faith (e.g., when it has long benefited from 
the anticompetitive agreement and uses antitrust rules as an excuse for walking away from 
its contractual obligations).560 
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court clarified that the civil nullity of anticompetitive 
agreements should be invoked by the interested party, and not declared ex officio by the 
civil courts in case Costa de la Luz/Repsol Comercial. 
With respect to judgments rendered by Spanish civil courts, the Audience of Madrid 
rendered a judgment on October 3, 2011 in case Nestlé España et al./Ebro Puleva holding 
that compensatory damages were denied to the plaintiff against the sugar manufacturer that, 
according to a previous decision by the NCA, had participated in a cartel.  The Audience 
admitted the passing-on defence for Ebro only on the basis that it had been proven that 
Nestlé increased its prices.  The reasoning followed by the court states that denying this 
line of defence would entail an unfair enrichment for those companies allegedly harmed by 
a particular behavior contrary to competition rules. 
The Audience of Barcelona, clarified in an order on February 16, 2012 in case 
Televisión Autonómica Valenciana/Mediaproducción that decisions issued by the NCA did 
not bind Spanish courts.  However when assessing whether to grant interim measures, and 
particularly in what regards the fumus bonus iuris, the conclusions reached in the 
administrative proceeding shall be considered as a very relevant element.  
                                                     
560 See also judgment of March 26, 2012 by the Audience of Madrid (Rani/Repsol Comercial), judgment of 
June 16, 2011 by the Audience of León (Ms Teresa/Grupo Indes Edades) and judgment of November 4, 
2011 by the Audience of Guadalajara (Yves Rocher/Ms Martínez). 
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The Audience of Madrid, in the judgment of November 25, 2011 in case Takata 
Petri/Dalphi Metal, held that directors can refuse to provide information requested by a 
shareholder – even if the shareholder has the right to request such information under 
national law – when this exchange of information may represent an infringement of 
European competition law (for example, when the information refers to the cost structure). 
 Legislative framework  b.
Spanish Commercial courts are specialized civil courts that are directly entrusted with 
the application of competition rules, both national561 and EU562. 
Therefore direct antitrust claims (whether or not seeking damages), under which a 
plaintiff seeks a declaration that a contractual clause or a commercial conduct is null for 
being contrary to competition rules, should be filed before these courts. 
The situation may be different for indirect antitrust claims, when a defendant invokes 
competition rules to oppose a plaintiff’s request (e.g., honouring of a contractual 
obligation).  In this scenario, the competent court will typically be an ordinary civil court 
rather than a commercial court.  Practice by the judiciary shows that the ordinary civil 
courts tend not to reject these indirect antitrust claims (due to a possible lack of 
jurisdiction), but rather take into account the relevant competition law for ruling on the 
case.563 
Practice by the judiciary also shows that follow-on actions may be lodged before the 
ordinary civil courts, since they are limited to seeking damages (and do not extend to the 
interpretation and application of competition rules), and are therefore not distinct from any 
other civil compensatory claim.564 
                                                     
561 As per the first additional provision of the Spanish Competition Act. 
562 As per Article 86-ter 2(f) of the Judiciary Act. 
563 An important exception applies: ordinary civil courts must reject the defendant’s antitrust argument when 
this amounts to a genuine counterclaim or reconvención (i.e., a separate claim lodged against the original 
plaintiff). According to Article 406 of the Civil Procedure Act, a civil court may not accept a 
counterclaim when it lacks jurisdiction on the main claim. In such a case, the counterclaim amounts to a 
direct antitrust claim and should be filed with a commercial court. 
564 Nonetheless, commercial courts remain fully competent to hear follow-on cases. See judgment of January 
20, 2011 by Commercial Court No. 2 of Barcelona in Centrica Energía/ENDESA Distribución Eléctrica. 
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Direct antitrust claims may be based upon EU law565 if trade between EU Member 
States is affected by the agreement or practice, or upon Spanish competition law. 566   
Invalidation of anticompetitive agreements or conduct may be based on the competition 
rules themselves 567  or on the Spanish Civil Code. 568   Regarding the economic 
consequences of an antitrust breach, two scenarios may be differentiated.  In cases of 
contracts contravening competition rules – and hence being null and void – parties should 
reciprocally restore their economic contributions under Article 1303 of the Civil Code, 
with the important limitation contained in Article 1306 (turpis causa and prohibition of 
unjust enrichment).  Whereas, Article 1902 of the Civil Code is the general legal basis for 
claiming damages under Spanish law (‘any person who by action or omission causes 
damage to another by fault or negligence is obliged to repair the damage caused’) and is 
generally invoked for claiming compensatory damages caused by an antitrust infringement, 
either under a follow-on action or otherwise. 
Finally, a violation of the antitrust rules could in certain circumstances be regarded as 
an unfair commercial practice caught by Article 15 of the Unfair Competition Act and in 
such a case, Article 18 thereof provides an autonomous legal basis for claiming damages 
before civil courts. 
With respect to limitations periods under Spanish law, a claim for invalidation of a 
contract (e.g., for breach of antitrust rules) is limited to four years under Article 1301 of 
the Civil Code.  Claims for damages are limited to one year569 from the day the plaintiff 
was aware of the damage.  Under well-settled case law, in a case of damage caused by 
continuous or successive illegal acts, the one-year limitation period only begins when the 
harm is definitely caused. In follow-on actions, the date of the decision by the Competition 
Authority declaring the antitrust infringement does not normally coincide with the moment 
                                                     
565 Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 
566 Article 1 and 2 of the Spanish Competition Act. 
567 Article 101(2) of the TFEU or Article 1(2) of the Spanish Competition Act. 
568 Article 6(3). 
569 Article 1968 of the Spanish Civil Code. 
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in which the plaintiff was aware of the harm. The one-year period is interrupted by any 
claim (judicial or extrajudicial) made by the harmed person.570 
Furthermore, under Spanish tort law, standing to bring a damages claim lies with the 
party that has suffered the damage or, in the case of consumers, consumers’ associations 
that are mandated to protect their interests.  Also, if one party contributing to any damage 
has compensated the victim in full, it has standing to start proceedings against the other 
contributing parties to recover the part of the damages that has been paid on their behalf.  
Regarding standing as a defendant, actions for damages should be brought against the 
individual or company participating in the damage. Indirect purchasers that have suffered 
damages as a result of anticompetitive behavior (such as a cartel in an upstream market) 
are also entitled to claim damages.  There is always a possibility that in these cases, the 
plaintiff may have to jointly sue both the seller and the seller’s supplier. 
Discovery mechanisms in Spain are rather limited and they are generally only available 
to the parties once judicial proceedings have already started. The Civil Procedure Law 
does not include any mechanism for pretrial discovery.571 
Discovery may be mainly channeled through Article 328 of the Civil Procedure Law, 
which provides that a party to the proceedings may request that the other party submit to 
the court documents that are not –  and cannot be – available to it (such as the defendant’s 
internal documents) and are related to the object of the proceedings and of evidentiary 
importance. These petitions for disclosure normally affect only the parties to the 
proceedings, but the court may also require a third party to produce documentary evidence 
                                                     
570 Article 1973 of the Spanish Civil Code. 
571 Although the Civil Procedure Law provides for certain mechanisms that can be used by the future plaintiff 
to obtain information from the defendant, or even secure the future production of evidence, these 
mechanisms would have a very limited application in competition law claims. Under Article 256 of the 
Civil Procedure Law a future plaintiff may ask the court to order a number of measures aimed at 
obtaining information that is necessary to prepare the claim. However, the law establishes very limited 
types of information that can be obtained (basically data on the legal standing and capacity of the 
defendant, production of the elements on which the procedure is going to decide, production of certain 
documents such as wills, annual accounts, insurance policies, medical records or IP rights). 
 Article 297 of the Civil Procedure Law also foresees measures for securing the future production of 
evidence. This instrument could in theory be helpful to identify documents that can be part of the claim 
and whose production can be asked under Article 328 of the Civil Procedure Law. However, and from a 
practical perspective, these measures will usually not entail the production of documents for preparing the 
claim. 
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if it is deemed fundamental for the final decision.572  Unjustified failure to produce the 
evidence requested will lead the court to take its decision on the basis of the evidence 
available, including possible non-authenticated copies or a description of the contents of 
the requested document, submitted by the party interested in the disclosure. In these cases, 
the court is also empowered to issue a formal request to the party in default if the 
circumstances dictate. Under this instrument, the court may order one party to submit 
documents related to administrative proceedings, including leniency applications.573 
The plaintiff may also try to obtain documents under Article 328 of the Civil Procedure 
Law by seeking interim protection from the court – even before submitting the claim. 
However, the approval of these measures by the courts requires the plaintiff to show that 
the arguments for the potential claim are, prima facie, well founded, and that there is some 
urgency in the need to obtain the documents.  The courts will normally refuse to grant 
interim protection aimed at allowing the plaintiff to have access to the information 
necessary for preparing the substantive part of its claim. 
Under Spanish tort law, compensation in a damages case will only cover the damages 
that the plaintiff is able to prove in court. From this perspective, the courts have no 
discretion on granting damages. For this reason, expert reports quantifying the economic 
value of the damages are particularly important, as shown by recent judicial practice.574 
Expert reports are generally permitted before civil courts under Article 299 of the Civil 
Procedure Law. In a claim for damages (either via direct antitrust claims or followon 
actions), the plaintiff must produce a written expert report and attach it to the claim (or to 
the response in the case of the defendant). The plaintiff may also ask the court to appoint 
an independent expert under Article 335 of the Civil Procedure Law.  
Article 25(c) of the Competition Act empowers the Spanish Competition Authority to 
assist courts in determining the basis of the indemnification due to the harmed party. 
                                                     
572 See Article 330 of the Civil Procedure Law 
573 The limits imposed in Article 15-bis of the Civil Procedure Law to the submission of leniency documents 
only affect the competition authorities, and not the private parties that prepared and submitted those 
documents (see infra). 
574 See CENTRICA case Energía/Endesa Distribución Eléctrica, cit., which illustrates the importance of the 
expert reports. 
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 Class Actions c.
The Civil Procedure Law states that there are different ways in which several parties 
may submit a collective action.  
The simplest collective action would be the consolidation of the claims of different 
plaintiffs, provided that there is a link between all the actions due to the same object or the 
same petition.575  To this effect, the court would presume that such link exists when the 
actions are based on the same facts. 
Moreover, although there are no class actions as such under Spanish law, Article 11 of 
the Civil Procedure Law includes some provisions in relation to collective legal standing in 
cases involving only the defence of the interests of ‘consumers and final users’. 576   
Consumers’ associations can protect not only the interests of their associates but also the 
general interests of all consumers and final users.  This could be applicable to antitrust 
cases, particularly those involving the declaration of antitrust infringements or 
injunctions. 577   When a consumers’ association initiates a collective action under 
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 11, the admission of the claim will be made public.578 
Collective actions in defence of the interest of consumers and end users can be of two 
types, depending on the degree of certainty regarding the identification of the consumers 
or users affected by the claim. 
First, in the event that a particular group of identifiable consumers or users is harmed 
by specific anticompetitive behavior, the locus standi for defending the interests of that 
group would fall with consumers’ associations and the groups of affected consumers.579  
Here, consumers or users whose interests may be affected must be informed by the 
                                                     
575 See Articles 12 and 72 of the Civil Procedure Law. 
576 To this effect, the definition of ‘consumers and final users’ is broad, including any individual or company 
that acquires, employs or enjoys, as final user, moveable and immoveable goods, products, services, 
activities or functions that are manufactured, provided, supplied or delivered by any private or public 
entity. 
577 Article 11(1) of the Civil Procedure Law. 
578 Article 15 of the Civil Procedure Law expressly foresees the publication of the admission of the claim in 
the media. 
579 Article 11(2) of the Civil Procedure Law. 
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plaintiff so that all potentially affected consumers may intervene in the civil proceedings at 
any time (i.e., opt-in clause). 
Second, if anticompetitive behavior damages the interests of a group of consumers or 
users that cannot be easily identified, the only entities with the capacity to represent those 
interests in court would be the consumers’ associations that are ‘widely representative’.580 
For this purpose, the courts will acknowledge that a consumer association is ‘widely 
representative’ if it is part of the Consumers and Users Council.581  Here, publication 
would be considered sufficient for all the interested consumers to identify themselves. The 
law provides a two-month term after which the proceedings will be resumed. Affected 
consumers or users who do not identify themselves before the court within that term will 
not be able to join the action, notwithstanding the possibility of benefiting from the final 
outcome of the case. In such case the judgment will be binding on all affected consumers 
and users, not only on those that have appeared in the proceedings. 
 Quantification of damages d.
Spanish tort law has a purely compensatory nature. Any party causing harm to another 
party (materially or emotionally) must redress the affected party so as to restore the 
situation to what it was prior to causing the harm.582 Therefore, damages awarded by the 
Spanish courts are monetary sums equivalent to the harm caused to the plaintiff.  Other 
kinds of damages, such as punitive or exemplary damages, are quite obviously alien to the 
Spanish legal system.583 
The Spanish courts have acknowledged the possibility of claiming two kinds of 
damages: economic or material damages, including all the damages affecting the assets 
and estate of a person or company, and non-economic damages, including damages that 
affect the emotional well-being of a person. 
                                                     
580 Article 11(3) of the Civil Procedure Law. 
581 See Article 24 of the Royal Legislative-Decree 1/2007 of November 16, 2007. 
582 This rule applies even in the case of damages arising from criminal offences (civil liability ex delicto). 
583 Compensable damage must be certain (not merely potential or hypothetical), although it can occur in the 
future. 
194 
Material damages are calculated as the financial or economic equivalent of the loss 
caused to the plaintiff. In this regard, the Spanish courts require the damage to be real and 
certain.584 Following the provision for contractual damages of Article 1106 of the Civil 
Code, and in line with the idea of complete compensation, case law has differentiated 
between two kinds of material damages:585 damnum emergens (i.e., the cost of repairing 
the damages, including not only the damage itself but all the expenses reasonably 
necessary for such reparation) and lucrum cessans (i.e., the loss of profit resulting from the 
behavior of the defendant). In both cases, the courts only grant damages under either of the 
two categories if the harm to the plaintiff’s interests is certain and can be demonstrated. In 
this regard, actual damage is considerably easier to prove than the loss of profit. 
Non-economic damages are more difficult to measure and value and, therefore, are 
more difficult to redress. Although in principle an antitrust offence would only entail 
material damages, moral damages cannot be excluded. Thus, any psychological stress 
caused by anticompetitive conduct or harm to the plaintiff’s reputation or good name may 
be included in the claim. 
In terms of legal fees and costs, the general principle under Spanish law is that 
litigation costs are paid by the losing party, unless the court finds that the case raises 
serious legal or factual doubts in view of the circumstances and the case law.586  If the 
claim is partially rejected, each party will bear its own costs and the common costs will be 
shared equally. In addition, there is a limit to the costs that the losing party must bear: one-
third of the value of the action.587  These limits do not apply if the court finds that the 
claimant (or the counterclaimant, as appropriate) has acted recklessly. 
In principle, Spanish tort law does not contain an express provision regarding the 
possibility of a defendant arguing that the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff have 
been transferred to a third party. This situation is especially relevant in competition law 
cases where a distributor sues its supplier for damages and the supplier may reply that no 
                                                     
584 See, inter alia, judgments of the Supreme Court of November 16, 2009 or of February 25, 2009. 
585 See, for instance, judgment of the Supreme Court of October 3, 1997. 
586 See Article 394 of the Civil Procedure Law. 
587 See Article 394(3) of the Civil Procedure Law. 
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damages have been suffered by the plaintiff insofar as they have been passed on to the 
plaintiff’s customers. 
Although this defence has only been discussed by Spanish courts in few cases,588 it 
seems that they should take it into account in examining a defendant’s position.  Spanish 
tort law provides that compensation must be equivalent to the damages effectively suffered 
by the claimant. It follows that damages subject to compensation must be reduced with the 
profit or advantage that the harmed person has gained through the actions causing the harm 
(compensatio lucri cum damno).589  
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588 See judgment of February 20, 2009 by Civil Court No. 11 of Valladolid in Gullón et al./Acor; judgment 
by the Audiencia Provincial de Madrid of 9 October 2009 in Nestlé España et el./Acor; and the recent 
judgment of the Audience of Madrid of 3 October 2011 (Nestlé España et al./ Ebro Puleva, SA) already 
cited. 
589 See judgments of the Supreme Court of May 8, 2008 and of December 15, 1981. 
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CHAPTER V  
 
THE NEW DIRECTIVE ON ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS 
On April 17, 2014 the European Parliament voted to adopt, at first reading, the proposed 
Directive and rules governing actions for damages for infringement of competition law.  
This was the culmination of expensive but the suppression and negotiations involving the 
Commission, European Council and European Parliament following the publication of the 
original proposed text in June 2013.  The new measures seek to ensure “a more level 
playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market […] and to improve the 
conditions for consumers to exercise the rights they derive from the internal market […] 
and to reduce the differences between the member states after the national rules governing 
actions for damages [for competition law infringements].”590  This is the first time the 
European Parliament has been involved in legislation on enforcing EU competition rules.  
On November 10, 2014, the European Council formally adopted the Commission's 
proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions (“EU Damages Directive”). 591   
Because the Directive touches on issues of harmonization in the internal market, the EU 
Parliament and Council adopted it under the ordinary legislative procedure.  It was 
officially signed into law on November 26, 2014 and published in the EU Official Journal 
on December 5, 2014.  The EU countries will have to implement the new EU Directive 
into their national legal systems by December 27, 2016.  The EU Damages Directive was a 
laudable but very ambitious aim given the mixture of common and civil law systems in the 
28 EU member states and the differing levels of private enforcement to date.  This chapter 
considers the key changes introduced by the EU Damages Directive and the impact that it 
is like to have an antitrust homages actions across EU Member States (once it is finally 
implemented by 2016) highlighting the key issues.  It should be noted that at the outset that 
the EU Damages Directive does not deal with every aspect of antitrust damages actions.  
In particular, it does not deal with the question of jurisdiction, the possibility of claimants 
                                                     
590 Recital 9 of the EU Damages Directive. 
591 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ 2014 L 349, p. 
1–19. 
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joining together to bring paint collective antitrust action, and crucial practical issues as 
litigation costs and funding. 
1. Disclosure 
i. Introduction of an EU-wide litigation disclosure mechanism 
The scope of national laws on disclosure has been a key factor in the popularity of certain 
jurisdictions (such as the UK) with claimants seeking to bring damages actions for 
infringements of competition law.  This is because antitrust litigation is often characterized 
by information asymmetry, and the extent to which the claimant can require disclosure of 
relevant documents from a defendant will often be crucial to successfully establishing 
liability (in standalone action), causation and quantum (in both follow-on and standalone 
actions).  The EU Damages Directive seeks to impose minimum disclosure requirements 
which will apply in national courts of all the EU Member States, effectively introducing an 
EU wide litigation disclosure mechanism. Article 5(1) of the EU Damages Directive 
provides that national courts must have the power to order both defendants and third 
parties to disclose relevant evidence which lies in their control, provided that the claimant 
has presented a reasoned justification containing reasonably available facts and evidence 
sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for damages.  In order to ensure equality 
of arms, courts must also have the similar powers to require claimants to disclose relevant 
evidence in the control of defendants. 
This will be a significant change for many jurisdictions. Even for those jurisdictions which 
already have extensive pre-trial disclosure, such as the UK, the provisions of article 5(1) 
may require changes to be made to existing procedural rules.  For instance, in the UK the 
existing Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) require that applications for third party disclosure 
must be supported by evidence – it is unclear whether the requirement in the EU Damages 
Directive that applications for third party disclosure must be made on the basis of 
“reasonably available facts” imports a new (lower) threshold.  National courts must also 
be able to order disclosure of either specified pieces of evidence or relevant pieces of 
evidence, in recognition of the fact that it will not always be possible for claimant to know 
in advance precisely which relevant documents the defendant has in his control.  However, 
where disclosure of relevant categories of evidence is ordered, these must be 
circumscribed as precisely and as narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably available 
facts set out in the reasoned justification.  Legal privilege must also be respected, and 
disclosure can only be ordered of documents in the control of the defendant/third party 
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from whom they are requested. In this way, the EU Damages Directive seek to strike a 
balance between recognizing the information asymmetry which can cause difficulties for 
claimants, and protective defendants against very wide and vague disclosure requests. 
Disclosure of evidence under Article 5 must also be proportionate. I n deciding whether 
this is the case, national courts must consider the legitimate interest of all parties 
concerned, including third parties.  In particular, Article 5(3) requires that they must 
consider the extent to which the claim or defense is supported by available facts and 
evidence justifying the request to disclose evidence.  The scope and the cost of disclosure, 
especially for any third parties concerned, also to prevent non-specific search of 
information which is unlikely to be of relevance for the parties in the procedure should 
also be considered.  Finally whether the evidence to be disclosed contains confidential 
information, especially concerning any third parties, and the arrangements for protecting 
such confidential information shall be taken into consideration.  Article 5(4) also expressly 
states that the interest of undertakings to avoid actions for damages following an 
infringement of competition law shall not constitute an interest that warrants protection.  
With regard to the issue of confidentiality, the EU Damages Directive recognizes that will 
relevant evidence containing confidential information should in principle be available in 
antitrust homages actions, safeguards are needed to ensure that such information is 
appropriately protected. The recitals to the EU damages directive state that national courts 
should therefore have at their disposal a range of measures to protect such confidential 
information from being disclosed during proceedings.  These may include the possibility 
of redacting sensitive passages in documents, conducting hearings in camera, restricting 
the circle of persons entitled to see the evidence, and instructing experts to produce 
summaries of the information in an aggregated or otherwise non-confidential form. 
ii. Disclosure of information contained in a NCA file. 
Where relevant evidence is not within the control of the defendant but included in the file 
of a NCA, as a general rule the NCA may be required by national courts to disclose it 
under Article 6 of the EU Damages Directive, provided that it cannot be reasonably obtain 
from another party or a third party.  However, the new EU Directive provides that certain 
“blacklist” documents should benefit from absolute protection from disclosure, namely 
leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions.  This was a particularly 
controversial aspect of the EU Damages Directive, which was the subject of a considerable 
debate following the decisions of the ECJ in the Pfleiderer and the Donau Chemie cases. 
On one hand, documents such as corporate leniency statements and settlement submissions 
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are likely to include information which would be highly relevant and helpful to claimants; 
yet on the other hand, ordering the disclosure of such documents is likely to discourage 
those involved in anticompetitive conduct from applying for leniency or settlement, 
thereby undermining one of the key tools of public enforcement of competition law.  The 
ECJ had suggested that national courts should conduct a “balancing exercise” in each case, 
weighing up the competing interests at stake.  In the Donau Chemie it held that the 
balancing exercise should be carried out in all cases, on the grounds that “in competition 
law in particular, any rule that is rigid, either by providing for absolute refusal to grant 
access to the documents in question or for granting access to those documents as a matter 
of course, is liable to undermine the effective application of, inter alia, article 101 TFEU 
and the rights that the provision confers on individuals.”  At first sight, it appears difficult 
to reconcile these statements with the approach adopted in the EU Damages Directives.  
However, the ECJ stated that its judgment was made “in the absence of binding European 
competition law rules”; Article seeks of the EU Damages Directive introduces such 
binding European competition law rules, and therefore supersedes the approach previously 
advocated by the ECJ. 
Article 6 also provides for more limiter protection for a further set of “grey-list” 
documents such as other information prepared specifically for proceedings of a 
competition authority, information that the competition authority has drawn up and sent to 
parties in the course of proceedings, and settlements submissions that have been 
withdrawn. 
Such documents can only be ordered to be disclosed after the NCA has closed its 
proceedings by adopting a decision or otherwise.  When assessing the proportionality of 
disclosure of documents contained in a NCA file, national courts are also required by 
Article 6(4) to have regard to a number of additional factors.  Namely, whether the request 
has been formulated specifically with regard to the nature, object or content of documents 
submitted to a NCA or held in the file of such NCA, rather than by a non-specific 
application concerning documents submitted to NCA; whether disclosure is requested in 
relation to an action for damages before a national court; and the need to safeguard the 
effectiveness of public enforcement of competition law. 
In some cases, claimants may seek disclosure of evidence from defendants or third parties 
which they have obtained via access to file process.  However, the Draft Directive restricts 
the use of such evidence in a damages action to the person who obtained it or any 
successor or person who acquires his claim (Article 7(3)). 
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Furthermore, if leniency corporate statements submissions are obtained via the access to 
file process then there are to be deemed inadmissible in actions for damages or otherwise 
protected under applicable national rules, to ensure that the protections granted by Article 
6 cannot be circumvented.  A similar approach is taken for “grey-list” documents 
benefitting from the limited protection outlined above. 
Likely impact on antitrust damages actions 
The provisions of Article 5-7 of the EU Damages Directives will broaden the scope of 
disclosure available in antitrust damages in many EU Member States (although in some 
countries, such as the UK, they may have slightly restrictive effect insofar as the courts 
had previously demonstrated a willingness to disclose documents related to leniency 
applications in certain circumstances).  However, it is unlikely that the EU Damages 
Directive will result in complete harmonization of disclosure rules in all Member States: 
the EU Damages Directive only sets out the minimum requirements, and it will remain 
open to individual Member States to adopt wider disclosures rules.  It therefore seems 
likely that the scope of national disclosure rules will continue to be a key factor for 
claimants when deciding where to bring a claim (assuming there is a choice of jurisdiction 
available), and countries such as the UK will remain attractive to claimants due to wide 
disclosure rules. 
The absolute protection granted to leniency corporate statements and settlements 
submissions in Article 6 seems to spell the end for the Pfleiderer balancing exercise in 
respect of such documents, but national courts will still need to weigh up competing 
interests when assessing the proportionality of disclosure of other types of documents, 
such as those on the “grey list”.  In particular, the need to safeguard the effectiveness of 
public enforcement of competition law is expressly requires to be taken into account as 
part of the part of the proportionality assessment when disclosure is sought of any other 
documents on a NCA file. 
2. Effect of National Decisions 
Infringement findings by the Commission are already binding on national courts in 
competition damages actions pursuant to Article 16(1) Regulation no. 1/2003.  The EU 
Damages Directive proposed by Commission originally provided that infringement 
findings by a national NCA of an EU Member State were reluctant to accept that 
infringement findings by the NCAs of the EU Member States should be legally binding on 
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national courts outside that jurisdiction.  This was a particular concern in relation to less 
experiences NCAs. 
In the final text of the EU Damages Directive a compromise has been reached.  Article 9 
provides that infringement findings by a NCA in one Member State will be legally binding 
on national courts in damages actions brought in its own jurisdiction.  However, where the 
NCA decision is being relied upon before the court of another EU Member State, it will 
only constitute “at least prima facie evidence” that an infringement has occurred, rather 
than legally binding proof of liability.  The NCA decision will be assessed “along with any 
other material brought by the parties”.   
i. Likely impact on antitrust damages actions 
By ensuring that infringement findings by NCAs will constitute legally binding proof of 
liability in damages actions before national courts in the same EU Member State, Article 
9(1) of EU Damages Directive will help to establish a follow-on action regime in all EU 
Member States.  It seems likely that this will lead to an overall increase in the number of 
antitrust damages actions being brought in the EU (although in some jurisdictions, such as 
the UK, Article 9(1) will not result in any change to the existing approach). 
However, it is questionable how much weight will be given in practice by national courts 
to decisions by NCAs of other EU Member States.  The compromise position reached in 
Article 9 leaves national courts with a considerable degree of discretion, and it seems 
unlikely that a national court will accept an infringement decision of an NCA of another 
Member State as binding proof of liability without looking in detail at the facts and 
reaching its own conclusions on the issue of whether there has been an infringement. 
This is certainly likely to be the approach adopted by the UK courts, based on the approach 
taken to similar issues in other contexts.  For example, in the case of Ferrexpo v. Gilson 
Investment (a shareholder dispute) the High Court held that, whilst decisions of other 
courts could be relied upon by the claimants as admissible evidence, the High Court could 
not assess what weight should be properly attached to a decision of another court without 
going into the facts for itself.  It also noted that the difficulties in assessing the weight to be 
attached to the other decision were magnified if, as in the Ferrexpo case, the party relying 
upon the judgment of another court puts it forward without any information about how the 
argument before the other court proceeded. 
The impact of Article 9 of the EU Damages Directive on antitrust damages actions is 
therefore likely to be relatively limited compared to the impact in might have had if it had 
remained in its original form.  However, it will help to establish to follow-on action regime 
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in EU Member States where private enforcement is not that well-established at disclosure 
rules discussed above. 
3. Limitation Periods 
Limitation periods within which an antitrust damages action must be brought will remain a 
matter for national law, but Article 10 of the EU Damages Directive introduces minimum 
requirements which must be reflected in national laws of all EU Member States.  A 
minimum limitation period of five years will apply, which will not start to run until the 
infringement has ceased and the victim knows or can reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge of the behavior constituting the infringement, the qualification of such behavior 
as infringement, the fact that the infringer caused harm to him, and the identity of the 
infringer who caused such harm. 
In addition, the limitation period must be suspended during any investigation by the 
Commission or NCA, and must restart not earlier than one year after any infringement 
decision has become final or proceedings are otherwise terminated. 
Likely impact on antitrust damages actions 
These requirements are likely to lead to extremely long limitation periods in practice, and 
an increased risk for undertakings that antitrust damages actions could be brought many 
years after the infringement has ceased.  Moreover, if damages are awarded in respect of 
an infringement that occurred many years earlier, the interest payable on damages awarded 
could be very significant.  It is also notable that the new EU Directive does not define what 
is meant by an infringement decision becoming “final” in this context.  As illustrated by 
the UK experience, this can be a very important and controversial issue, as it can have a 
significant impact on whether a claim is deemed admissible or brought out of time.  In the 
UK, antitrust damages claims brought before the CAT must currently be brought within 
two years of the later of the cause of action arising; the expiry of any right to appeal 
against the infringement decision; or an infringement decision becoming “final”.  The UK 
courts have had to determine what is meant by “final” in this context in a number of cases, 
often resulting in appeals which have significantly delayed the substantive hearing of the 
case.  Questions may also arise as to whether an appeal against how the scope of a cartel 
has been defined in an infringement is not disputed (as seen in the recent challenge to the 
Commission’s decision in respect of the high-voltage cartel)   
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4. Joint and several liability  
Article 11 of the EU Damages Directive provides that, as a general rule, a person who has 
suffered harm as a result of a competition law infringement should be able to claim 
compensation for the entire harm suffered from any of infringers.  It therefore introduces 
the concept of joint and several liability in antitrust damages actions across all Member 
States. 
There will be a degree of protection for immunity recipients, who will only be liable to 
compensate their own direct and indirect purchasers, unless the other co-infringers are 
unable to compensate the remaining claimants.  However, in practice, this is likely to offer 
limited reassurance to those considering whether to apply for leniency, as there is still a 
risk that they could potentially be held liable for the entire harm caused by the 
infringement, and it is not clear on the face of the new EU Directive how or when it will be 
determined whether co-infringers are unable to compensate victims.  This could mean that 
immunity recipients have to wait a number of years to determine the extent of their 
liability.  It is also notable that this protection appears only to apply to immunity recipients, 
defined as those who have received “immunity” form fines through a leniency program, 
even though the underlying policy reasons for offering protection to immunity recipients 
would appear to also apply to those who receive a lesser reduction in fines. 
As for the SME exception, Article 11(2) of the new EU Directive provides that an SME 
will only be liable to its own direct and indirect purchasers and not to any other purchasers 
of the affected products, provided that its relevant market share was less than 5 per cent at 
any other purchasers of the affected products, provided rules could irretrievably jeopardize 
its economic viability and cause its assets to lose all their value; and the SME in question 
is not a coercer or a recidivist.  In practice, determining whether these conditions are met 
in a particular case is likely to be a complex (and costly) question, particularly given the 
lack of further guidance in the recitals. 
Likely impact on antitrust damages actions 
It seems unlikely that the rules on joint and several liability will have a significant impact 
on the number of antitrust damages action being brought in the EU, given its existence in 
jurisdictions such as the UK.  However, it will make it easier to bring a claim for the entire 
harm caused against the defendant with the deepest pockets across the EU, potentially 
reducing the needs for a claimant to “forum shop”. 
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For defendants, the possibility of seeking a contribution from co-infringements under 
relevant national laws remains, but this will of course involve further proceedings and the 
associated time and expense.  It is notable in this regard that Article 11(5) of the EU 
Damages Directive provides that where the infringement has caused harm to parties other 
than the direct or indirect purchaser of the infringing undertakings, the amount of 
contribution to be made by an immunity recipient “shall be determined in the light of its 
relative responsibility for that harm.”  This will require national courts to undertake 
extremely difficult and complex assessments, which will inevitably be both time-
consuming and expensive.  The experience of national courts in a particular jurisdiction in 
assessing contribution claims is becoming increasingly important to immunity applicants 
facing damages claims. 
The interplay between the provision on joint and several liability and those setting out the 
minimum limitation periods also raises some interesting questions.  Article 11(3) 
establishes that EU Member States must ensure that for cases where there is an immunity 
recipient who may benefit from protection from joint and several liability the limitation 
period shall be “reasonable and sufficient to allow injured parties to bring such actions” 
(i.e. to seek compensation from the co-infringers or the immunity recipient in the event 
that co-infringers prove unable to compensate the victims. 
5. Remedies 
i. General principles 
At the outset, Article 2 of the new EU Directive makes two very clear statements regarding 
the general principles that are to apply to the quantification of damages claims.  First, the 
EU Damages Directive establishes the principle of full compensation, that each Member 
State is to be obliged to ensure may be recovered by those who have suffered harm from 
competition infringements.  In this regard, full compensation “shall place a person who 
has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the 
infringement not been committed.”  As such, it will include compensation for actual loss 
and loss of profit, together with payment of interest.  This principle will be extremely 
important in many jurisdiction, where in a long-running cartel the claim for interest alone 
may equate to over half of the damages sought. Secondly, however, there is a clear 
limitation upon what such claims may not include. In this regard, the EU Damages 
Directive expressly excludes what is described as “over-compensation”.  Thus, this 
205 
remains a clear policy that distinguishes the EU approach from systems that employ 
“punitive” or multiple damages, such as those available under the US Clayton Antitrust 
Act. 
However, it is arguable that the exclusion goes too far in seeking to meet this policy 
objectives. The courts in England and Wales have already expressly limited application on 
extempore damages to cases where there has been no previous regulatory fine thus 
preventing double punishment in addition it would appear to rule out the application of 
awards for restitutionary damages or other measures seeking to return them unjust 
enrichment.  Such words are not strictly speaking loss-based measures, but are employed 
equitable remedies to ensure that unlawful profits are disgorged and repaid, often in 
circumstances where it may be difficult for the claimant to establish quantum and/or 
causation of loss on the ordinary measure.  It will be interesting to see whether the 
somewhat simplistic approach adopted in the EU Directive will be implemented so as to 
exclude such a remedy.  
ii. Passing-on defence 
 It was to be hoped that the somewhat sale debate as to whether or not the passing-on 
defence applied to EU antitrust actions would be laid to rest.  In some senses it has been, 
although the detail of Articles 12-16 of the EU Damages Directive begins to acknowledge 
how complex the issue will be to address in practice.   
First, the EU Member States are to ensure that the principle of compensation expressly 
permits those who have suffered harm at any level of the supply chain (i.e., even indirect 
purchasers) may claim that the compensation claim does not exceed the actual loss 
suffered at any particular level of the supply chain.  This approach is obviously consistent 
with the emphasis on compensatory damages, but then begs the question of how this 
division of action lost between different levels of the supply chain is to be proven and 
assessed.  To answer this question, the Commission looks at the usual solution employed 
to answer evidential conundrums: this solution must lie with the burden of proof.  
However, complexity is introduced in the form of varying presumptions in respect of the 
burden of proof to be applied to direct and indirect claims. In fact, in a direct claim, it is 
for the defendant to bear the burden of showing that the direct claimant passed on its losses 
(in the form of higher prices) to its own customers, and therefore that the claimant suffered 
no actual loss itself.  To assist the defendant in proving a matter of which it arguably 
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knows nothing about, a defendant seeking to raise this defense may reasonably require 
disclosure from the claimant and third parties.  In indirect claims, however, the burden lies 
upon the indirect claimant to show that the loss was passed on to it (by the direct 
purchaser), although again disclosure may reasonably be required of the defendant cartelist 
and other third parties (presumably the direct purchaser).  Yet, even here, the Commission 
has loaded the dice in favor of the claimant.  This is because the indirect purchaser shall 
henceforth be deemed to have proven that the overcharge was passed on in circumstances 
where the defendant has committed an infringement of competition; the infringement 
resulted in an overcharge for direct purchasers; and the indirect purchaser purchased the 
affects the goods or services from the direct purchaser (subject to the defendant being able 
to being able to credibly demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the overcharge 
was not in fact passed on). Perhaps recognizing the potential for complexity it has created, 
the Commission then indicates that national courts should be able to take into 
consideration various matters including competing actions arising at different levels of the 
supply chain in connection with the same infringement, judgment resulting from such 
actions and other information in the public domain.  National courts may be excused from 
thinking that such insights offered moderate assistance.  It is obvious that such issues will 
need to be taken into account; the difficulty will be how to assess and quantify the 
competing claims between them.  Article 16 of the EU Damages Directive proposes that 
clarity on this issue will be provided in the form of guidelines for national courts on how to 
estimate the share of the overcharge that was passed on to the indirect purchaser.  These 
guidelines have not yet been published, but are awaited with interest.  It will, perhaps, be 
more helpful if they are modest in terms of what basic to achieve, and have regard to the 
fact that national courts (which in some jurisdictions are used to calculating and 
apportioning damages between private parties in complex multijurisdictional disputes) 
may have more experience and insight to offer on this topic than the Commission, whose 
functions do not extend to such matters.  
6. Quantification of harm  
On the issue of quantification more generally, the Commission has demonstrated restraint.  
As such, Article 17 of the EU Damages Directive limits itself to setting out a number of 
very basic principles, clearly aimed at those jurisdictions where existing laws of national 
procedure make it difficult in practice to begin any form of antitrust claim.  Thus, EU 
Member States are to ensure that the standard of proof in the national jurisdiction does not 
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render it excessively difficult to exercise the right to damages and that judges are to be 
given the opportunity to estimate losses. Cartel infringements are to be presumed to cause 
harm (thus ensuring that a ground of action does not fail in some jurisdictions simply 
because the losses cannot be measured at the outset). However, the proposal to impose a 
rebuttable presumption of a certain level of overcharge has been abandoned.  Indeed, it had 
to be, given the clear priority placed upon the principle of compensation for actual loss as 
proven by the claimant, and the obvious inconsistency with that principle of any measure 
which awarded a sum on the basis of a presumption.  Finally, it is interesting that national 
competition authorities of the new member states are to be given the power to assist the 
national court, if so requested, on the issue of quantification of loss.  This raises important 
and interesting possibilities. It may be, for example, that in the course of the administrative 
procedure the regulator received a wide variety of confidential information on the facts of 
conduct upon price and volume of sales in the affected market.  This information may have 
been received from third parties and never fully disclosed to the cartel defendants or, most 
likely, the claimants.  The possibility of creating important asymmetry of information in 
this regard is obvious, as is the scope for unfairness should a court seek to take account of 
material not disclosed to the parties before it.  Whilst the Commission may be prepared to 
take decisions on the basis of information it alone has been given opportunities to review, 
such practices are generally rejected by courts on the basis that damages are to be awarded 
on the basis of evidence that all parties have had the opportunity to comment upon and 
contest.   
7. Effect on consensual settlements 
The Commission has introduced three key measures in the EU Damages Directive which 
are aimed at increasing the incentives for parties to reach consensual resolution of antitrust 
actions.  First, Member States are required to ensure that the limitation period for bringing 
an action for damages is suspended for the duration of the consensual settlement period.  
Interestingly, this suspension will only work in favor of those parties involved or 
represented in the settlement negotiations.  Presumably, it is envisaged that Member States 
will require parties to bring such settlement negotiations to the attention of the national 
court or otherwise reach agreement to suspend the limitation period, in order for an 
automatic suspension to apply.  Otherwise, it is easy to foresee circumstances where a 
dispute may arise as to whether a “consensual dispute resolution process” for the purposes 
of the obligatory suspension of the limitation periods has arisen and/or continues to exert a 
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suspensory effect.  Secondly, national competition authorities are given discretion to 
consider whether a settlement reached prior to a fining decision should be a mitigating 
factor in setting the level of a fine.  This is a potentially interesting development, which 
would require the various NCAs to develop reasonable predictable methodologies for 
recognizing and quantifying the mitigating impact of such settlements upon fines.  Against 
this new background, it will be interesting to see whether there could be a new incentive 
for a defendant to essentially accept liability and seek out would-be claimants in order to 
ensure some kind of settlement agreement before the fine is imposed.  Thirdly, a number 
of measures seek to reinforce the ability to achieve finality of settlement.  One of the 
greatest difficulties in reaching a settlement can be the uncertainty faced by defendants 
seeking to settle on a definitive basis their share of the damages.  In such circumstances 
defendants are often understandably concerned that the claimant may return for further 
damages having failed to recover other shares from other defendants.  The Commission 
has introduced some helpful measures in the new EU Directive which, effectively, permit 
the settling parties to agree that, in so far as the settling injured party is concerned, it will 
not come back to the settling defendant for any further sums in connection with its own 
losses.  This is an important limitation given the continuing application of the principle of 
joint and several liability for all cartel losses upon co-infringers. 
8. The Opt-in versus the opt-out model  
In the EU legal setting, the substantial cost of under-enforcement is estimated to be 
around €23 million every year. 592  In the context of private damages actions for 
infringements of competition law, an effective collective redress mechanism is crucial to 
ensure access to justice for the victims (especially consumers and SMEs) and overall 
deterrence for the system. 
 
At this stage, in light of the different approaches recently adopted by the Commission 
                                                     
592 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Report on Damages actions for breach of the 
EU antitrust rules, available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/swd_2013_0203_en.pdf. 
 In particular, see para. 8.  The document shows that only 25% of competition law cases had follow-on 
actions. The vast majority of those actions were brought before three Member States, namely U.K., 
Germany, and The Netherlands. England is an interesting (but costly) forum due to low or no language 
barriers, the availability of disclosure procedures for information in the possession of the other party, and 
benches equipped with judges experienced in competition law.  The Netherlands and Germany are known 
for their expeditious and relatively low-cost court systems with flexible rules for establishing the damage 
sustained. Finally, Germany might be a natural major forum because of its economic importance within 
the EU. 
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and the U.K. Government, it appears that an important question remains open, namely, 
which class action model is ideal. Furthermore, any form of collective action would still 
require the existence of some financial incentive for claimants to bring actions against 
anticompetitive conducts. Therefore, it is also worth addressing the underlying problem of 
how to finance collective actions.  In fact, determining the optimal procedure for obtaining 
collective redress has always been as controversial as it is essential to ensure private 
enforcement of competition law.  As mentioned above, most Member States and the 
Commission itself have embraced the presumption in favor of the opt-in systems and 
against opt-out ones. However, such presumption needs to be tested and weighted against 
the benefits and dangers of the opt-out model. 
In order to shape an ideal and optimal system, it is useful to briefly focus on the three 
common shortcomings that normally occur in private enforcement actions and, if not 
corrected, lead to under-enforcement and low deterrence of the competition law system. 
 
The first is known as the information asymmetry problem. Often parties might not 
even know that an infringement has occurred, and hence are not in the position to bring a 
claim against it. Secondly, a rational apathy problem might arise. Parties are rationally 
inclined to initiate proceedings only if their individual benefits are higher than individual 
costs. In case of small size claims, in particular, an individual action might be too costly to 
initiate, and thus potential defendants would give up. 
 
The last shortcoming is represented by the risk of free-riding. Individuals usually have an 
interest in leaving the enforcement (both stand-alone and follow-on actions) to others and 
then benefit from it.593  With this in mind, it becomes easier to understand that in an opt-in 
class action, the first obstacle would consist in identifying ex ante all final consumers – 
which could be costly and time-consuming.  In addition, consumers might be generally 
reluctant to opt in, in case there is a risk that legal costs will be higher than damages 
awarded – which normally happens when not enough consumers decide to join the claim, 
as proved by the only U.K. case.  Thus, in an opt-in action, if the group is not big enough, 
it might not be able to gather enough information nor have the economic strength to bring 
                                                     
593 For an in-depth analysis of class actions from a deterrence perspective, see Van den Bergh R. and 
Visscher L., “The preventive function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer Law”, in Erasmus 
Law Review, 2, 2008, p. 1-30.  
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or support a claim in court. 
 
Conversely, opt-out mechanisms seem to be a better solution to offset information 
asymmetry, rational apathy, and free-riding issues – especially in cases involving a wide 
range of consumers and low value damages. 
 
In fact, if the claim is brought by the entire class by default, costs would spread evenly 
amongst all members. Generally, harmed consumers would have from the beginning a 
prospect of lower litigation costs and, hence, would conclude they have more to gain than 
to lose.  Thus, the number of members who would actively decide to opt out would be 
low.594 
Alternatively, unclaimed damages could be allocated to a public fund and earmarked 
for competition law enforcement.  In opt-out actions, cy-prés schemes could also be used 
when the damages awards are too small for their distribution or when funds remain 
unclaimed. In this case, courts would have discretionary power to earmark funds for a 
designated purpose, which may or may not be strictly related to the harm suffered.595  In 
light of the advantages and feasibility of an opt-out system, there is a need to carefully 
examine the reasons for the widespread opposition to an opt-out class action procedure. 
As already mentioned, many of the concerns in relation to opt-out actions derive, both 
at the EU and national level, from the U.S. experience and the alleged conflict of the opt-
out model with the civil law principle of due process. 
i. A few points on the U.S. class action mechanism 
U.S. class action litigation culture is allegedly driven by the “U.S. trinity”596 of triple 
                                                     
594 There is empirical evidence that actual opt-out rates are extremely low in countries that have implemented 
this system. In the U.S., for instance, the average opt-out rate is not higher than 0.6 percent. See 
Einsenberg T. and Miller G.P., “The role of Opt-outs and Objectors to cass action Litigation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues”, (2004) in NYU Law and Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 
04-004, 4.  
595 The possibility for the CAT to make cy-prés awards was considered in the public consultations that 
preceded the U.K. Draft Bill but it was eventually excluded.  
596 Riley A. and Peysner J., “Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays the piper?”, in European Law 
Review October 31, 2006, p. 749, available at 
  https://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/85252/Damages-in-EC-antitrust-actions-Professor-
Alan-Riley.pdf.  
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damages, contingency fees and pre-trial discovery. In addition, it is often characterized as 
based on jury trials and on the ability of the lead plaintiff to leverage bargaining power for 
the whole class, while there are only limited financial risks associated with advancing 
unmeritorious class action claims. 
The main stigmas attributed to the U.S. system are embodied in the principal-agent 
problem and the risk of frivolous litigation. 
With regard to the first issue, it has been argued that in the U.S., there is a dangerous 
tension between clients and their lawyers. In fact, on one hand, the plaintiff’s interests are 
often too small to undertake monitoring activities on their lawyers and, on the other, the 
prospect of high contingency fees might be an attractive incentive for lawyers to settle 
early at the expenses of plaintiffs.597 
As to the risk of frivolous actions (i.e., actions brought even when the amount the 
defendant would have to pay is lower than the costs of defending himself in court), the 
U.S. experience would demonstrate that unmeritorious actions are often initiated with the 
sole purpose of threatening to cause reputational harm and obtaining payment of damages 
through settlement. 
However, most detractors of the U.S. system often offer mere hypotheticals and 
opinions rather than real evidence in support of their allegations.598  A recent study showed 
that, with respect to compensation, victims in the U.S. recovered over $33 billion – two-
thirds of which in opt-out class actions – and only 19 percent of recoveries went to 
litigations costs and legal fees.599  According to the study, only 11 percent of cases in the 
sample were settled without having at least one indicia of validation (i.e., prior imposition 
of a criminal penalty, previous granting of civil relief by the Government, or lost trial in a 
related case),600 and – despite the entitlement to treble damages – only in slightly over 20 
percent of cases did victims receive more than their actual damages. In any event, U.S. 
                                                     
597 See Van den Bergh R. and Visscher L., “The preventive function of Collective Actions for Damages in 
Consumer Law”, cit., p. 23.  
598 See editorial written by Lande R. H., “The Proposed Damages Legislation: Don’t Believe the Critics”, in 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, January 2014, available at 
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/01/30/jeclap.lpu003.full. 
599 Davis J.P., “Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws”, 2010, available at: http://works.bepress.com/joshua_davis/6. 
600  Ibid, p. 26.  
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defendants usually do not settle early because they can first make a motion to dismiss the 
case, then they can oppose class certification, and finally they can file a motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, it is unlikely that frivolous antitrust cases would actually 
pass all these stages. In addition, following the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005,601 it has become even more difficult to bring a class action in State courts - where 
abuses have traditionally occurred. 
Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has also worked to prevent 
excessive litigation and unmeritorious claims by raising the standard of pleading for the 
plaintiff and extending the applicability of rule of reason.602  Besides, U.S.-style litigation 
– in the negative meaning used to criticize it – would not be an inevitable outcome. Much 
of the past excess litigation in the U.S. can be attributed to a complex entwinement of 
constitutional and substantive law aspects that are not replicated in Europe. 
In fact, in the EU, many of the feared U.S. features are available, neither in the already 
existing opt-out regimes (see infra), nor in the one proposed in the U.K. 
Competition cases are not left for juries to decide but in many instances are judged by 
specialized judges. Such courts are not able to award treble or exemplary damages,603 and 
the litigation system is not based on the allegedly unrestricted and extensive use of 
contingency fees.   
ii. The due process of law principle in the EU  
                                                     
601 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 - Public Law 109–2 of February 18, 2005. 
602 See Case Bell Atlantic, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), paras. 556-558, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court heightened the pleading requirement for Federal civil cases, requiring that 
plaintiffs include enough facts in their complaint to make it plausible—not merely possible or 
conceivable—that they will be able to prove facts to support their claims. See also case Brunswick Corp. 
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mart, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), para. 489, where the Supreme Court limited the claimant’s 
right to bring an antitrust action to situation where they have been harmed by illegal conducts and the 
antitrust injury is “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
make defendants’ act unlawful”. Furthermore, see case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) 
which clarified that indirect purchasers do not have standing under federal antitrust laws. Finally, with 
regards to the extended applicability of the rule of reason, see case Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) where the Supreme Court reversed the 96-year-old doctrine that 
vertical price restraints were illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, replacing the older 
doctrine with the rule of reason. 
603  In the U.K., see case 1178/112, 2 Travel v. Cardiff Bus, cit., where the CAT unusually upheld an 
exemplary damages award of £60,000 on the basis of the “cynical disregard” of the plaintiff’s rights. 
Before the draft Bill, exemplary damages were thought to be seldomly available in the competition law 
context under Devenish Nutrition v. Sanofi Aventis SA (France) & Ors. [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 – which 
bars exemplary damages in cases where the NCA has already imposed a fine. 
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At the Member State level, the preference for the opt-in collective redress mechanism 
is usually justified based on the long-standing civil law principle of due process. 604   
According to such principle, no victim can be made a plaintiff without his or her 
knowledge. In this context, an opt -out mechanism has been often considered a violation of 
the principle. In a nutshell, opt-out systems would fail to respect class members’ autonomy 
and potentially breach the right to fair trial under ECHR.605  This argument centers on the 
idea that it is unacceptable to create binding legal relations by omission. The right to fair 
trial would imply a right of access to court, and equally a right not to go to court. This, 
however, seems to be a very formalistic and limited notion of autonomy that equates it to 
express individual consent. In a democratic society based on the rule of law, procedures 
that enable parties to effectively enforce their rights would seem to promote rather than 
inhibit autonomy. 606   Moreover, if on one hand the opt-out system allows people to 
commence an action on behalf of others without their consent, on the other hand, it also 
gives individuals an opportunity to remove themselves from the action. 
Thus, we should recognize the need to balance the rights of individuals to decide the 
manner in which they enforce their rights with the public interest in ensuring that disputes 
are resolved in a proportionate manner. 
Finally, there are already a few EU jurisdictions that have adopted some kind of opt-
out procedure. In fact, apart from the United States, which has been the first jurisdiction to 
adopt the opt-out system under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
few Member States in Europe also have in their legal system some kind of opt-out 
mechanism.  Portugal, for instance, enacted an acção popular607 almost 20 years ago, 
which enables any natural or legal entity to bring an action for breaches of consumer 
rights. Although there is no certification requirement, the court has the power to 
discontinue the action. To facilitate the role of consumers associations, the law prescribes 
                                                     
604 See Articles 2 and 103(1) Grundgesetz (Germany), Article 5 Code Civil (France), Art. 2697 Codice Civile 
(Italy).  
605 Article 6 ECHR. 
606 Another argument in favor of opt-out is that even where proceedings are brought individually, how an 
individual argues his/her claim has the potential to either advance or prejudice the claims of all others who 
are similarly situated. This is of course even more relevant in jurisdictions where judgments may create a 
binding legal precedent.  
607 The action can be brought under the Right of Proceeding, Participation and Popular Action Law, no. 83 of 
August 31, 1995.  
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they are exempted from adverse cost orders, should they lose. 
In Denmark since 2007, an opt-out mechanism has been available for claims not 
exceeding DKK 2,000 (€270).608  Only a public authority can be appointed as a group 
representative (i.e., Consumer Ombudsman). 
In Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Protection of Competition Act of 2008 allows opt-out class 
actions in competition litigation609 and the competent court has the power to certify actions 
and settlements. 
Last but not least, in The Netherlands, since 2005, courts can approve collective 
settlement of massive claims on an opt-out basis.610  Thus, parties negotiate an out-of-court 
settlement of mass claims represented by one or more associations and then petition courts 
for settlement approval. The competent court gives the opportunity for objectors to come 
forward and be heard before reviewing and approving the settlement. Once approved, a 
notice of settlement is published and the opt-out period stars. 
In conclusion, the opt-out system does already co-exist with the due process principle 
across some civil law EU jurisdictions. 
9. Funding of collective actions in the EU 
Overall litigation costs, including not only legal fees but also complex economic 
analysis costs and experts fees, may constitute a strong disincentive to bring competition 
law action, especially if the claim value is lower than the expected costs. With regards to 
the collective action model, financing poses a considerable obstacle to proceedings based 
on the opt-in system, whereas the opt -out system might have the advantage of bundling 
resources and using economies of scale thus allowing actions to be overall less expensive. 
Nevertheless, even the adoption of an opt-out regime might not in itself be sufficient to 
                                                     
608 See §254 of Act no. 181 of February 28, 2007. 
609 In accordance with Article 379(1) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure. The Bulgarian Protection of 
Competition Act of 2008 is available in English at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=238274.  
610 The Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade (WCAM) of July, 27 2005. The WCAM is laid down in 
Articles 907-910 of Book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code and Article 1013 of the Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). The WCAM procedure has been used to settle 
mass claims in seven instances: DES (June 1, 2006, NJ 2006/461), Dexia (January 25, 2007, JOR 
2007/71 m.nt. Leijten), Vie d’Or (April 29, 2009, JOR 2009/196 m.nt. Leijten), Shell (May 29, 2009, 
JOR 2009/197, m.nt. Leijten), Vedior (July 15, 2009, JOR 2009/325, m.nt. Pijls), Converium (January 17, 
2012, JOR 2012/51, m.nt. De Jong and November 12, 2010, JOR 2011/46, m.nt. J.S. Kortmann) and DSB 
(January 24, 2013, JOR 2013/12 m.nt. Leijten).  
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offset, or at least mitigate, the risks of high litigation that claimants would have to bear. 
Hence, other ways of addressing a potential lack of funding problem shall be examined. 
A number of methods are potentially available to alleviate the financial obstacle of 
bringing an action. First of all, interim measures might be useful in overcoming the most 
common financing issues. For instance, in a follow-on case – i.e., only the quantum but not 
the an is uncertain – courts could have the power to award interim damages which can be 
used to pay part of the litigation costs.611  Secondly, some type of modification of the loser 
pays principle612 that would allow the capping of legal costs could also be considered as a 
way to attenuate the litigation funding problem. National courts could be empowered to 
derogate from the normal cost rules in order to adjust litigation fees so that only a 
reasonable and proportionate amount could be recovered from the losing party. This seems 
to be the solution adopted in the U.K. for the fast-track procedure and in Germany where 
courts can adjust claimants’ litigation costs in competition law cases.613  EU legislators 
could also introduce a reduction or total exemption from court fees for claimants’ 
collective actions. Nevertheless, a reduction of court fees/or the moderation of the loser 
pays rule could reduce the costs and risks of the litigation, but would not necessarily make 
it financially attractive to bring lawsuits. 
In the U.K. and some other jurisdictions, damages-based agreements such as conditional fee agreements (“CFA”) 614  and after-the-event insurance (“ATE 
                                                     
611 In the U.K., for instance, both the High Court and the CAT have the power to award interim injunctions.  
612 The loser pays principle could, for instance, be limited in line with Directive 2004/48/EC on enforcement 
of intellectual property rights. This would allow courts to derogate from the principle in its application 
does not result in a fair outcome in the case at hand. See Article 14 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (OJ L 157, April 30, 2004, p. 45-86). In this sense, see Leskinen C., Collective Actions: Rethinking 
Funding and National Cost Rules, in The Competition Law Review, 2011, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p. 117-119.  
613 In the U.K., according to the draft Bill, all cases on the fast-track must be cost-capped – according to the 
discretion of the CAT – in order to encourage claimants to proceed with cases. With respect to Germany, 
see Article 89a of the Act Against Restraints in Competition (Gesetzgegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen). 
Cf. Wagner G., Litigation costs and their recovery: The German experience, 2009, 28 (3) C.J.Q. 367, p. 
374-375.  
614 A conditional fee agreement usually provides that lawyers would get their fees and expenses only in 
certain circumstances – the most common being a successful settlement of a victory in court. Lawyers 
entering into this type of agreements usually also levy a success fee, which is express as a percentage 
uplift on the hourly rate. The success fee must be paid in full by the client and cannot be part of the costs 
that the losing party will have to bear. See paper section of funding for further details. 
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insurance”)615 might also be available.  A CFA is an agreement under which the client 
pays to the lawyer different amounts for the legal services provided depending on the 
outcome of the case. CFAs operate to transfer all or part of the risk for a client's own legal 
costs from the client to the lawyer.  They can be structured in a variety of different ways. 
However, unlike damaged-based agreements, CFAs do not provide for lawyers to receive 
“contingent” fee giving the solicitor a share of any recoveries. 
While a CFA addresses a potential claimant's liability for its own legal costs, a claimant 
might also incur in potential liability for the other side's legal costs (i.e., adverse costs). 
ATE insurance is a type of legal expenses insurance that provides cover for all legal costs 
incurred in the pursuit or defense of litigation.  The policy is purchased after a legal 
dispute has arisen. 
However, in competition law cases where issues might be highly complex and 
outcomes unpredictable, lawyers and insurers have been reluctant to use these methods. 
ATE insurance, for instance, works best in cases where risk is spread across a wide range 
of homogenous cases (e.g., road accidents), whereas competition law claims are usually 
one-off cases and insurers are more risk adverse.616  More generally, in the context of 
ATE, substantial costs might be incurred in securing the insurance. In fact, most insurers 
require a separate assessment of the merits of the case. Insurers will not fund cases that are 
unlikely to succeed or where prospects are marginal. 
Another possible way of financing would be third-party funding, whereby a third party 
– a bank, a specialized firm or a hedge fund – would pay all or part of the costs of the 
action in exchange for a percentage of the damages awarded in case of success.617 
In recent years, third-party funding has been increasing and complex multi-party 
follow-on cases in Europe have been funded by private companies. Third-party funding 
has the essential advantage of offsetting the financial inequality between parties and can 
                                                     
615 ATE insurance is taken out after the event occurred, to insure the policyholder for disbursements, as well 
as any costs should they lose their case. 
616 For an overview of the cost and financing problem in the U.K., see Peysend J., “Cost and Financing in 
Private Thrid Party Competition Damages Actions”, in The Competition Law Review, 2006, Vol. 3, Issue 
1, p. 97-115. 
 
617 Third-party funders are spreading from Australia to Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, as noted by Hodges C., Vogenauer M. & Tulibacka M., “Costs and Funding of Civil 
Litigation: A Comparative Study”, in Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 55/2009, December 2009, p. 
30, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511714. 
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thus increase access to justice. The funding is often provided by specialized firms that are 
able to carry out a full financial analysis of all the legal and financial factors affecting their 
investments. 
The firms carefully scrutinize the cases and only underwrite those that have substantial 
merit and good chances to succeed. Each funder will set its own level but the benchmark is 
generally assumed to be at least a 60 percent prospect of success. Therefore, the system 
could be seen as potentially functioning as a first “quality control” mechanism for 
competent courts.  This positive effect of limiting vexatious litigation has, however, a 
drawback: the expected amount of damages must be considerable in order for a third party 
funder to be willing to fund the action, especially in jurisdictions only providing for opt-in 
collective mechanisms. 618   Funding will be normally available for claimants with a 
damages claim - or defendants with a substantial counterclaim - with the threshold value of 
at least €1 million since below this level funding would not be viable. 
The debate in relation to this type of funding has been centered on whether there can 
be a role for outside capital within law markets that does not jeopardize the proper 
administration of justice. Both the Directive and the Consumer Rights Bill envisage third-
party funding as an admissible form of financing.  The funding entity could not be part of 
the proceeding, its funding would be admitted only if disclosed before trial and if there is 
no conflict of interest between the funder and the claimants. 619  The competent court 
would be able to stay proceedings in case of conflict of interest, if the third party would 
not be able to provide sufficient funding to pay for both the claimant’s and/or the adverse 
costs. 
Ultimately, this financing method could be a good way to level the playing field 
between parties to dispute and provide for additional risk -mitigation options to businesses. 
To date, third-party funding for competition law cases is being granted by firms in the 
U.K., Germany, Ireland, and France. However, so far it seems to be often offered only to 
harmed competitors rather than to a broader category of victims that would include 
                                                     
618 In this sense, see Mulheron R. & Cashman P., “Third-party fundind: a changing landscape”, 2008, 27 (3) 
C.J.Q. 312, p. 317-318.  
619 Recommendation COM(2013) 401/02, p. 7, paras. 14-16. The Recommendation also requires for Member 
States to ensure that third party would not try to influence the proceeding or settlement, nor trying to 
purse its own interests, nor charge excessive interests on the fund provided. U.K. Consumer Rights Bill 
180 (2013-14). 
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consumers.620 
Last but not least, contingency fees have been proven to be a solution in the U.S. They 
are defined as fees based on a proportion of the sum recovered by the claimant (i.e., 
pactum de quota litis) and differ from conditional or success fee payable only upon a 
successful conclusion of the case that only include an uplift over normal legal rates. 
There are three fundamental advantages in any contingency fee system. First, it ensures 
access to justice for potential claimants without sufficient means – thus enhancing overall 
enforcement. Secondly, by obtaining a portion of the damages lawyers can afford to take 
on costly time-consuming and complex cases. Finally, contingency fees could benefit 
claimants because they would encourage lawyers to give clients unbiased (or at least less 
biased) assessments of the merits of their case. 
Those against contingency fees argue that they would put in jeopardy the independence 
of lawyers since the latter would get a personal interest in the case that may diverge from 
the clients’ interest. Lawyers may choose to settle for less than what it is in their client’s 
interest to avoid perceived risks or to favor other personal considerations. However, the 
hourly fee system does not seem to raise fewer concerns. In fact, it could reduce the 
incentive for lawyers to screen cases – which could imply bringing low -quality claims – 
and delay settlements in order to bill more hours.621  In view of the above considerations, a 
                                                     
620 See the Dublin-based firm Claim Funding International that is currently managing litigation on behalf of a 
large group of businesses to recover losses sustained as victims of the Global Air Freight Cartel 
(http://www.claimsfunding.eu). In the U.K., see competition-specific firm Competition Litigation 
Funding (http://www.competitionlitigationfunding.co.uk) and the London-based firm Juridica 
Investments Ltd (http://www.juridicainvestments.com) which however explicitly states in its website that 
it invests only in business claims, and does not invest in class actions. According to Juridica 2013 Annual 
Report, the antitrust and competition portfolio comprises “[f]ive cases in [that] involve violation of US or 
European antitrust law and three of these cases also involve multi-defendant, price fixing cartels. In one 
of our largest investments, one of the cartel cases involves defendants that have already been found guilty 
of criminal violations. The sixth case in this portfolio is a special situation involving statutory claims.” Litigation funding firms are also present in France, see, for instance, Alter Alia which, with regards to cartel damages claims, even set up a program inspired by the leniency programs. Under the Clemency Xtend program, cartel members that provide evidence of the competition law infringement are rewarded (http://www.alterlitigation.com/#cases-we-fund). 
621  Cf. Helland E. & Tabarrok A., Contingency Fees, Settlements Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: 
Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, in Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2003, 19 (2) 517, 
p. 540, available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/ContingencyFees.pdf. The U.S. study concluded that 
hourly fees encourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the time to settlement, whereas 
contingency fees increase legal-quality and decrease the time to settlement. It argues that this is not a new 
idea. Cf. Clermont K. M. & Currivan J. D., “Improving on the Contingency Fee”, 1978, Cornell Law 
Review 63(4), p. 571-572 argue that contingency fees raise quality because “The client is in a uniquely 
poor fee the primary screening function shifts to the lawyer, and the lawyer will probably do a more 
effective screening job”. See also Dana J. D. & Spier K. E., “Expertise and Contingency Fees: The Role 
of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation”, in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 
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“safeguarded contingency fee system” could provide part of the solution to funding of 
competition cases in the EU. Safeguards could be introduced to avoid the agent-principal 
tension that could lead to unmeritorious claims and unfair settlements, and the overall 
monitoring costs of implementing these safeguards would be easily offset by the gains in 
consumer welfare, deterrence, and overall competition. 
First of all, courts shall be able to certify the fairness of litigation fees and settlements 
– as it happens in the U.S. and is already envisaged by the U.K. draft Bill. In addition to 
this basic certification process, a number of other claimants could be considered. A system 
of public auction to select leading claimants/lawyers, for instance, could be set up and a 
preliminary test of the merits of the case could be introduced in the EU. Furthermore, other 
possible safeguards could consist in limiting contingency fees to no more than 10 percent 
of the value of the award622 or restricting them to direct purchaser actions – which could 
prevent abusive non-cash awards (e.g., coupons). Contingency fees could otherwise be 
limited to price fixing cases where a Commission or NCA negative decision has been 
judicially upheld.623   
In Europe, Member States regulate contingency fees in divergent ways. While 
contingency fees are allowed in a minority of Member States,624 many Member States still 
prohibit them even though some have developed alternative fee arrangements that provide 
for certain types of risk agreements which derogate from the general rules applicable to 
lawyers’ fees.625  Despite the availability of many options to limit the risks related to the 
use of contingency fees, a good opportunity was lost – both at the EU level and in the U.K. 
                                                                                                                                      
1993, 9(2), p. 349-367. The authors model this intuition formally and show that when lawyers can 
estimate case quality better than plaintiffs, contingency fees act as a check on frivolous litigation. A 
plaintiff who cannot convince a lawyer to take his case on contingency receives a strong signal that his 
case is of low legal-quality and will likely be deterred from filing position to evaluate his claim 
objectively and knowledgeably…[but] under a contingency. 
622 This amount is substantially less than up to 30 percent allowed in the U.S. 
623  Riley A. and Peysner J., “Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays the piper?”, in European Law 
Review October 31, 2006, p. 753, available at 
https://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/85252/Damages-in-EC-antitrust-actions-Professor-
Alan-Riley.pdf.  
624 See Van den Bergh R. and Visscher L., “The preventive function of Collective Actions for Damages in 
Consumer Law”, cit., p. 23.  
625  See editorial written by Lande R. H., “The Proposed Damages Legislation: Don’t Believe the Critics”, in 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, January 2014, available at 
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/01/30/jeclap.lpu003.full 
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– to regulate a safeguarded contingency fee system. An additional effort could have been 
made to allow this type of litigation financing at least in specific instances where access to 
justice is certainly impaired. Germany, for instance, is a good example of a system in 
which the use of contingency fees is allowed in cases where claimants could prove they 
would not otherwise be able to enforce their rights because of lack of sufficient funds.626 
In conclusion, while they are not favorably acknowledged neither by the Commission 
nor by Member States, contingency fees are definitely worth of consideration. In fact, in 
tandem with an opt-out system, litigation financing – and contingency fees, in particular – 
would have the potential to change significantly the EU competition liability landscape; 
without them there are serious doubt that any reform could work effectively. 
 
 
The evolution of private enforcement in the past forty years 
 
Source: The Competition Policy Brief of the European Commission 
 
 
 
                                                     
626 Davis J.P., “Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws”, 2010, available at: http://works.bepress.com/joshua_davis/6. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Whenever a legal system creates an obligation or a right, by necessity there must also 
arise an effective means for the injured party to enforce compliance with the behavior 
required.  In other words, any right should also have a remedy.  The right of individuals 
who have suffered loss from infringements of competition rules to bring private claims 
has long been a mainstay of antitrust enforcement in the United States.  . 
In Europe, on the other hand, competition rules have long been considered to be the 
province of administrative enforcement without paying due regard to the harms of 
antitrust victims.  More than fifty years after the Treaty of Rome, which set out the 
competition policy of the European Union, this conviction seems to be changing both at 
EU and national level of the Member States. 
The reasons for the increase of viability of private enforcement in the Europe are 
manifold. First of all, in the famous Courage ruling, the European Court of Justice clearly 
established the right of individuals to claim damages in national courts for loss caused 
by violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Secondly, Regulation no. 1/2003 contains 
a number of provisions which tend to support private actions in courts, above all the rule 
that national courts may now apply Article 101 TFEU in its entirety.  Thirdly, 
following the 2004,  2007, and 2013 EU-enlargements, the Commission has been 
committed to drawing additional resources into the competition enforcement mix, since 
the EU’s single market already counts over 502 million consumers. 
Finally, other countries around the world walk decisively and aggressively into 
adding private enforcement and tempt the plaintiffs to pursue the claims in their 
jurisdictions, while in many EU Member States no appropriate redress to antitrust 
victims is yet available. 
The growing interest and appetite for private enforcement also seems to have more 
fundamental reasons.  It is a sign of the maturity of the competition law system in the 
EU and a result of the general conviction that the preservation of the competition as a 
process is beneficial for the free market economy.  In particular, however, the interest for 
private enforcement seems to be rooted in the general recognition that competition law 
can benefit from more private litigation.  Both at the EU and national level private 
antitrust litigation is increasingly perceived as a useful complement to public 
enforcement..  It is acknowledged that private enforcement enlists those closest to 
antitrust infringements in the enforcement process, relieves enforcement pressure on 
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public authorities, frees their resources for complex cases, raises awareness of 
competition provisions, ensures compensation for victims of antitrust breaches, and 
finally deters violations of competition rules. Therefore, it contributes to the social 
welfare and the well-being of the economy. 
Notwithstanding the advantages of private enforcement, recent years have shown that 
the creation of a favorable legal environment for antitrust litigation in the EU is not an 
easy task.  With regard to the competition rules enshrined in the TFEU, the main 
problem is rooted in the complex relation between EU and national law.  The rule of 
substance, which establishes whether or not there has been an infringement of 
competition law is common to all EU Member States, since it is to be found in the TFEU.   
The conditions for liability, however, are the domain of 28 different national laws, as 
there is no European civil code or code of civil procedure, which would dictate 
coherent rules for the availability of damages or injunctions.  In addition to that, private 
litigation is to a large extent deterred by a number of obstacles, which vary between EU 
jurisdictions.  These barriers include inter alia: the uncertainty over who may sue, the 
non-availability or ineffectiveness of collective redress mechanisms, the need (in 
damages’ claims) to establish a causal link between the loss suffered and the antitrust 
infringement, as well as the need to prove fault.  In addition, it shall be considered that 
national courts generally have limited experience with antitrust arguments and may not 
be equipped with appropriate expertise to deal with antitrust cases.   
Last but not least, the difficulty of gathering the required evidence, the complex 
economic analysis which is needed to assess antitrust damages, and the high cost and 
risk of litigation hindered to date private enforcement actions within the EU. 
The Commission was the first to notice these obstacles and has made steady efforts to 
improve the situation of antitrust claimants in the EU.  In the past decade, the 
Commission’s initiatives, such as the 2005 Green Paper, the 2008 White Paper on 
damages actions for the breach of EU antitrust rules, the 2013 Package, and lastly the 
new Damages Directive had an overall positive effect.  They first drew attention of the 
EU Member States to the problem of the paucity of antitrust litigation in Europe, a n d  
stimulated debate in academic circles and national parliaments. These initiatives where 
crucial in order to identified the problems that needed to be tackled, if private 
enforcement is to become a fact of life in the European context.  Moreover, the very 
recent approval of the EU Commission Directive on Damages Actions entailed an even 
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stronger commitment of the Member States.  Although, the new Directive is likely to 
introduce effective changes to the private enforcement and further stimulate the debate it 
is important not overwhelming optimism and keep focusing on the yet outstanding issues 
in relation with private antitrust damages actions. 
In fact, in the light of these EU developments, it can be expected that at the national 
level reforms will continue and that we might even see a competition between 
jurisdictions across Europe with regard to facilitating private enforcement.  However, the 
deficiencies and the issues not addressed by the Commission cannot be overlooked.  In 
particular, lowering the costs of private litigation and additional solutions to claims 
funding will be certainly needed in order to achieve ideal enforcement levels – and 
consequently a fairer and more competitive market. 
At this stage, the only certainty lies in the fact that there are not enough damages 
actions and great differences between Member States’ enforcement systems. The 
Commission’s initiative, although welcomed, might not be decisive due, inter alia, to the 
preference given to the opt-in collective mechanism and its position against contingency 
fees. 
 
With regards to the collective redress mechanism, the general presumption in favor of the 
opt-in system has never been actually demonstrated, and in many instances the 
ineffectiveness of such collective redress mechanism has been proved.  Under the new 
Directive, future enforcement will lead to recovery of lower amounts (compared to an opt-
out scheme) and for the benefit of only a small percentage of victims.  Without opt-out 
actions, it is hard to see how consumers and SMEs would be able to bring more cases. 
 
Furthermore, the common criticisms about the similarities of the opt-out system with 
the U.S. class action shall be reconsidered.  The U.S. system is very different from the 
European one and, in any event, even in the U.S. the risk of excessive litigation has been 
reduced thanks to legislative reforms the case law of the Supreme Court.  Thus, an EU opt-
out model would not necessarily have to resemble the U.S. system and could be 
accompanied by safeguards that would foster private enforcement without leaving room to 
abuses. 
 
In contrast to the Commission, the UK is taking a maverick approach by adopting as 
opt-out mechanism for competition law claims.  Although, this choice might prove to be 
more effective, many concerns remain with respect to the funding collective actions. 
 
Neither the Commission nor the UK envisaged satisfactory mechanisms to fund 
litigation or viable solutions for cost sharing among members of the class. On the contrary, 
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both reforms disfavor contingency fee arrangements for competition law actions and 
exclude, at the same time, the possibility for courts to award punitive damages.  Especially 
in absence of punitive damages, any form of collective action would still require the 
existence of some type of financial incentive for potential claimants to bring a claim. 
 
For this reason, it would be auspicable to first of all derogate, upon courts discretion, to 
the loser pays principle in cases where it would be unfair and unreasonable for the 
claimant to pay the defendant’s litigation costs.  Moreover, third-party funding should be 
incentivized and at least some form of contingency fees – for instance capped contingency 
fees or contingency fees in cases where claimants would not have other financial means to 
bring an action – should be allowed. 
 
i 
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